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This thesis identifies a lack of public participation in both the historical and 
contemporary communication dimensions of New Zealand's media regulation. It 
illustrates how this situation is evident even in policies such as the Codes of Practice 
which dictate programme standards for broadcast television. The thesis then argues 
this situation can be resolved and shows how Citizens' Juries can act as dialogue 
bridges between media organisations and citizen representatives to enable community 
opinion to inform and benchmark policy decisions. 
The research programme first considers the twin narratives of social power and the 
restrictions of public participation in policy dialogue. This is addressed through data 
gathered from a series of literature reviews of the historical development of New 
Zealand's press and broadcasting services. An additional review clarified the impact 
of British and American socioeconomic principals in the regulatory policies of New 
Zealand media, especially television broadcasting. Interviews with television officials 
and researchers in Britain and America informed this investigative review which 
disclosed a triangulation of influences in New Zealand media models. 
The thesis is framed in the context of an ''action research" programme designed to 
specifically address the historic lack of public dialogue evident even in television 
policies that have a widespread community impact. The study confirms the 
documented ability of "action research" inquiry to provide large quantities of rich 
descriptive data and to generate new theoretical insights. A list of fifteen 
characteristics applicable to an action research study aimed at organisational change is 
used to validate this study's methodology. The action research inquiry method closely 
matches this type of exploratory problem-solving research, as it requires 
interdisciplinary theoretical scanning. This proved beneficial as it enabled specific 
interacting theories to be located to precisely explain the social issues and situations 
that can emerge in a programme designed to resolve a real-world issue in a complex 
social setting. The action inquiry method also acknowledges the value of practice-
based knowledge and other informal experiences that contribute to this research 
programme. 
(iii) 
As the preface relates, reflections about the action steps (part of the action research 
inquiry structure) were shown to increase understanding and theoretical insights, and 
propel the research process forward. These "active thinking" phases led to an 
investigation of the Citizens' Jury methodology, its international practice and the 
planning of the Waikato Citizens' Jury. In this event 12 Waikato residents debated the 
"good taste and decency" Code of Practice for Free-To-Air television with a number 
of television experts, including broadcasting executives, Broadcasting Standards 
Authority staff members, academic researchers and different aged television viewers. 
The thesis provides a rationale for the design and operation of the Waikato Citizens' 
Jury as well as its evaluation procedures. The EPPT (Equal Preparation Participation 
Time) formula was an outcome of the Waikato Citizens' Jury held from 2-4 July 1999. 
The formula components are designed to act as a policy guideline for the management 
of public dialogue events between policy-makers and citizen representatives. 
This study contends that the Citizens' Jury model is a more ethical, and valuable 
public opinion gathering method than the polling theoretical methods in present 
widespread use, as its practice engages both parties in a process of informed face to 
face dialogue. The Jury structure works to equalise the normally asymmetrical 
relationship between policy-makers and citizens. The thesis asserts that the Waikato 
Citizens' Jury demonstrates both a solution to the dialogue divide between television 
policymakers and citizens, and the problem of resolving public participation in New 
Zealand media regulatory practices. It also demonstrates action research displays the 
tenets of sound scientific research practice and the success of the EPPT dialogue 
formula in action. The thesis ends by concluding that New Zealand media 
organisations due to their persistent refusal to consult directly with citizens, especially 
about policies with a widespread community impact, exhibit a syndrome the author 
terms "institutional NIMBYism". 
(iv) 
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One vision will erect a tent, 
Another raise a tower. 
Pity that proud unseeing one 
Whose scan conceives no bower. 
Canvas is but easily rent, 
Stones are prone to crumble. 
Shelterless I braved the storm. 
Might the pious be as humble! 
(Roger White, 1981) 
Preface 
A Prehistory of the Project 
The core of this research programme is the organisation, enactment, and analysis of a 
substantial public participation exercise in the form of a Citizens' Jury 1 project 
designed to demonstrate the viability of wider consultation of New Zealand citizenry 
in relation to New Zealand media. This preface describes how that public project 
arose out of two hypotheses: firstly, that there is a historic and contemporary lack of 
dialogue between citizens and media policy-makers; and, secondly, that this situation 
could potentially be resolved with further investigation and the use of an approach 
based on the ideas and practices of Citizens' Juries in other countries. At this stage I 
also sketch: how these hypotheses arose; how I came to adopt the action research 
approach that shapes the thesis; and how a flavour of action research's self-reflexive 
component can be conveyed through an imaginary dialogue. 
The research story began in July 1998 with an examination of 1 iterature about the field 
of New Zealand media regulation. In the course of the examination, while searching 
how to make the original contribution to knowledge required for a doctorate, I 
identified a number of intriguing patterns and themes relating to the nature of the 
1 The common format for the term "Citizens· Jury'' is used in this thesis instead of its APA format. 
relationship between New Zealand broadcasting authorities and the public. Since 
previous studies had covered such areas as: historical factors (e.g., in publications by 
Day, 1994; Hawke, 1994; Boyd-Bell, 1985); audience research ( e. g., in publications 
by Lealand, 1998; Zwaga, 1992); regulatory debates (e.g., in publications by Spicer, 
Powell, & Emanuel, 1996; Smith, 1996; Bell, 1995; Farnsworth, 1992); and 
broadcasting standards and the role of the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
(Clemens, 1995), it was obvious there would be some difficulty finding an appropriate 
framework to make a distinct contribution to debates about media regulation in New 
Zealand. 
This difficulty was compounded by two further factors: Firstly, media regulation has 
been a hot topic of debate for media researchers to research and write about in most 
comparable countries in recent years (e.g., O'Regan & Cunningham, 2000; Donald, 
1998) and, secondly, and more importantly, because, as a former media practitioner 
committed to greater democracy, I wished to produce research that would make a 
contribution to more effective and inclusive community relationship practices. 
After considerable trial and error, I adopted an action research approach. In line with 
the requirements of a doctoral thesis, and my stated objectives, action research enabled 
an original contribution, a critical perspective, and the execution of a project with the 
potential to make real-world change. As a result the Citizens' Jury project, which 
demonstrates action research theory in action and the successful resolution of the two 
hypotheses, became the fulcrum of the thesis. 
2 
For this particular research programme, action research offered a number of additional 
advantages. These advantages can be briefly summarised as: 
• descriptive data to prescribe a research strategy; 
• practitioner experience and values; 
• interdisciplinary scanning to facilitate theoretical insights; 
• problem-solving response plans; 
• research with an intent to change a situation; 
• research projects devised for real-world social settings; and 
• the active involvement of citizen participants. 
Despite media theory being considered a "loose field" of different perspectives 
(Dahlgren, 1997, p. 50), no single media research approach appeared to offer a 
comparable mix of multiple research strategies so relevant to how I saw this research 
programme with its public project developing. For example, while a discourse pattern 
of elite social power emerging from the historical material held strong promise, 
discourse analysis did not fit with either the range or the practical application and 
experiential aspect of the Citizen's Jury. I chose not to use reception and other allied 
audience analysis methods for similar reasons (Jensen & Rosengren, 1990). In this 
instance, another reason was the decision to relegate public opinions gathered about 
television content to a peripheral rather than a central focus of the research. The 
openness of cultural studies to new developments and its "cluster of concepts" 
(Comer, Schlesinger, & Silverstone, 1997, p. 13) had considerable appeal but again 
offered fewer useable specifics given the intent and range of this thesis. Ethnography, 
as the site of media reception (Frey, Botan, Friedman, & Kreps, 1992), was also 
reviewed and rejected for similar reasons. 
3 
In adopting action research inquiry, and its resolution of a real-life problem situation, I 
hope to demonstrate that it is a method worthy of being institutionalised in the field 
alongside other media research traditions. Like traditional methods of media inquiry, 
the action research method has its own history and set of prescribing rules or 
characteristics. For example, a major characteristic of action research inquiry is the 
production of a complex genealogy of subject material. During the course of this 
thesis a considerable quantity and diversity of data developed to create numerous spin-
off studies within several different media inquiry traditions for future researchers. It, 
for example, will enable a comparative assessment of public opinion survey 
methodology and an audience analysis between New Zealand and British citizens can 
be undertaken with data results from this study providing an initial benchmark. Such 
data accumulation about diverse issues pointing to new research avenues is a common 
feature arising from action research projects. 
In the course of applying action research for this thesis, I have discovered that it holds 
particular benefits for media researchers and policy makers, especially those prompted 
to operate beyond the boundaries of audience and textual analysis. 
The structural flow of the thesis 
In addition to enabling the generation of specific data, the action research approach 
gives a distinctive shape to the structure of this thesis. The structural arrangement is 
designed to reflect both the flow of the research steps and a number of best practice 
action research principles. For example, this introductory Preface is included as the 
4 
thesis opens with two data-laden literature review chapters, instead of the usual 
explanatory introduction chapter. This arrangement displays the first research steps 
and the principle that an action research programme attend to prescribing data material 
before "questions of methodology and research technique" (Kemmins & Mc Taggart, 
2000, p. 599). This opening arrangement has also been selected because action 
research is characterised by large amounts of rich descriptive data, which both 
prescribes a research plan and its theory explorations and development (Winter, 1998). 
However, action research is not alone in opening a research study in this way. The 
analytic induction method similarly begins with the explanatory material generating a 
hypothesis (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997, p. 88). Accordingly, chapters one and two 
contain considerable descriptive information about the action research field of New 
Zealand press and broadcasting because this material prescribed and suggested the 
direction of the hypotheses and initiated the real-world problem-solving project 
strategy. 
As the study drew to a close I was able to draw my own conclusions about the inquiry 
method for, despite an increasingly strong track record across a number of other 
disciplines, action research is still often criticised for its variation from scientific 
approaches. The progress and results of this thesis confirm that the action research 
inquiry method, and its various components, closely conforms to the tenets of sound 
research practice. I argue that any variations are not matters of substance, but instead 
provide research programmes using the method a distinctive appearance, just like 
other inquiry traditions. This confirmation is important since, in some fields, action 
5 
research remains a contested method, despite it being institutionalised in various 
academic disciplines for many years. 
Finally, the last section of this opening preface relates to another major characteristic 
of the action research inquiry method, that of research reflections. Reflections arising 
from action research and their documentation typically form part of action research 
projects (Eden & Huxham, 1996). However, though action research is generally 
regarded as being a more self-reflexive mode of inquiry I am less comfortable with 
this aspect in the conventionally formal parameters of an academic thesis. I have 
chosen therefore to present and position this side of action research outside the main 
body of the thesis. 
Accordingly, the last part of this preface is laid out as an impressionistic dialogue 
containing research reflections about the origins and development of this research 
programme. The dialogue is designed to show how reflections about the research 
process actively progressed the thesis. It is laid out like a question and answer 
transcript to portray structurally another action research characteristic, "the integral 
involvement by the researcher in an intent to change" (Eden & Huxham, 1996, p.53 7) 
an organisational practice. This also aligns with Winter"s ( 1998) claim that action 
research is a process of improvisation and a journey of theoretical self-discovery with 
the inquiry process just as important as the topic. This reflective section sets out the 
early stages of this research programme's journey and supports Winter's claim that 
action research is "inherently both reflexive and multidisciplinary" (I 998, p. 37 I). For 
6 
the same reasons, a similar closing dialogue of research reflections concludes the final 
section in the postscript. 
Negotiating the Research Journey 
Question: What is the position of "dialogue" in your thesis? 
Finding and creating dialogue was the essence of this study. Dialogue weaves together 
and organises themes throughout this research journey. In each phase, including the 
investigation, identification, collection and explanation of the various materials, 
dialogue guided and informed the research process. In fact, the whole research 
programme symbolically reflects Mikhail Bakhtin's ( 1981) view that dialogue 
consists of a speaker, a listener or repondent, and the relation between these two. This 
research programme, also symbolically reflects some of his theories about language 
operation. 
For example, Bakhtin explains that there are always two forces at work in all 
language or dialogue and calls them the centripetal force and centrifugal force (1981, 
pp.667-668). Centripetal pushes things towards a central point while centrifugal 
pushes things outward in all directions and away from a central focus. Symbolically 
this relates to my research intent to open up the dialogue arena of media policy-
making to multiple community voices from its present centralised and closed system. 
Question: Okay. enough symbolism. Let's get back to your research process 
7 
Well, it is the relationship between Bakhtin's first two elements (the speaker and the 
listener), or in my case media decision-makers and the community, that I resolved to 
try and improve. Dialogue, or rather, a lack of dialogue was the rationale behind 
organising the Waikato Citizens' Jury. That Jury was designed to demonstrate a 
method of improving the social environment between media organisations and citizens 
through a more equal dialogic exchange. 
Question: How do you define "dialogue" and why use this term? 
To keep it simple various dictionaries define ''dialogue'' as a conversation between 
two or more people. It comes from the Greek word dialogos meaning "a 
conversation". However, dialogue can take many different forms such as being any 
written representation of a conversation, as in a historical narrative or a drama. For 
example, the poem at the beginning of this study is titled Dialogue and what meaning 
it holds will vary according to each reader, as it can be a dialogue between the poet 
and his mind, the poet and reader, or poem and reader. This interpretative variation is 
in all dialogues and can lead to problems about meaning but in oral face to face 
dialogue this is less of a problem as meaning can be debated and confirmed. The term 
dialogue also links descriptively across decades of knowledge back to the philosophic 
dialogues of Plato. 
Indeed, it was the free-flowing face to face dialogue between citizens2 at assemblies 
and citizens' juries in ancient Greece that inspired the design of modem Citizens' 
: While it is understood that a "citizen'' in Ancient Greece was only a freeborn adult male the use of the 
word in this thesis is inclusive of either male or female persons and those from any strata of society. 
8 
Juries, and it is the lack of this type of interpersonal dialogue between New Zealand 
media policy-makers and citizens that provided the inspiration for this study. 
Question: So how did you travel from media regulation to ancient Greece? 
The open nature of the research inquiry process allowed such free ranging actions to 
take place. Exploratory literature reviews of the history of New Zealand's mass media 
regulation (press, radio and television) were the first step in the process. The second 
step was a reflective thinking phase to assess the material. Two dialogue patterns or 
narratives emerged: the lack of citizen participation or even representation in media 
policy-making and the restrictive actions of government officials, media organisations 
and media executives towards various issues of public interest. This initial 
exploratory process and the reflective phase led to the hypothesis (Gk. Hupothesis, a 
proposal) that there was a historic and contemporary lack of dialogue between citizens 
and media policy-makers. A second hypothesis also appeared - based on my 
practitioner knowledge - that this situation could potentially be resolved with further 
investigation and different approaches. 
Such questions explore the ironic contradiction that media have adopted a democratic 
mediation role on behalf of the public, to encourage greater public participation, yet 
they themselves keep their own doors firmly closed to public participation. This area 
appeared to be a site for an interesting research programme as I had skills and 
experience that connected with this idea. I later read that the relationship between 
9 
media and citizenship is under-researched, though my approach differs somewhat to 
those advocating ways of rectifying the gaps (i. e., Donald, 1998; Price, 1995). 
Question: So, the study involved both exploratory and problem-solving research? 
Yes. Though the study also involved a third trial function since the organisation and 
operation of the Waikato Citizens' Jury tested the prediction that it was a suitable 
method to solve the documented lack of dialogue between citizens and media policy-
makers. Of course during the analysis process, a number of other theories were also 
tested, including my choice of the action research approach. 
Question: Why did you see it as important to resolve this organisational dialogue 
problem as well as explore and explain the lack of public participation hypothesis? 
There were a number of reasons. Firstly, it was a challenge that appeared waiting to 
be achieved. More importantly, it seemed strange in a communication-rich era, and 
one branded a knowledge economy, that accessing and valuing community knowledge 
should still be so consistently avoided in policymaking especially when the value of 
public consultation has been heavily promoted, even in New Zealand legislation. 
Question: But aren't a number of public participation or consultation processes now a 
policy requirement and carried out regular(v by, for instance local government? 
Yes. Such processes are carried out. But I would argue public meetings, pamphlet 
drops, questionnaires, virtual opinion polls and even referendums are superficial 
asymmetrical activities. These methods just do not compare to a face to face informed 
10 
dialogue to accurately gauge community opinion for topics with a widespread 
community impact. To inform and benchmark such policy decisions I also 
believe the people who will be the recipients of those decisions should be fully 
consulted. Another reason suggesting that face to face dialogue was the best 
method came from my consultancy, or practice-based knowledge and experience. As 
a public relations and communication management practitioner I have organised and 
participated in numerous public consultation events that were dialogic, as well as the 
usual norms of public participation practice. The contrasts were obvious. 
Question: How did you start the investigation to find a suitable dialogue method for 
public participation in media policy discussions? 
It happened during a second exploratory research phase. The historical reviews of 
New Zealand's press, radio and television had revealed a consistent theme of British 
public service principles and regulatory models. In addition elements of America's 
more market-based media system, and its relation to popular audiences, also appeared 
more noticeable from the late 1980s as deregulation began to take effect. 
Question: So, another literature review was carried out to assess these international 
connections? 
Yes, and their importance for, and impact on, New Zealand's media environment and 
regulation led me to a research fieldwork trip to Britain and America to discuss 
regulatory policies with researchers and broadcasting officials in those countries. 
also judged, based on the historical evidence, that if a dialogue method had already 
11 
been used successfully (to gather community opinion to inform policies) in these 
countries, it would be more likely to gain attention and be adopted in New Zealand. 
This built on the existing formula I had discovered for the entry of new ideas into the 
New Zealand regulatory system. 
Question: Did you find the Citizens· Jury method to create public dialogue overseas? 
Yes, in London, almost by accident. I carried out a number of interviews with senior 
executives and research officers at various agencies during two overseas trips in 
October/November 1998 and November 1999. The first trip was significant for 
providing information about the dialogue method that I required. A senior researcher, 
Jane Aldridge, at the Independent Television Commission in London handed me a 
copy of a just completed draft report she thought I might find interesting as I walked 
out her office door at the close of our discussion. This ITC report contained details of 
the first Citizens' Juries to be carried out by a regulatory body, and the topic was 
television programme standards. 
Question: Is this what led you to focus on television rather than other media? 
Well, by this stage I had already decided that the media area to demonstrate a public 
dialogue method should be broadcast television so the "fit" was a wonderful 
coincidence. My explorations of the history of New Zealand television, and in 
particular publicly owned television, had revealed frequent bouts of public frustration 
and demoralisation about television organisation and regulation. There are many well-
documented instances of government executives and television officials making 
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arbitrary and coercive decisions which provoked outrage even from people in the 
television industry. My practice-based knowledge, and previous experience from 
working in that industry, provided confirmation of the normality of these instances. 
Contemporary public debates continue to display a similar cycle of frustration with 
Television New Zealand still being treated like a political football each time a new 
government is elected. The amount of public debate about television standards and 
research evidence, that "good taste and decency" was a problematic community 
standard to set, made it an obvious topic for a trial Citizens' Jury between citizens and 
policy-makers. I also immediately thought there was an opportunity to carry out an 
international comparison of citizen attitudes at some later stage, so kept this possibility 
in mind when planning the evaluation phase of the Waikato Citizens' Jury project. 
The fact the Codes of Broadcasting Practice for Free-To-Air television, the industry 
standards for broadcast television content, were due for review in the Year 2000 also 
contributed to this decision. 
Question: Was there any difficulty in reconciling the action-based knowledge of the 
Citizens· Jury with your practice-based knowledge and academic knowledge? 
I found theoretical gaps and mismatches when I started to construct a theoretical 
framework integrating the real-world resource material, from, for example, the 
Waikato Citizens· Jury, with the stronger linear meaning structures that had emerged 
from the literature resource material. My own practice-based knowledge about the 
thesis problem and its possible solution helped drive and inform all phases of the 
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research process, but there appeared to be no appropriate position for it in the nonns 
for media research inquiry. For some time, it turned into a difficult multidisciplinary 
negotiation to match abstract philosophic principles with complex real-world 
phenomena. The result was not a tidy linear fit but a fragmented web of concepts. It 
didn't help when I read that social science ''cannot sustain claims to prescribe action" 
as "academic conceptions of theory tend to be prescriptive" (Winter, 1998, p. 361 ). 
What I required was an inquiry context that allowed the descriptive data to be 
prescriptive. 
While contestable, Winter ( 1998) suggests that this type of situation can appear 
because a "university still draws its cultural authority from its institutional separation 
from the immediate motives of practical life" (p. 365). Understanding that there was 
indeed a recognised conflict and contradiction in my completed research when it came 
to explaining it (for a purely academic purpose) helped direct the process. By taking 
an action research approach the thesis has been able to bridge the "institutional 
separation" I found between academic theory and my real world research project and 
use of practitioner skills. 
Question: Finally, why use the words "citizen" and "community"? 
I prefer the word citizen when referring to individual members of a country, or 
members of the so-called general public, as it conveys a real image not found in the 
tenns "audience" or "public'' usually used in media studies. I was interested to later 
find there were others stating this preference ( e. g., Karim, 1999). Also, dictionary 
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definitions for citizen include "a person belonging to, or living in a city or country, 
usually with certain rights and privileges" which infer values not found in the other 
words (Orsman, 1979; Irvine; 1962). From the latter source, the word "citizeness" is 
given as the correct term for a female citizen. However, for simplicity, I use "citizen" 
as a gender-neutral term to refer to either male or female. 
I also prefer to use the word "community" to describe either a small, or large group of 
citizens. Again, terms such as '·public'' and '·audience" do not present ready meanings 
of visibility, values and active association. The term ··community" in the thesis is 
mostly used to refer to the New Zealand population and is intended to be inclusive of 
diversity and acknowledge links to many different groups. Raymond Plant ( 1974) 
explains many dimensions of meaning for the term "community" but a shared essence 
from them all could be: a particular type of social life and experience. My use of the 
words "citizen" and ''community" are intended to convey a sense of interaction and 
partnership between people. 
Question: Okay, last question. I have to ask. Why use "divide" instead of the more 
popular term "gap" in your title? 
Well, while New Zealand politicians have recently popularised the term "closing the 
gaps" in reference to a number of community orientated policies I found the distance 
between New Zealand citizens and media decision-makers is not just a small ''gap", 
but a huge "divide" and was perceived as such on both sides. Individuals in the 
community consistently indicated they were resigned to the situation and those in 
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authority tended not to bother as they have after all been elected, appointed, or 
employed to decide policies on behalf of the community. It was like a Western with 
two opposing parties seeking a potentially better future while negotiating across a 
conceptual and resource divide of canyon-like proportions. 
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Gatekeepers, Gatecrashers and Collaborators 
The thesis identifies a lack of public participation in the development of New 
Zealand's press and broadcasting policies through literature reviews of the history of 
press, radio and television. This chapter constructs this material as three instrumental 
case studies to argue that the turbulent past of these New Zealand media displays an 
overarching pattern of control by dominant political and organisational authority. It 
further contends that this control works to exclude citizen and community interests. 
The chapter begins by examining key events in the development of the press industry 
and goes on to revisit similar events within the development of broadcasting, both 
radio and television. It aims to illustrate how the combined social power of 
government, and media organisations, produced the regulatory policies of these three 
domestically accessed media without public dialogue. 
In focusing on social power, the thesis is sited in a topic that is vast and 
interdisciplinary in scope, as social power is subject to numerous theoretical variations 
depending upon where its influence and patterns are observed. As a subject social 
power is also subject to many definitions, generalisations and interpretations. In order 
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to establish a clear pattern of social power the subject in this chapter is approached 
through historic examples where appropriate concepts are tied closely to the specific 
circumstances under examination. The chapter views the range of influence from 
being a hidden bureaucratic organisational factor to being publicly transparent through 
the coercive actions of domineering government executives and media officials. 
Through these descriptive examples, it explains how "elite", "bureaucratic", "top-
down" social power, both hidden and explicit, has significantly dictated the shape of 
New Zealand's media development, and its relationship to citizens and community. 
The examples also illustrate the socially dominant alignment of media organisations 
with government, and their combined exclusion of citizen and community interests. 
The regulatory agencies of the three media (press, radio and television), their 
operation and community interactions, especially in relation to content regulation, are 
discussed separately in chapter two. 
1.1: (Case 1) Press Industry Gatekeepers and Political Collaborators 
The asymmetric power relationship between media and politicians on one hand and 
the New Zealand people on the other has a long history. Issues of power and control 
emerged during the earliest days of the press in New Zealand. The first newspaper to 
be published was the second issue of the New Zealand Gazette and Britannia 
Spectator on April 18, 1840, at Port Nicholson by the New Zealand Company 
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(Bradley, 1973). Wealthy businessmen who were already a dominant minority in the 
country's population published this first newspaper, like the others that followed. 
Bradley explains there were many power struggles during these early years: 
The early history of the press in New Zealand was characterized by an 
intense degree of political in-fighting and by libel and law suits, as 
different sections of the new settlers' communities scrambled for their 
share of land, resources, and political power ( 1973, p. 5). 
In 191h century New Zealand newspaper owners '·were committed political advocates 
and many newspaper controllers became important office-holders" (Day, 1990, p.4). 
The power of the press to mass circulate information in a community was recognized 
early, and its influence used by many of New Zealand's most prominent politicians. 
For example, Prime Ministers John Ballance and Sir Julius Vogel established daily 
papers (The Wanganui Herald and Otago Daily Times respectively). Later, in 1907 a 
group of conservative farmers and professional men founded Wellington's The 
Dominion, with the sole purpose of opposing the Liberal Party Government of Sir 
Joseph Ward (Du Fresne, 1994, p.11 ). Consequently, while early newspapers may 
appear to have displayed a wide variety of unrestricted news the press standard was 
not politically neutral. In combining news publication with their political ambitions 
these press owners provide early confirmation of the assessment that "elitists normally 
focus on the polity" rather than the economy as a source of power (Olsen & Marger, 
1993, p. 75). 
The increasing social power of press owners soon attracted political control. The first 
recorded incidence of direct government interference with a New Zealand newspaper 
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took place in Russell in December 1840. The New Zealand Advertiser and the Bay of 
Islands Gazette was ordered to cease publication after expressing concerns about 
government land policies. The New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator issue 
of January 30, 1841 called this action an "insult to the good sense and loyal 
disposition of the Queen's subjects in New Zealand" ( cited in Day, 1990, p. 14 ). 
Readers already receiving information structured by the political interests of press 
owners now had their news controlled and restricted by government interests. The 
government intervention is indicative of a symbiotic relationship between media and 
government and Olsen and Marger ( 1993) go so far as to claim that neither can 
function without the other. On this occasion the emerging press industry had been 
firmly reminded that it must take into account government interests. It is significant 
that nowhere in the conflict between these two dominant social groups is there any 
real representation of a public position though outrage is expressed at the government 
curbing a press owner's right to distribute information (Day, 1990). 
This incident of collaborative conduct between press owners and the government, and 
their combined inattention to community interests, indicates what has become a 
recurring theme of New Zealand's media evolution. The theme's importance is 
highlighted by Biocca's (1991) argument that the ability to control a means of 
communication in a mass-mediated society is a power exercise that can define a 
society's structure. Foucault (1972) similarly establishes a definite relationship 
between discourse and power, claiming it is embedded in all organisations, and 
20 
systems. However, though he establishes that power has a widespread structural 
connection Foucault does not, unlike Olsen and Marger ( 1993), ascribe specific forms 
to power, therefore their perspective is preferred as providing greater explanatory 
depth to this project. Elsewhere in his writings, along with Biocca (1991 ), Foucault 
does view citizens as regulated by dominant power discourses. Both identify patterns 
that, like the early struggles over the press in New Zealand, work to privilege a few 
and exclude others (Foucault, 1984, p.112). Historically this pattern of exclusion 
increased in influence as press owners and government allied in various forms to 
control the distribution and access of news information within the community. 
Newpaper ownership, consolidation, monopoly, and government links 
One such form, although it was promoted as a benefit for readers, was the 1879 setting 
up of the United Press Association (UPA), which established greater industry control 
of press content. This national agency for news items made the same national news 
available for circulation for the first time to readers throughout the country, but it 
meant only one perspective was available. Day explains the arrangement in the 
following terms: 
Within this association each newspaper's individual reporting 
responsibilities were restricted to local events and their communication 
to the association. The rest of a newspaper's material was press releases 
from the United Press Association ( 1990, p. 237). 
There were other restrictions. All newspapers desiring news items from the United 
Press Association services had to join the association and members were not allowed 
to compete or gain telegraphic news from any other agency, local or international. 
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Day ( 1990) reports the government viewed the power of this new press agency with 
some concern but still passed the legislation protecting its business monopoly. The 
Protection of Telegrams Act stated that overseas telegrams were copyrighted for 18 
hours from first publication. This strict legislative mechanism stopped anyone not 
belonging to the United Press Association from publishing overseas news material 
printed in the newspapers of association members (Day, 1990, p. 232). 
The formation of the United Press Association had a long-term effect. It ensured 
those newspapers that had been dominant in the late 1800s maintained their 
dominance until a separate news service was established I 00 years later for television 
in the 1960s. The press owners' early alignment with political authority had proved 
beneficial, and, in terms of power, their actions are consistent with the self-interested 
behaviour of interdependent 'elite' relationships where: 
Elites commonly employ all available means to protect and preserve their 
power and enhance it whenever possible. They share power with others only 
when it is in their self-interest, and they never voluntarily surrender power 
(Olsen & Marger, 1993, p. 80). 
There are a number of other signposts within this dual authority alignment which show 
how the elite social status of the two organisations worked to exclude community 
interests. If Olsen and Marger's ( I 993) characteristics of elite status are applied to 
the New Zealand media, they confirm how both press and government possess social 
power. Significant characteristics include: press owners possessing wealth and 
working to become part of the polity; they and the government being a minority of the 
population, and both being highly organised, controlling a critical resource (e.g., mass 
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media), operating hierarchical structures; and both organisations working to dismiss 
opposing factions (Olsen & Marger, 1993, pp. 79-80). 
To adapt terminology coined to address United States media concerns, the government 
and press owners played collaborative "gatekeeper'' roles that worked to exclude 
community participation in media decision-making. Gatekeeping is a metaphor 
commonly associated with people involved in the editorial process of news production 
in media organisations (White, 1950). Various explorations of the social contexts in 
which news selection and presentation are produced have since broadened the original 
"gatekeeper model'' (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Boyd-Barrett, 1980; Bell, 1991) but for 
the purposes of this thesis, a "gatekeeper'' is taken as a metaphorical reference for 
those that sit highest in the media chain, that is to say those authorities - organisational 
and political - that control the decision-making about the structure and policies of 
press and broadcasting, and consequently community access and interaction. When 
used to maintain industry authority and independence, media regulation can similarly 
support a community gatekeeping role. 
The elite management of press regulation and public pressure 
In 1898 a newspaper proprietors's association was formed (renamed the Newspaper 
Publishers· Association ofNew Zealand Inc. in 1971), and in 1912 a professional 
journalists's association (Perry, 1982, p. 5). In 1973 the journalists's association was 
wound up and replaced by the New Zealand Journalists' Union. Unlike these 
professional industry associations, the formation of the Press Council can be assessed 
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as being a result of public dissatisfaction but, on closer examination, even this incident 
proves to be an industry managed event designed to strengthen the press industry's 
interests over community interests and maintain its independence from political and 
community interference. 
In practice the press industry had managed to operate for over 100 years without any 
regulatory body, in spite of repeated requests from some large publicly representative 
organisations (i.e., the National Council of Women, the Post Primary Teachers' 
Association, and the United Nations' Association) that there should a press council to 
enforce a set of industry standards. In 1966, for example, after feeling misrepresented 
in a newspaper, Perry ( 1982) reports that Miss Alexia Page, the principal of Wanganui 
Girls College, wrote a letter that summed up the rising community attitude about the 
need for improved press standards which came to Parliament's attention: 
Surely the logical alternative to a controlled press is a press that controls 
itself. New Zealand needs a press council - a body that will take full 
professional responsibility, including disciplinary action where 
necessary - and no paper should be allowed to publish that is not affiliated 
to that council (cited in Perry, 1982, p. 5). 
Government interest in the idea spurred the press proprietors's association to contact 
The Newspaper Society in London for information about the United Kingdom Press 
Council. Nevertheless, as Ian Templeton of the New Zealand Journalists' Association 
states, "the Press was quite united in its opposition and resistance to statutory control" 
( cited in Perry, 1982, p. 7). 
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Despite their opposition Sir Thaddeus McCarthy, a member of the Court of Appeal, 
investigated the management of the United Kingdom's Press Council and many of his 
observations of the British model came to be included in the articles of the New 
Zealand Press Council, which was finally established in 1972. The formation of the 
Council forestalled any attempt by central government to impose regulatory controls 
on the press industry and it therefore excluded the public demand for meaningful 
change in press content standards. McCarthy had accurately assessed that the greatest 
danger for press liberty would come from, "public hostility resulting from the excesses 
of the press itself, and the temptation then arising for a government to take some 
controlling powers" ( cited in du Fresne, 1994, p. 26). 
The elite status and social power of press owners had thus enabled them to resist 
public calls for change, preempt any government action and retain full industry 
control. Day argues this industry position in his historical analysis that, "press 
development in New Zealand is an outcome of the implementation of these two 
interests (the organizational and political) and the modifications each forced on the 
other" (1990, p.4). The alliance of these two nationally dominant organisations 
combining against strong public pressure meant that the potential for any change 
favouring community attitudes about media standards was substantially reduced. 
Outside of the press, examples of government dominance in early broadcasting 
illustrate how the possibility for such change in radio was reduced in a similar manner 
- for similar reasons. 
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1.2: (Case 2) Government Domination and Gatekeeping of Radio 
Indeed the impact of the government's dominant social power and its dismissal of 
community interest - in relation to media standards and content - form recurring 
themes in the early decades of radio broadcasting. The history of New Zealand 
broadcasting, more than the press, is littered with examples of executive authority 
directly interfering, restricting and eliminating any alternatives to establishment 
procedures and opinions. As a result radio's history also contains many conflict 
situations, some involving progressive community-minded broadcasters. These 
"gatecrasher'' personalities were often subject to severe bureaucratic restraint and, on 
occasion, dismissal. The Reverend Colin Scrimgeour was one of the most prominent 
gatecrashers in the history of these media to maintain control, and to preserve the 
distant position of government in relation to citizens and their interests. 
The government first became involved in broadcasting with the passing of the 1903 
Wireless Telegraphy Act, which was said to be, "a purely protective measure to keep 
out commercial interests" (Hall, 1981, p. 2). The Attorney-General of that time, the 
Honourable Albert Pitt, is quoted as claiming, "the government intend to acquire a 
monopoly of this system, just in the same way as has been done in regard to telegraph 
lines and telephones" ( cited in Hall, 1981, p. 2). 
As Hall (1981) goes on to report there was considerable public debate about the 
intentions of this first piece of broadcast legislation, as it stifled enterprise, research 
and ownership. The first radio regulations came under the authority of the Post and 
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Telegraph Department whose officials argued that the Act's provisions were, "to 
protect the free flow and secrecy of official messages'' although wireless 
experimenters were "resentful of its restrictions" (Hall, 1981, p. 3). These strict 
regulations contradicted a broadcasting policy report prepared by the Chief Telegraph 
Engineer, E. A. Shrimpton. He had stated New Zealand should adopt, "a happy 
medium between what was practically a free for all in the United States and the very 
reluctant, restrictive and almost impossible conditions imposed in England'' (Day, 
1994, p. 50). 
In 1932 radio broadcasting officially became a state operated national service 
managed by a Broadcasting Board of three people who were also given the authority 
to impose restrictions on the private stations (Holloway, 1979). When the government 
abolished that Board, in 1936, radio broadcasting became a department of government 
and the imposition of department bureaucratic procedures directly led to greater 
executive interference in radio operations. The 1936 government action is considered 
by some to chart the nationalisation of New Zealand broadcasting. 
Bureaucractic executive control and interference in radio services 
This has meant media critics and historians tend to align with one of two opposing 
poles in relation to the distinctiveness of New Zealand's experience. Hall ( 1981 ), for 
example, claims the New Zealand government pioneered state ownership and control 
of broadcasting while Watson and Shuker ( 1998) state that governments in many 
countries passed legislation making broadcasting a state monopoly. In this chapter I 
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want to argue instead that the distinctive factor in the development of New Zealand 
broadcasting may more accurately be found in the high level of government 
interference in programme content, in contrast to other democratic nations such as 
Britain and the United States. 
The rigid control and restrictive actions towards broadcasters exhibited by successive 
New Zealand governments can be partially explained as the normal actions of such 
institutionalised bureaucratic organisations along the lines set out by Max Weber. 
Weber studied dominant authority organisations and based his concept and analysis of 
"bureaucracy" on real-world observations of their actions ( cited in Eldridge, 1970). 
Seidman usefully summarises the concept as follows: 
Bureaucratisation implies a unique administrative and social order; social 
institutions are organised according to a spirit of impersonality and 
professionalism. Bureaucratic institutions are divided into offices, each 
defined by a specific function and social role; offices are arranged in a 
hierarchical way so that there is a kind of top-down command system; 
individuals are assigned specific duties and authority ( 1994, p. 79). 
This summary accurately describes how the New Zealand government set up and 
managed New Zealand broadcasting. In 1932, for example, the government 
restructured the Broadcasting Company into a Broadcasting Board to operate 
broadcasting as a national service. Then the government abolished the Board in 1936 
to turn broadcasting into a government department with a system of broadcasting 
inspectors whose job was to ensure that "nothing controversial or seditious or libelous, 
or even coarse, was broadcast, at any rate without penalty" (Edwards, 1971, p. 56). 
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Radio scripts were often checked and censored before being broadcast and the 
inspectors also investigated complaints. 
Weber's concept of "bureaucracy'' also accurately describes the work regime of these 
broadcasting inspectors as the inspectors acted to maintain order, rationality, 
uniformity and consistency between people working in broadcasting so they dictated 
the organisation's external interactions (Gilbert, Jones, Vitalis, & Walker, 1992, p. 
42). Seidman's (1994) summary also describes the inspectors's operational style: 
Bureaucratic business is carried out according to a set of impersonal rules and 
procedures that aim to exclude personal considerations and conflicts from 
interfering with institutional operations. (p. 79). 
Hierarchical bureaucracy and the use of top-down elite power has been evident in this 
chapter's description of how the government restructured broadcasting from 1932 to 
1936. It will be further illustrated, through other examples in this chapter, and chapter 
two, that hierarchical bureaucracy structures all New Zealand radio and television 
services, whether public or private, due to either state ownership or state legislation 
controlling broadcasting's operational environment. 
A gatecrashing broadcaster and a series of bureaucratic reactions 
The control even extended into advertising where government-appointed broadcasting 
inspectors were also authorised to examine breaches of the advertising regulations. 
The earlier elite partnering of press owners with political interests and government had 
ensured advertising regulations favoured newspapers over radio in that the privately 
owned commercial stations could have their broadcasting licenses suspended for even 
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minor breaches. In June 1932 the 1 ZR station lost its license for such a breach 
(Edwards, 1971, p. 58). The station's popular radio broadcaster, the Reverend Colin 
Scrimgeour responded by arranging a public protest meeting and the government later 
retracted the station's suspension. 
This incident may at first appear to be a unique example of successful community 
opposition to the interfering bureaucracy of government but, in fact, it was instigated 
by an elite personality who held official positions. In addition to being a popular radio 
broadcaster, Scrimgeour was also the spokesperson for a national organisation of radio 
clubs representing 20,000 listeners, and the chairman of a radio station federation. 
This incident of community opposition was therefore not simply a citizen initiated 
action to pressure government but was organised by an elite status personality who 
was able to increase his social status and retain his position. 
Through his official community service positions, Scrimgeour could call on many 
thousands of loyal radio listeners, and fellow broadcasters, to counter future restrictive 
actions by government officials against his broadcasting activities. However, any 
government fear of future community reactions did not protect Scrimgeour from more 
official interference in his broadcasts. In November 1932 the Postmaster General, 
Adam Hamilton, withdrew the right of the private stations to sell advertising time and 
announced the government would buy out the three largest stations (Edwards, 1971 ). 
This move appeared to be one calculated to damage Scrimgeour because, after the 
owner of I ZR, Lewis Eady, sold his station to the government, the Broadcasting 
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Board refused to allow Scrimgeour to continue his regular radio broadcasts at IZR, 
which was now a government-owned station. 
To continue broadcasting Scrimgeour was forced to buy a station of his own from the 
LaGloria Gramophone Company. Nevertheless, official interference in his 
programmes continued. On the eve of the 1935 general election his broadcast was 
jammed by order of the Postmaster General, Adam Hamilton (Gregory, 1985). In 
1936, despite his difficult relationship with broadcasting officials, Scrimgeour was 
appointed Controller of the National Commercial Broadcasting Service. He continued 
his popular broadcasts although they were subjected to bureaucratic restrictions. 
When Prime Minister Peter Fraser proposed censoring Scrimgeour's popular Man in 
the Street programmes Scrimgeour retaliated by saying he would rather stop 
broadcasting and would be telling his thousands oflisteners why he had taken the 
action. Edwards ( 1971) reports this threat was sufficient to cause the politicians to 
retreat on this occasion but bureaucratic interventions continued until in March 1943 
he was suspended from his Controller position for supposedly broadcasting without 
prior script approval (Edwards, 1971 ). Scrimgeour was locked out of his office on the 
direct orders of the Prime Minister, and a year later left to live and work successfully 
as a broadcaster in Australia. Scrimgeour was an unusual personality in early 
broadcasting because, although he held elite status positions which gave him official 
power, he appears to have catered to, and drawn from, community interests through 
his radio programmes. These programmes and his behaviour in opposing official 
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actions were, however, an aberration amidst governmental bureaucratic machinery that 
attempted to dictate how all aspects of broadcasting should perform. Scrimgeour's 
lack of bureaucratic conformity was nevertheless a harbinger for the future. 
The bureaucratic top-down restructuring and specific programme interventions by 
government officials of radio services are a systematic feature throughout the first 
decades of television. The government's dominant social authority to structure and 
regulate broadcasting led to direct interference in the content of many television 
programmes, as well as conflicts with television employees. As with the history of 
radio, many of these conflicts were explicit executive actions by government 
executives, including Prime Ministers. 
1.3: (Case 3) Bureaucracy and Political Gatecrashers Affect Television 
Auckland businessman Al Bell, of Bell Radio and Television Corporation, operated 
the first public television transmission. Bell had obtained an experimental broadcast 
license and in May 1957 a few hundred people in Auckland were able to view 
television three hours a night for three days a week (Boyd-Bell, 1985). Despite being 
granted a government license to broadcast Bell was viewed as a ''pirate broadcaster" 
and a long battle ensued with government officials. Boyd-Bell ( 1985) reports that the 
Post Office changed the license frequency three times to try and stop these private 
broadcasts but the Bell technicians were able to modify their equipment each time. 
This coercive use of social and technological power by government officials continued 
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till the private operator was eliminated and, later, a government operated television 
service was established. 
State operated public television started transmission on Wednesday I st June, 1960 
and, by July 1961, the government had introduced a license fee of four pounds to help 
fund the new service and secured its monopoly status as New Zealand's only 
broadcaster of television (Boyd-Bell, 1985, p. 12). In 1962, within two years of 
television beginning, the government used its executive power to restructure the New 
Zealand Broadcasting Service (NZBS) into the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation (NZBC). The restructuring heralded an era of greater government control 
and operational interference. 
Bureaucratic interference by officials in the internal programming and content of 
television services quickly became a pattern. Boyd-Bell ( 1985) explains how one 
example of official intervention in 1963 stopped a documentary being screened and 
the reason why: 
The NZBC refused to screen a BBC interview of the anti-Gaullist former 
premier of France. Like the documentary Death of a Princess nearly 20 years 
later, the programme was politically sensitive, and corporation 
chairman Dr Llewellyn defended the decision in a radio talk reprinted 
in the Listener. He asserted that the decision had been taken 
independently by himself, and the director-general, but in defending 
the corporation's independence qualified it by admitting it could 
never be wholly free of the shackles of government intervention. (p. 88). 
Numerous official actions restricting television programming are documented after 
this episode. Broadcaster Brian Edwards ( 1972) claims this type of official 
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intervention occurred because the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (NZBC) 
was secure in its monopoly, and its knowledge, that neither its employees nor the 
public had any other choice. He suggests the bureaucratic New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation rode roughshod over both and weathered every storm it created by simply 
ignoring them. Edwards (1972) also claims that some staff were summarity dismissed 
without reason, that producers judged audiences to be limited in their ability to 
understand certain content, and that programmes attracting large audiences would be 
rescheduled without notice. All these are actions typical of a hierarchical 
bureaucratically operated organisation according to Weber ( 1970)and Seidman ( 1994). 
Political and bureaucratic interventions as products of elite social power 
Therefore, to an extent, incidents of conflict in the first decades of television can be 
explained as a typical by-product of bureaucratic organisations, which are closed top-
down power systems that require conformity and do not allow for different 
viewpoints, or procedural variance. Weber ( 1970) explains that conflict usually 
occurs when a bureaucracy works to maintain its order against counter forces, usually 
those supporting individual freedom and innovation. This is sufficient explanation for 
the clashes between radio personality Colin Scrimgeour and broadcasting officials, 
however, conflict as a counter force to a strict bureaucratic structure does not 
sufficiently explain the domineering and serial interventionist nature of the many 
executive actions taken by government executives, such as Sir Robert Muldoon, that 
are documented in television's history. His media conflicts were legendary and I 
contend that they could only occur because they were underpinned by his elite social 
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status and backed by a socially dominant well-resourced organisation. Du Fresne 
( 1994) offers a revealing summary of the actions of Muldoon and other domineering 
officials during the first decade of television operation: 
During the latter part of the 1960s, and throughout the following decade, 
broadcasting journalists fought a running battle with politicians over the 
right to produce news bulletins and current affairs programmes free of 
political influence. Successive Ministers of Broadcasting were in the 
habit of phoning radio and television news editors to express their 
displeasure at items unfavourable to the government and there was a series 
of celebrated clashes between Sir Robert Muldoon and television 
journalists during Sir Robert's three terms as Prime Minister (p. 30). 
None of these politicians intervening in broadcasting activities and causing conflicts 
appear to have accepted that there were media conventions in other countries, which 
were critical of such interfering behaviour. Instead they rode roughshod over the 
norms of news independence and attempted to use their elite social status to coercively 
influence media employees and their activities. 
Weber's (1970) concept of conflict as a by-product of bureaucracy means such an 
organisation and its officials act as a stable reference so any difference must yield and 
adjust, usually through official domination. The same situation would appear to apply 
to the domineering politicians as their behaviour mimics the characteristics of 
bureaucratic systems. As Follett (1965) states "domination" is only one method for 
dealing with conflict. She explains that while domination appears easier to use in 
conflict situations - rather than the methods of "compromise" or "integration" - it 
usually does not succeed, as the conflict remains unresolved and will reappear. This 
result is apparent in the development of New Zealand's television services as staff, 
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and public, discontent, especially from political inference, is apparent throughout each 
decade and the same issues recur. 
Muldoon's domineering behaviour in particular often initiated lengthy periods of 
conflict. He consistently used domination as a method of handling situations and 
conflict emerges as a particular by-product of Muldoon' s coercive top-down 
behaviour. The power wielded by government, and its executives, and its 
bureaucratic organisation is responsible for the distinctive, undemocratic pattern of 
interference in television operations that was to plague it throughout its later decades 
just as it had during its first. 
Continuing upheavals for television from political restructuring 
At the end of its first decade New Zealand television still lacked any long-term 
strategy, or goals. As in its early years, changes appeared to be mostly a result of 
political whim or party politics. During the next decade, the government's control of 
television broadcasting continued to affect its organisational structure and its 
executives continued to interfere in programming decisions. A request by the New 
Zealand Broadcasting Corporation for the government to allow a second channel took 
ten years to be approved. This lengthy second channel application process only ended 
when the new Labour government announced the proposed channel would also come 
under the jurisdiction of the government's New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation 
(Smith, 1996). The government's elite social power and existing monopoly of 
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television allowed it to dismiss the private applications and take control of the second 
channel. 
When colour television was introduced in 1973 the organisation of television was once 
again being scrutinised and reviewed. Donald Stewart, a member of the Adam 
Committee on Broadcasting, confirmed the absence of long-term goals for television, 
and the prevalence of political interference. He stated that "policy decisions were 
informed by little more than short-term political gain" (Stewart cited in Moriarty, 
1991, p. 9). Despite the first 15 years of television organisation featuring only one 
owner, the state, there was still no stability (Smith, 1996). Television organisation 
was continually subjected to a changing scenario of legislative frameworks with its 
administration reflecting the operating systems of other bureaucratic government 
departments. John Farnsworth describes how this style of administration operated: 
The NZBC developed as a strictly hierarchical and bureaucratic organisation, 
with its upper echelons staffed and controlled by administrators, many of 
whom were drawn from radio. There was a high degree of codification 
present, for example, with two books of regulations to cover all aspects of 
procedures and operations, a strongly centralised command structure based 
on common notions of seniority and deference (1992, p. 194 ). 
New Zealand television, unlike Britain, had no legislative protection or independence 
from political interference. Broadcasting executive Ian Cross described New Zealand 
television as a "battered baby" due to the amount of continual political interference 
and negative impacts from legislative restructuring ( cited in Boyd-Bell, 1985, p. 7). 
The restructuring scenario that began in 1973 accurately depicts his description of 
television's suffering at the hands of politicians. 
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A political gatecrasher disrupts television's organisation 
Smith reports that this scenario began when Labour's Minister for Broadcasting, 
Roger Douglas announced that three independent corporations were to be established -
two for television and one for radio ( 1996, p.2). Each corporation was to have a three-
person board that would be responsible to a Broadcasting Council, designed to act as a 
buffer between the Corporations and any future attempts at political control. 
Accordingly, on I April 1975 the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation ceased to 
exist and television services evolved into the stand alone Television One channel, and 
the new second channel became Television Two. Ritchie ( 1977) states that the 
political conflict surrounding this legislation was intense: 
Political debate over this waxed hot and strong and the then opposition 
gave no ground, indicating that when they became government they would 
reverse the decision. The National Party gained the Treasury benches in 
November 1975 and within a year the Broadcasting Council was gone, 
replaced by a unified corporation, its component services stripped of some 
of their independent functions and direct responsibility to Cabinet and 
parliament restored ( 1977, p. 6). 
This political reversal, however, did not satisfy the politicians. The new National 
government led to yet more changes, this time mostly instigated independently by 
Muldoon. On February 14, 1979 Ian Cross, the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation Chairman, announced that TV One and TV2 would be amalgamated, as 
millions of dollars could be saved by eliminating the TV2 news service. A month 
later the Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, publicly stated that one channel should be 
eliminated altogether. He suggested," ifwe picked the best programmes out of both 
channels there would, in the minds of many people, be little loss" (Garbutt, 1988, p. 
55). In response the Minister of Broadcasting claimed he was now considering 
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closing one channel but by early April 1979 Muldoon had again changed direction and 
was publicly saying that people were suggesting TV One should be dumped, and 
perhaps even the press industry could operate television services. 
This see-saw of political rhetoric only ended when Muldoon finally announced the 
government would be applying severe cost-cutting measures to all television services 
rather than the proposed closure of one of the two operating channels. Muldoon's 
attempts to dictate the direction of broadcasting policies were repeated towards 
broadcasting employees. Gregory ( 1985) claims the politician's series of public 
criticisms were "often thinly-disguised threats": 
Muldoon's frequently expressed criticisms of public broadcasting 
journalists, especially those in television, could be seen as a continuing 
attempt to intimidate broadcasters and to undermine their credibility in 
the eyes of the New Zealand electorate. For its part the corporation often 
displayed what appeared to be an unbecoming willingness to accommodate 
his wishes ... Muldoon had also been able, with the corporation's agreement, 
to short-circuit the normal complaints procedure in pursuing his grievances 
over programme matters (p. 95). 
Muldoon's actions reflect a continuous pattern of elite social power used coercively. 
Government and politicians, including Prime Ministers, repeatedly used dominant 
authority power to structure and control the operation of New Zealand television. The 
extent and influence of executive domination and government restructuring are a 
consistent theme in many reviews of television development (Boyd-Bell, 1985; 
Edwards, 1972; Mulgan, 1997; Gregory, 1985; Bell, 1995, Smith, 1996; Spicer et al., 
1996). The next two decades, the 1980s and 1990s, reveal yet more government 
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restructuring and executive dominance of television services. The actions in this 
period were to prove even more drastic, wide-ranging and long-term in their effects. 
Political and corporate interests combine to begin an era of deregulation 
During the I 980s the political authority, and economic ideologies of the Fourth 
Labour government combined to completely change the structure and operation of 
television services and their community relationship. Politicians and other officials 
linked the need for such a drastic change to a funding problem for television operation, 
and others to rapid changes in technology (Rennie, I 992). However, the more obvious 
reason was the desire of this government to privatise some areas of government 
responsibility, and corporatise others, in order to gain greater efficiency and financial 
gain from the public sector. 
This change of direction for broadcasting began when a I 984 Treasury Report 
assessed the performance of government public enterprises, as inadequate, and blamed 
the institutional framework (Boston, Martin, Pallot, & Walsh, I 99 I, p. 30). The 
report used corporate business principles as the foundation for its public sector 
criticisms. It cited a lack of clear objectives, an operating environment marked by 
special assistance, lack of competition, and an absence of incentives for managerial 
performance (Treasury, I 984b, p. 279). A Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
Broadcasting in February 1985 followed the Treasury Report. The Commission's 
report submitted six months later highlighted the difficulties, ambiguities, conflicting 
interests and inherent contradictions from having a license fee and advertising mixed-
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funded system for television operations - and advocated yet stronger regulations 
(Spicer et al., 1996, p. 9) but their advice was ignored. The government's negative 
reaction to this report was not surprising, as a new era of restructuring was already 
being proposed for all public sector organisations, including broadcasting. This era 
reflected an alignment of government interests with business interests in a manner 
similar to the beneficial alliance between the press industry and government back in 
the late 1800s. 
This second major alliance began on 12 December 1985 when the Minister of Finance, 
Roger Douglas, released details of a new state process of economic management that 
would drastically reduce the state's involvement, and assistance to the public sector. 
He stated, "the essence of the problem is that the public sector needs to be adapted to 
meet the management needs of a modern economy" (Treasury, 1985, p.11 ). Douglas 
gave five radical principles the government would apply to all public sector 
organisations, including television: 
• non commercial functions were to be separated from major trading 
"state-owned enterprises" (SO Es) 
• managers expected to run the SOEs as successful businesses 
• managers being given responsibility by way of performance contracts 
accountable to Ministers and parliament 
• barriers to competition to be removed 
• SOEs to be guided by appointed boards comprising members from the 
private sector 
At this same time public television's operational stability was being constantly 
threatened by different issues, on different political agendas. Some examples include: 
the approved private third channel, National's repeated election pledge to privatise 
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TV2, the proposed de-commercialisation of TV One, and Labour's hidden intentions 
(Mayne, 1987). Television had become an even greater ''political football" than past 
years. The power of government to impose its will was again affecting all aspects of 
television organisation and operation at both structural and programme levels. 
Throughout this period of immense change, as in past decades, there was no public 
consultation about the new regulatory structure or objectives proposed for television 
services. Mulgan ( 1997) suggests the strictly controlled and rapid implementation 
process at the time was possibly deliberate because "politically television is regarded 
as the most important medium" (p. 287). Others suggest any apparent public apathy 
observed was possibly due to the fact that by 1984 viewers had seen television 
restructured so many times that the amount of political interference had damaged the 
organisation's credibility with its audience (Wood & Maharey, 1994; Boyd-Bell, 
1985). The only active opposition came from the Maori Council and the Wellington 
Maori Language Board, which had placed an injunction against the transfer of 
broadcasting assets from the Crown to the new State Owned Enterprise, Television 
New Zealand (Gee, 1990). 
Overseas observers regarded the extensive public sector restructuring by the Fourth 
Labour government as similar to the market response policy changes usually only 
carried out in the world's largest corporations, such as IBM (Stace & Norman, 1995, 
p. 2). Others said New Zealand had gone furthest along the entrepreneurial path for 
delivery of government services than any other country and they called the process an 
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experiment (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). However, these "market response" and 
··experiment" conclusions by outsiders do not convey the essence of how or why these 
changes took place. This would require a long term assessment and understanding of 
the country's regulatory environment as undertaken in this study. 
The changes were, yet again, a result of the government's dominant social power to 
restructure policy operational environments, including that of broadcasting, without 
interference or recourse to community opinion. New Zealand emerged from this 
period of government restructuring with the most deregulated television operational 
environment in the world. But this period of restructuring only converges with the 
many other restructurings of television, and radio, to confirm that those with the social 
power to dictate structure can dominate and set a regulatory pattern for the future. It 
also confirms the historic ability of government and politicians in New Zealand to 
change and control the regulatory environment of media, including any community 
interactions, as they desire, due to their dominant authority power and resources. This 
long term view and conclusion is comprehensively confirmed by a review of policies 
defining the media environment and the distant positioning of New Zealand citizens in 
relation to media authorities in the next chapter. 
1.4: Summary 
This review of press, radio and television development has tracked examples of the 
recurring dominance of elite social power through New Zealand media history. It 
traced the pattern through the actions of government, politicians, press owners and 
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broadcasting officials in diverse situations. The ability of socially dominant 
organisations, such as government and private media, to regulate and create policies 
with a widespread community impact without recourse to community consultation is 
clearly a consistent structural pattern. Equally evident is each elite's ability to create 
alliances with each other, and other socially dominant organisations, and to utilise 
media services to their own advantage. 
The chapter reveals that engaging in dialogue with citizens, or community 
representatives, in order to inform media policies was not a consideration for those in 
charge of the development of New Zealand's press and broadcasting services and this 




The Media Policy Landscape 
This chapter presents material from a second literature review, and series of interviews 
undertaken to examine whether the hypothesis revealed from the exploratory review of 
the historical development of press and broadcasting in chapter one - that there is a 
lack of public participation in the development of New Zealand's press and 
broadcasting policies - was replicated in the contemporary agencies and policies 
regulating these media. This hypothesis testing review disclosed that the current 
regulatory environment of press, radio and television contains a mix of government 
legislation; industry self-regulation; written and unwritten codes of practice, and ad 
hoc executive decisions. In addition, a second layer of legislative policies was 
discovered showing that there were many non specific media policies that could also 
affect the operation of press and broadcasting. 
Of special interest during this second literature review were any policies designed to 
govern these media on behalf of the wider community and any that specifically 
encouraged, or allowed public participation. Finding any policies that allowed public 
participation was considered to be especially important as the actions of government 
and its executives, the lack of public debate, and the hypothesis in chapter one all 
combined to indicate New Zealand operates a style of representative democracy that 
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is more rigid than the functioning of similar democratic nations, such as Britain and 
the United States. 
2.1: The objectives of this chapter 
This chapter begins by defining how public policymaking functions in relation to 
media, as a foundation for discussing the particular characteristics of social power 
evident in media regulation. It then describes legislation jointly governing the 
operational environments of both press and broadcasting, examines the regulatory 
agencies of press and broadcasting as separate cases, and concludes by reviewing the 
professional practice policies of these media. This chapter extends the preceeding 
chapter, again with considerable descriptive data, as it comprehensively seeks to 
affirm the hypothesis and its implications, in order to inform an action plan to resolve 
the hypothesis situation. The data material in this chapter reconfirms the asymmetrical 
and dominant social power of government and press and broadcasting authorities. As 
a result a number of specific connections and triangulations are made between the data 
in chapter one and this chapter. 
This synthesis of theory and description provides added confirmation of the contention 
- that there is a lack of public participation in the policy-making processes of press, 
radio and television, even in policies with a widespread community impact, due to the 
elite and dominant authority power of government and media organisations controlling 
citizen access. Public policy methodology, a reliance on institutional in-group 
experts, and the role of government are all major influences regulating press, radio and 
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television services. However, the material in this chapter reveals the largest and most 
influential media policymaking institution in New Zealand to be government. 
Emerging patterns in chapter one showed that New Zealand's central government 
considered itself the best provider of essential services including broadcasting. 
Another pattern of coercive actions by government led to the conclusion that official 
interventions in media operations were a distinctive feature of New Zealand's media 
development. This feature can be partially explained by the centralist pattern of 
government development in New Zealand society, in contrast to other nations such as 
America, and it was argued by some that New Zealand developed this strong system 
of central government "because the resources of the private sector were too scarce and 
fragmented" to provide essential services (McKinlay, 1990, p. 8). However, despite 
this justification all three media (i. e., press, radio and television) were shown to have 
been successfully operated first by the private sector. The government view that it 
was the "best provider'' initiated the nationalisation of broadcasting and this action 
initiated a pattern of policy and executive interventions. Government dominance in 
broadcasting' s organisation changed its structure repeatedly to reflect different 
ideological agendas and there are many examples of political attempts by government 
and politicians to restrict its operations. At the heart of all these interventions lies the 
government's elite and dominant social power to make, and change, policies that 
regulate different operational environments, including that of media. 
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2.2: The public policy process and its relationship to media operation 
Defining public policy-making highlights the elite position and influence of those in 
government appointed media decision-making positions, in contrast to New Zealand 
citizens. Various definitions of the public policy process help explain this 
asymmetrical situation. The most useful for this study was found to be a combination 
of two: ''the relationship of a governmental unit to its environment" and "public policy 
is whatever governments choose to do or not to do" (Eyestone, I 971, p. I 8: Dye, I 984, 
p. I). Both these definitions explaining government policymaking apply equally well 
to self-regulated privately owned media if reworded to state: "the relationship of an 
media organisation to its environment" and "public policy is whatever media 
organisations choose to do or not to do". 
A useful addition to these definitions is to consider the formulation of a public policy 
as not just a single event but a course of action that has a history and a future and that 
a particular concern or issues usually initiate policies. Rose ( 1969, p. x) recommends 
public policies be viewed as, ''a long series of more-or-less related activities". 
Friedrich ( I 963) suggests that public policy always has an objective and is directed, 
and Anderson (1994) argues that public policy is usually the outcome of a ''matter of 
concern" and that "demands for policy actions usually stem from problems and 
conflicts in the environment and are transmitted to the political system by groups, 
officials and others" (p.5; p. 46 respectively). 
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An interpretation by Anderson (1994) describes the official process and action that 
followed on from the public dissatisfaction expressed about the lack of a press council 
described in chapter one. In linking public policymaking to "concern" Anderson 
connects specifically to media policies as most are considered to result from a concern 
about the potential effects of media operation or content on a community (Dickinson, 
Harindranath, & Linne, 1998). Descriptive examples in chapter one also suggest that 
the influence of independent media organisations, and popular personalities like 
Scrimgeour, have been a cause of concern to different New Zealand governments. 
Such concerns, through further descriptive examples in this chapter, will be shown to 
have led directly to legislation being proposed and enacted. 
Together the various definitions of public policies turn policymaking into a continuous 
action process designed to have precise environmental impacts. This conclusion 
produces a useful definition framework to assist the choice of media policies relevant 
to the ideas discussed in this chapter: 
Media policies are an outcome of what a media authority (government or 
private) wants to achieve within its area of operation so policies are designed 
to achieve objectives, often with a long-term effect, and usually relate to an 
issue of concern. 
This definition can also apply to elite policy alliances as illustrated by the 
government's early Protection of Telegrams Act. This Act was a legislative policy 
designed to control incoming overseas information for security reasons but it also 
allowed the United Press Association to maintain a nationwide monopoly of overseas 
press news for almost I 00 years. This symbiotic and beneficial elite relationship 
between government and press is revealed again in this chapter. 
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2.3: Coercive social power as a characteristic of media policies 
Similarly, the theories of social power underpinning the descriptive data in chapter one 
were found in many instances to be reflected in this chapter. Elite social power is 
therefore considered to have played a significant part in the development of New 
Zealand press and broadcasting. Again, as the concept of social power is theoretically 
wide-ranging I have chosen to approach the subject by considering the specific 
characteristics and patterns of power that emerged during this chapter's review of 
media regulation. The mechanisms for the use of social power in media organisation 
vary from the hidden to the explicit, and cover such issues as "bureaucracy", in the 
structure of an organisation, to '"domination" used by people with '"elite" status 
attempting to coercively change a situation. It is therefore proposed there is a strong 
element of coercion in the policy-making function of government towards media 
activity. Coercion as an element of policymaking is confirmed by The Economic 
Monitoring Group ( I 985). 
Examples reveal how a coercive use of top-down social power causes the formation of 
in and out-groups within media policy-making. Those in elite positions are shown to 
control the relationship between these two groups and consequently any interaction by 
the community with media. The policy reviews of press, radio and television in this 
chapter collectively show government and media organisations dictate the policies that 
regulate press, and broadcasting. Together they form a dominant and elite discourse 
controlling the relationship of citizens to media policymaking. 
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In Miller and Rose (1993) Foucault's concept of"governmentality" is explained as the 
mechanism that legitimises such elite discourse and that it is a process of 
normalisation. Figure I illustrates those that have been shown to possess 
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Internal & external research 
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Figure I. Elite participants invited into the media policy dialogue circle 
Citizens and the community are not considered part of the legitimate policy dialogue 
process as they lack the mantle of governmentality. Colin Shaw ( 1995), for example, 
confirms this situation in regard to the practice of setting of media standards. He 
outlines three methods to set community standards outside a broadcasting 
organisation, none of which include citizen representative dialogue: 
The first is through the law, with legislation which prescribes the limits within 
which broadcasters are free to operate .... The second way is through the 
terms of the licence given to the broadcaster, whether directly by the 
government or by some intermediate agency acting on the government's 
behalf, such as the Federal Communications Commission in the USA .... 
The third way lies in judgements retrospectively made by an independent 
agency. The New Zealand Standards Authority is an example of such a 
mechanism, invested in that case with strong powers and a degree of legal 
authority (Shaw, 1995, p. 218). 
Only government and professional experts possess the official recognition to 
participate in media policy dialogue and implement media procedures, practices and 
decisions. This is an argument used to justify the practice of "closed government'', as 
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debate by government and its representatives "produces more rational policies, freed 
from public pressure, which is assumed to be irrational" (Leftwich, 1983, p. 233). The 
historical accounts in this thesis depict New Zealand governments as "closed" and this 
style of activity appears to be a continuing operational choice of all New Zealand 
media authorities. 
Bureaucracy is the key factor contributing to the development and maintenance of this 
closed policy dialogue circle as it encourages an internal workforce of professionals or 
experts within large organisations. Seidman confirms that "bureaucracy creates a new 
type of worker, the official or white-collar worker, who is a technically skilled, 
specialised professional hired on the basis of qualifications ( 1994, p. 79). Discussing 
this emergence of professional expertise in organisations Johnson (1993) argues that 
Foucault fails to explain where such expertise gets '·stored, produced and embodied" 
(p. 143). However, I contend that Foucault's concept of governmentality fits precisely 
with Weber's observations of bureaucracy as both acknowledge "the 
institutionalisation of expertise in the form of the professions" (Miller & Rose, 1993, 
p. 140). 
For example, the New Zealand Broadcasting Standards Authority in its 1999 Annual 
Report, states an annual consultation process was initiated with major broadcasters 
and, under the heading "other consultation", lists further meetings with broadcasters, 
'·a number of tertiary institutions which offer media studies" and other agencies such 
as '"the Race Relations Conciliator, the Commissioner for Children and the Mental 
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Health Commission" (pp. 4-5). The report then states the Authority's consultation 
process for the next year will also involve a close liaison with the New Zealand 
Television Broadcasters' Council - another elite body of professionals - but nowhere 
states it has, or intends to engage in any consultation process with grassroots citizens. 
Those without official positions or lacking links to media authorities are not consulted 
although they comprise the largest group of media recipients. 
Bureaucracy is the force that creates the conditions that encourages the development 
and internal structuring of such professional expertise in large socially dominant 
organisations, such as government, its institutions, and media organisations and the 
knowledge categories of institutionalised experts are not just stored and produced in 
the structures and discourses of all these organisations but are also stored and 
embodied in their policy dialogues which seek to control their operational 
environments, and dismiss external influences. Consequently, the policies of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority can only reflect and embody the views of the 
consulted in-group experts they list and their views will be institutionalised in 
community policies instead of those of citizens it was set up to represent. The 
legislation establishing the Authority will be shown to support this distancing of the 
community. 
The experts and officials of media and research organisations form an "in-group" with 
a policymaking status equal to that of government while citizens and community 
comprise an ''out-group" (Drigotas, Insko, & Schopler, 1998). In relation to the 
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formation of different social groups Weber discusses how such groups can either be 
"positively" or ·'negatively'' charged ( cited in Eldridge, 1970, p. 73). Those in 
institutional positions who have governmentality can be regarded as a positively 
charged policymaking in-group. They can also be seen to engage in internal 
organisational dialogue when making policies - in preference to external community 
inclusive dialogue - even when devising policies that have a widespread community 
impact. The adoption of corporate objectives for public sector organisations during 
the political reregulation of New Zealand broadcasting in the late 1980s increased the 
institutionalisation of professional expertise to the extent that policy and research 
experts, for example from private companies and institutions like universities, now 
form an arm of government in regard to media regulation. The consultation process 
adopted by the Broadcasting Standards Authority illustrates this situation. 
The lack of public dialogue informing policies with a direct community impact due to 
an organisational or political preference for professional expertise is particularly 
apparent in the policies regulating radio and broadcast television. The exclusion of 
community dialogue and attention to community interests in broadcasting policies has 
led over the years to the formation of several activist groups ( e. g., The Monitor 
Group, Media Aware, Children's Television Foundation, and the Friends of Public 
Broadcasting). Tension between different groups, like coercion, is evident in the 
policy situations described in this chapter, just as it was identifiable in the 
development history of press, radio and television described in chapter one. Tension 
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between government and journalists is also a reason given for the many political 
attempts to legislatively control the activities of these media. 
2.4: (Case 1) Elite social power gives the press constitutional protection 
This review of policies regulating the press industry shows the press has experienced 
greater protection from government policies than other media, as a result of careful 
organisation alignment and social positioning. The press industry's elite social status 
connects symmetrically with that of government policymakers and works to either 
limit negative policy intentions or eliminate them altogether. John Hardingham, a 
former New Zealand Herald editor, dismisses any such privileged position for the 
press. He claims, '"the press enjoys no special privileges" and that "under the law it 
possesses precisely the same rights, privileges and powers as the ordinary citizen - no 
more and, of course no less" ( cited in du Fresne, 1994, p. 13 ). 
This situation appears true in policies such as the Defamation Act, under which the 
press is no more allowed to tell malicious untruths than any individual citizen, and the 
Official Information Act where the press has only the same rights as ordinary citizens 
to access government records. But the promotion by the press industry of the 
importance of an independent and free press as a standard for democracy has proved 
to be a constitutionally beneficial alignment. This principle of a free and independent 
press is commemorated each year on May 3 when journalists celebrate World Press 
Freedom Day, established by UNESCO in 1989. Veis (2000) connects a 
constitutionally free press to the struggle for democracy: 
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An open society and fully functioning democracy make up the only 
environment in which the (press) watchdog can serve-and survive. But the 
relationship between democracy and a free press is more than that between a 
watchdog and his master: it is a symbiosis ensuring the survival of both (p.6). 
This symbiotic relationship between political authority and the press industry in New 
Zealand has already been noted in chapter one and Olsen and Marger ( 1993) state it is 
a characteristic of elite social power. The relationship first emerged in 1840 after the 
government ordered a newspaper to stop publication and other press proprietors 
reacted strongly stating they had a right to publish without interference. Timothy 
Balding, Director-General of the World Association of Newspapers, explains that this 
right to publish is because "the press is or strives to be, above all the voice of the 
people in their continual dialogue with the centres of power in society" (2000, p. 6). 
This idealistic industry profile is extended to regarding press employees - working in 
areas of war or political unrest - as industry martyrs in a continual struggle for 
democracy. Balding emphasises this industry position by reporting that in 1999 a total 
of 71 journalists died on duty, 80 journalists remain imprisoned in 18 countries, and 
l 03 countries still place restrictions on press freedom (2000, p. 6). 
The press-political-democracy triangle is internationally accepted and given 
constitutional protection in many countries. In America the standard of a free press is 
outlined in the First Amendment of the Constitution adopted in 1791 but in New 
Zealand it was not until 1990, when Sir Geoffrey Palmer initiated the Bill of Rights 
Act, that the standard of press freedom was enshrined in legislation, as Section 14. 
This statute, was first invoked in 1992 when a court imposed suppression order was 
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overturned on the grounds that Section 14 "emphatically confirms ... the media's right 
to seek and impart information and the public's right to receive that information" (Mr 
Justice Thomas cited in du Fresne, 1994, p. 16). 
Political actions and policies illustrating a desire to control the press 
The lack of constitutional press protection for so many years, combined with the 
government's dominant social power to design policies for different operational 
environments, partially explains many of the past conflicts between journalists and 
politicians. However, another explanation is central government executives coercively 
using their elite social power against media organisations and their representatives, as 
described previously. These actions meant the regulatory policies examined in this 
chapter had, by definition, to be deliberately broad as it can be seen that the 
government or an executive can often decide a course of action and implement it as a 
"policy" approach to a matter of concern, without it becoming law. As both 
legislative and executive actions are backed by government social power, they can 
both regulate press (and broadcasting) activity, as in the following examples. 
During the 1951 Auckland waterfront dispute the government imposed emergency 
regulations suppressing all press articles sympathetic to the striking waterfront 
workers or their unions. The government at this time also imposed D notices. These 
were memos circulated to newspapers listing subjects that were not to be published 
with the government citing national security as the reason for both actions. 
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Some later actions to control press activities took a more personal and political 
approach. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon banned journalist Tom Scott from his 
press conferences in the 1970s as he objected to Scott's writing style and political 
articles (du Fresne, 1994, p. 19). Reactions were vigorous and vocal but the ban 
continued. In 1983, Muldoon's Cabinet barred The Dominion from receiving any 
official government information. The action was designed to punish the same paper 
for publishing leaked confidential government documents and both parties made 
appeals to the New Zealand Press Council. 
The Council's adjudication decision helpfully recognised the guiding policies of both 
parties. The Council upheld the right of newspapers to publish information received 
in this manner, in the public interest, and it also upheld the government's accusation 
that, "The Dominion had failed to exercise sufficient care and accuracy in reporting 
the material" (cited in du Fresne, 1994, p. 19). The Council in its response appears to 
have been guided by its symbiotic relationship with government, the need to placate a 
major news source and the fact the publishing of leaked material "has its qualified 
sanction" (Tucker, 1992, p. 20 I). 
The press industry has successfully negotiated other restrictive government policy 
actions. In 1991 a proposal was made to charge journalists for their Parliamentary 
Press Gallery space. Newspapers reported this could be the first step to being denied 
parliamentary access and claimed the move was undemocratic as it restricted the 
public's right to know about government business (du Fresne, 1994). The government 
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abandoned the policy in the face of this press opposition. The introduction of the 
Privacy of Information Bill in 1991 also raised strong press objections. Again, after 
industry representations the many media references were deleted. Justice Doug 
Graham proposed that their inclusion was probably a result of the inevitable tension 
that exists between governments and journalists ( cited in du Fresne, 1994, p. 20). 
Legislation designed to interact with media activities 
There are many legislative policies that have the power to regulate the functioning of 
both press and broadcasting. The Defamation Act states that people are allowed "to 
sue a newspaper if they believe it has published information which, in the classic 
lawyer's phase, lowers their reputation in the minds of right-thinking people" (du 
Fresne, 1994, p. 21 ). This statement is open to wide interpretation. For example, in 
1995 former Prime Minister David Lange took out a defamation action against the 
Australian publishers of North and South magazine after an article by political 
columnist Joe Atkinson criticised his performance as Prime Minister. The case was 
argued for five years in courts. Two appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Privy 
Council in London dismissed the action in favour of "the publisher's defence of 
political expression" (Waikato Times, 2000, October 20, p. 3). Lange finally withdrew 
his defamation case in December 2000 stating, "the case had shown that the law was a 
playground of the rich" (NZPA, 2000, December 15, p. 9). Pursuing the defamation 
action to this stage, as an individual against a socially dominant media organisation 
with greater resources, had cost Lange NZ$ I 00,000. 
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While expensive courts costs can regulate the number of cases taken against the press, 
and restrict them to those with elite status and substantial financial resources the 
' 
significant damages allowed by the Defamation Act can also regulate media 
organisations. In 1983 Cabinet Minister Bill Birch was awarded NZ$ I 80,000 which 
was an amount sufficient to put the defendant newspaper out of business (du Fresne, 
1994). As politicians are the most frequent plaintiffs, it would seem unlikely the 
government will be moved by media representations for a legislative limit on 
monetary damages. The design of the Defamation Act appears to favour elite status 
individuals and well-resourced organisations. 
The policy of parliamentary privilege can also regulate media activity and appears to 
favour government. A number of breaches of parliamentary privilege against the 
press, and other media, have been upheld since 1905. Such actions can be taken, as 
parliament is historically a court where laws are made, so it has the authority to punish 
people, including the media, for what it perceives to be improper conduct towards it 
(Burrows, 1980, p. 311 ). 
Other policies regulating media operation can restrict information prior to publication. 
For example, media can be fined for revealing information about defendants before 
they go to court; coroners can suppress all details of suicide cases, and Family Court 
proceedings and the activities of social workers cannot be investigated and publicised. 
Media in the late 1990s are publishing more details in these areas although there have 
been no policy amendments. David Edmunds, chairman of the New Zealand 
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Journalist's Training Organisation (NZJTO), suggests any change could be a response 
to increased competition in the now deregulated media market (Personal 
communication, 2000 April). 
Both the Security Intelligence Act and the Race Relations Act have provisions that can 
restrict media freedom and the 1979 Crimes Amendment Act has the potential to limit 
media use of tape recorders. Under this act "it is an offence punishable by 
imprisonment for up to two years intentionally to intercept any private communication 
by means of a listening device" (Burrows, 1980, p. 392). There is even a provision 
within the 1959 Post Office Act for civil action against someone persistently using a 
telephone to obtain information. Even though it may be far-fetched, Burrows 
suggests it is possible in these situations that a court could "be persuaded that there 
was a necessary element of wilfulness" ( 1980, p. 394). 
In addition to these examples there are other regulations and statutes that can be 
invoked against media representatives and their organisations. They range from the 
1910 Indecent Publications Act and the 1976 Cinematography Films Act to the 
Children's and Young Person's Act, the Copyright Act and even the Consumer 
Information Act. All this legislation indicates a government intention to regulate 
media operations in a variety of policy environments but apart from the Defamation 
Act the only avenues available for public participation are the complaint systems of 
individual press and broadcasting organisations and their appeal agencies. 
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The New Zealand Press Council 
The New Zealand Press Council investigates public complaints about newspapers and 
other print media, although it only operates as an appeal process. The Council deals 
with each complaint on its own merits to compile a list of precedents or rulings to 
guide future appeals (Personal communication, Southworth, 2000 May). To assist 
editors, the Council recently published a statement of principles that can be read in 
conjunction with their complaint decision lists. The Council's circulation of the 
complaint decisions act as editorial policy guidelines. 
Complaints appeals to the New Zealand Press Council cover a wide range of subjects, 
such as allegations of bias and inaccuracy, breaches of good taste, ethics and fairness, 
and the publication of offensive material (NZ Press Council, 1995). Summaries of 
complaint decisions are published in the Council's annual reports and full indexed 
transcripts are available. Newspaper publishers are required to regularly publish the 
complaint procedure and they publish in full any decisions awarded against them 
(Personal communications Southworth, 2000 May ; Edmunds, 2000 April). This self-
regulation complaint system attracts comments which often describe the Council as a 
"toothless tiger". Tucker (1992) claims "daily newspapers have nothing to fear from 
the Press Council other than embarrassment, although that in itself can be considered 
significant" (p. 212). 
In 1995, the New Zealand Press Council noted it had been involved in "600 
adjudications since its inception" (NZ Press Council, 1995, p. 24). The listed 
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complaint cases are headlined like news items: Case 585: A Policeman's Lot refers to 
a complaint by a detective alleging biased and inaccurate reporting while Case 588: 
Opossum War Out in the Open is about an alleged breach of journalistic ethics (pp. 
24-30). Comparing the number of appeals to the Council in different years shows the 
numbers have not increased, in spite of increased market competition. For example, in 
1999 Council upheld a total of eight complaints out ofa total of75 (Waikato Times, 
2000, April 27, p. 2). In its 1999 annual report released in April 2000 the council 
states: 
Forty-six of the 75 complaints were adjudicated - eight being upheld, five 
being part upheld and 33 not being upheld. Of those that went to adjudication, 
14 were against metropolitan newspapers, 14 against provincials, 10 against 
community newspapers, two against a weekly, one against a Sunday paper and 
five against magazines. The other complaints which didn't reach adjudication 
were either mediated, withdrawn, not followed through or were still being 
addressed (Waikato Times, 2000 April 27, p. 2). 
As a comparison the Twentieth report of the NZ Press Council published back in 1992 
stated it received 71 complaints that year of which IO were upheld, two partly 
upheld, 27 not upheld, one declined, 27 lapsed and three were held over. 
The New Zealand Press Council occasionally publishes guideline policies about press 
content. One of the first was An Appraisal of Sex, Nudity and Related Topics in the 
New Zealand Press published in 1973. This policy statement was in reaction to the 
large number of public complaints received during the Council's first six months. 
While it states that the Council has no jurisdiction to deliver a morals judgement, as 
the climate of public taste and opinion is "ever-changing", it reminded its press 
members that "good taste, in substantial degree, is a matter for editorial discretion" 
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(NZ Press Council, May 1973, pp. 3-6). This policy confirms editors have the 
authority to set policies about community standards in their media without the need to 
investigate community opinion to assess such ever-changing social boundaries. 
There are many policies originating from a variety of legislation sources that are 
designed to affect broadcasting activities, as well as the press. These range from the 
Defamation Act, to breaches of parliamentary privilege. Like the press, broadcasting 
activity can be restricted by this pattern of government legislation. Where 
broadcasting diverges from the press is in the functioning of its regulatory appeal 
agency, the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA). 
2.5: (Case 2) The New Zealand Broadcasting Standards Authority 
This broadcasting agency is a statutory body established by the Broadcasting Act 
(1989). This Act, amended in 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1996, remains the primary 
legislation governing state-operated television and radio (Television New Zealand and 
Radio New Zealand) and also private radio and television. Unlike the New Zealand 
Press Council, the policies and operational procedures for the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority (BSA), and its relationship to broadcasters, are all legislatively enshrined in 
the Broadcasting Act ( 1989). The Act outlines five main functions for the Authority: 
• to receive and determine complaints; 
• to publicise the complaints procedure; 
• to issue advice to broadcasters about standards and ethical conduct, 
• to encourage the development and observance of practice codes by 
broadcasters 
• to conduct research into broadcasting standards. 
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According to one of the first Authority members the decision to establish the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority was a deliberate state move to retain an element of 
government control and public service in a newly deregulated broadcast market 
environment (Hardie, personal communication, 1999, September 17). Consequently, 
the mission statement of the Authority is ambiguous. It begins with a proactive 
community direction and position for the Authority but this is directly undercut by the 
principle of self-regulation (for broadcasters) and the need to function in a changing 
deregulated broadcast environment. The mission statement says the Authority is 
required: 
To establish and maintain acceptable standards of broadcasting on all 
New Zealand radio and television, within the context of current social 
values, research and the principle of self-regulation, in a changing and 
deregulated industry (cited in BSA Annual Report, 1999). 
The statutory Authority has four appointed members. These include a chairman, who 
must have a legal background (usually at barrister level) - as the Authority's complaint 
decisions can be taken to the High Court - and the other three members either have 
radio or television experience, or a strong association with broadcasting matters. 
Media experience for members was not originally an appointment criteria for the 
government body as when the Authority was formed in 1989 it was considered 
essential to have both grassroots community representation and a majority of women 
members. The then Minister of Broadcasting, Jonathon Hunt, proclaimed the 
Authority should have broad community representation and the majority of the 
members should be women, as he considered women to be the general setters of 
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community standards (Personal communications, Hardie, 1999, September 17; Fish, 
2000, February I 0). 
Both Jan Hardie and Jocelyn Fish, two of the first four members of the Authority, 
confirm it was considered important to have grassroots community representatives as 
members and believe they would not be considered for appointment today. They 
claim the whole appointment process quickly changed to favour people with 
professional media experience and or a higher public profile than they possessed. In 
1989 the four appointed members came from Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington and 
Hamilton. In 1999, two members come from Wellington and two from Auckland. 
The Authority, funded by government and a levy on broadcasters, commissions 
research about issues it judges to be of community concern. For example in 1998, and 
1999, AC Neilsen NZ was contracted to measure public awareness of the Authority 
and Colmar Brunton Research carried out a survey into privacy issues, and also 
completed public opinion surveys about the "acceptability of language, violence and 
sex in broadcasting" (BSA, 1999 January; BSA, 1999 July; BSA, 1999 October 
respectively). The Authority distributes these research findings through a range of 
methods. Press releases convey result fragments to the wider community and 
Authority staff write up Authority decisions and research surveys as monographs for 
general purchase ( e. g., Stace, 1998; Dickinson, Hill and Zwaga, 2000). 
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Occasionally, the Authority hosts a seminar or a symposium about a matter of concern 
and invites those considered to be interested parties. For example, in July 1991 the 
Authority hosted a seminar on violence with keynote speakers from overseas and New 
Zealand, and in May 1994 hosted a seminar titled Power and Responsibility: 
Broadcasters Striking a Balance. At a symposium in April 2000 Colmar Brunton 
presented the results of their research about the media habits of children aged 6-13 
years (Ballard, 1994; BSA, 2000 April and July). The Authority's chief executive 
officer, Dr Michael Stace, says all research results and the various perspectives 
presented by interested parties are fully considered by the Authority members and are 
used to inform their decisions (Personal communication, 2000, May 9). 
However, the Broadcasting Standards Authority is probably best known for its public 
complaint adjudication role. Like the New Zealand Press Council appeal process 
broadcasting complainants dissatisfied with responses from individual media 
organisations can appeal to the Authority within set time frames and adjudication 
decisions also become a list of legalistic precedents to guide future complaint 
decisions. 
Rules and procedures for handling broadcasting complaints 
A key difference between the New Zealand Press Council and the Authority is that 
complaints to individual broadcasters, and complaint appeals, about radio and 
television items must relate to the Broadcasting Standards Authority's Codes of 
Broadcasting Practice. The present Codes for programme standards derive from those 
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originally compiled by the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation in 1962. The 
Codes are reviewed and rewritten periodically by broadcasters and ratified by the 
Authority. 
Radio and television broadcasters developed the first Codes to be supervised by the 
Authority in December 1989, without community consultation (Fish, 2000), in spite of 
the Broadcasting Act ( I 989) stating broadcasters are encouraged to engage in a 
consultation process when compiling the Codes. The words "The Authority shall .... 
encourage broadcasters to consult with persons having an interest in the subject-matter 
of those codes" is open to wide interpretation (Section 2 I, no. 2). The lack of 
consultation specificity in this legislative guideline has meant that broadcasters 
compile the Codes of Broadcasting Practice and then invite comments about their draft 
from a few media related professionals, such as media studies academics. 
Initially the Broadcasting Standards Authority supervised the Codes of Practice for 
advertising as well as radio and television programmes. However, in I 993 an 
amendment (No. 2) to the Broadcasting Act ( I 989) introduced by the new National 
government transferred the supervision of advertising standards - apart from political 
advertising - to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), the industry's self-
regulatory body. The ASA later formed the Advertising Standards Complaints Board 
to handle public complaints. Hardie ( I 999) says the incoming National government 
advocated a policy of self-regulation and thought, "those who own the positioning of 
standards should maintain them". This government attitude is reflected in the 
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complaint processes of press and broadcasting which both require public complainants 
to approach the media source subject to complaint in the first instance. The only 
exception to this process is a complaint about a breach of privacy by a broadcaster. 
Privacy cases may be made direct to the Broadcasting Standards Authority and 
compensation up to NZ$5,000 can be ordered (Stace, I 998, p. I 2). 
Complaint appeals referred to the Broadcasting Standards Authority broadly fall into 
the subject categories of: good taste and decency; balance, fairness and accuracy; 
privacy, alcohol promotion; violence, sexism and racism (www. BSA, I 998). In 1990, 
during the Authority's first year of operation, it received numerous complaints about 
issues outside its area of jurisdiction, and outside the specified content strands of the 
Codes. Of the twelve complaints determined that year, two were declined, and three 
withdrawn (BSA, 1990 June). The Authority's first Annual Report states the 
adjudicated decisions included: five upheld, one upheld in part and six not upheld. 
Five of these first 12 complaints were for breaches of the new liquor advertising rules, 
three about good taste and decency, two about individual privacy, one about violence 
in a children's programme, and one about the inappropriate use of a female body in an 
advertisement. 
In comparison, the I 999 Annual Report of the Broadcasting Standards Authority states 
it received a total of 204 formal complaints and issued I 84 decisions which was an 
increase of I 8% on the previous year (BSA, I 999). Over 80% of these complaints 
were about television items and 22% of the complaints were upheld or partly upheld. 
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For the 40 complaints totally upheld, the Authority imposed different penalty orders. 
These ranged from no penalty being awarded to costs having to be paid to the Crown 
and compensation to a complainant. In contrast to the Defamation Act the monetary 
penalties that can be imposed by the Authority are strictly limited. This difference 
indicates an uneven political approach between legislation designed to protect citizens 
in general, as opposed to that designed to protect elite individuals with sufficient 
resources to pursue defamation actions. For example, larger penalties that can impact 
financially on a media organisation (i. e., suspension of advertising) are rarely 
awarded and such penalty awards can be subjected to lengthy High Court appeals. 
The Report also reveals the number of public complaints and how their complexity is 
increasing each year, and the Authority has a particular problem determining "good 
taste and decency" complaints as community standards change over time. In June 
1999 the Authority still had 50 outstanding complaints to resolve and there were six 
appeals by broadcasters contesting Authority decisions waiting to be actioned by the 
High Court (BSA, I 999 June). Again, in contrast to individual citizens, the greater 
financial resources of these media organisations enables them to undertake court 
actions to appeal Authority decisions. This situation serves to confirm Lange's 
statement that court action is a "playground for the rich". 
As well as being sidelined by the expert-laden consultation process of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority, the community is also sidelined by the 
interpretations of '·consultation" in the I 989 Broadcasting Act. In early I 999 the 
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Codes of Practice for Radio Broadcasting were reviewed and the Radio Broadcasters 
Association proposed ··a fundamentally restructured Code" which was approved by 
the Authority in June 1999 (BSA, 1999). This new set of standards for radio 
programming ··was completed without any community consultation" (Edmunds, 
personal communication, 2000) even though the Code is radically different to the 
older detailed format and simply lists a series of broad guiding principles. Television 
broadcasters have proposed that the Free-To-Air Television programme Code 
reviewed in 2000 should follow radio ·s radical Codes of Practice restructuring 
example (see postscript). 
2.6: Professional practice policies influencing press and broadcasting 
Media representatives are expected to observe professional practice policies, as well as 
comply with the standards of the New Zealand Press Council and the Codes of 
Practice supervised by the Broadcasting Standards Authority. The professional 
organisation for journalists has promoted an ethics policy for over 30 years for all 
journalists across all media (Tucker, 1992, p. 196). Ethics and standards for practicing 
journalists are voluntary, but have been standardised by the New Zealand Journalists 
Training Organisation (NZJTO) into an Training in Ethics course which is a 
compulsory qualification paper in all New Zealand journalism courses. The course 
includes the in-house policies of The Nelson Evening Mail, Independent News Limited 
and Wilson and Horton, as these are considered to be good ethi~policies (Southworth, 
personal communication, 2000). Any ethical breach can incur disciplinary procedures. 
Southworth says there is provision for such breaches to be dealt with by the New 
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Zealand Press Council but such breaches are rare as New Zealand journalists are 
generally considered to act responsibly (Southworth, 2000 May; Tucker, 1992). 
Press and broadcasters being able to compile their own professional practice policies 
(including the Codes of Broadcasting Practice), demonstrate these media have the 
power of self-regulation. This is because they can be seen to "control, govern or 
direct" their industry environment and set their own operational rule policies 
(Hurlburt, 2000, p. 1 ). The material in this review demonstrates self-regulation is the 
rule for broadcasters even though government power has been shown to interfere and 
affect their operations at times. While broadcasting has always been subject to some 
government imposed supervisory controls, the current broadcasting legislation and 
environment encourages greater internal industry control than past years. This elite 
control situation works to further distance the community from policy discussions. 
2.7: Summary 
This review of policies regulating press and broadcasting charts a wide range of 
government legislation with the potential to restrict media activities. Tension, 
interventions and negotiation are all shown to be part of any media policymaking, 
especially between government executives and media organisations as they struggle to 
control their operational environments. This struggle is revealed through a series of 
coercive policy actions by government towards media representatives that required 
negotiation and official adjudication. 
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Citizens and community are shown to be consistently excluded from media policy 
dialogue and any public participation in press and broadcasting is limited to that of 
being either a complainant or a minority participant during subject and context 
specific commissioned research. The complaint systems and appeal agencies of press 
and broadcasting are complex, characterised by a legalistic system of rule-like 
precedents whilst current government policies promote media self-regulation. This 
has meant the operational policies and Codes of Practice for press, radio and television 
are discussed and compiled by media professionals. Policies defining community 
standards, such as '·good taste and decency'', are considered by both press and 
broadcasting to be difficult to establish and regulate due to their changing nature. 
Despite this difficulty, press and broadcast agencies demonstrate they still prefer to 
gauge community standards either by professional judgement or by research mediated 
by elite experts rather than by any direct dialogue with grassroots citizens, the largest 
body of stakeholders with a potential interest in such standards due to their community 
wide impact. 
The continuous increase in complaints (documented by the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority) about standards in broadcast television rising to 80% of all combined 
broadcasting complaints in 1999 reveals an underlying problem in establishing 
socially acceptable standards. Also, the lack of community dialogue informing such 
standards could be regarded as unethical organisational behaviour when public 
networks, like state-operated Television New Zealand and Radio New Zealand, are 
involved. 
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In conclusion, this second review chapter supports the contention that citizens and 
community are not consulted about media policies, even those with a widespread 
community impact like the "good taste and decency" Code which sets community 
standards for programmes screened on Free-To-Air television. 
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- 3 -
Managing the Research Field 
The reviews of New Zealand's press and broadcasting in chapters one and two 
identified a lack of public participation in their regulatory policies. This thesis 
proposes the situation can be resolved and shows how Citizens' Juries can act as 
bridges to create dialogue between media organisations and grassroots citizens. It is 
suggested that the use of Citizens' Juries can provide media policy-makers with 
representative community opinion to more accurately inform and benchmark policy 
decisions, especially those with a widespread community impact. 
3.1: The research approach and rationale 
The proposal to solve the identified lack of dialogue between media policymakers and 
citizens is framed in the context of an "action research" programme. Action research 
is a research paradigm that grew out of a need for social practice to take an integrated 
approach across social science disciplines and it is inclusive of both hypothesis testing 
and problem solving response projects. It is an approach "to action" rather than a 
reflection about action. Kurt Lewin ( I 946) is credited with identifying the perspective 
at the end of the Second World War and defined it as an approach concerned with 
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"two rather different types of questions, namely the study of general laws ... and the 
diagnosis of a specific situation'' (cited in Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 527). He argued 
that action research, because of its real-world focus, had a particular ability to both 
advance theory and achieve social changes. Lewin's perspectives underpin this action 
research programme to create public dialogue in the action field of media regulation. 
Lewin is also credited with describing the action research process. He pictures the 
process as a spiral of research circles. Each circle begins with a description of what is 
occurring in the action field followed by a period of reflection, thinking, 
understanding and even further learning. To move to the next step, the action plan, 
requires a period of exploration and a considered assessment of the possibilities and 
opportunities. The action plan leads to the action step which is continuously 
monitored. The final step in the circle is an evaluation of the plan's effect and action 
on the chosen field and the reporting of the results. The evaluation step can lead to 
further reflection, a new action plan and the cycle begins over again. 
Reflection, rethinking and replanning are essential components during each step of 
action research. While these can appear to be "resting steps" within an action 
research programme they are in reality very active phases that can lead to the redesign 
of a particular plan, or action, to enhance the progress of the research project. These 
steps of informed self-reflexive inquiry give action research the flexibility to adapt to 
new data, and new directions, and to produce further insights that can yield still 
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greater understanding later in the evaluation phase. The reflective steps throughout 
the progress of this study acted as stepping stones for further research ideas and clarity 
to link the different stages of the project. Such apparent variations from other more 
established modes of research inquiry can attract criticism but these can be easily 
countered. 
3.2: Critical debates about action research as academic inquiry 
For instance Eden and Huxham argue that "good action research will be good science 
though not in a way which depends necessarily upon meeting all the tenets of 
traditional scientific method" ( 1996, p. 526). The more controlled quantitative 
evaluations adapted from experiments of the so-called "hard" sciences have 
traditionally given social practice research its validity (O'Connor, 1995). However, 
such strict evaluation regimes do not work as well for research programmes involving 
community action, citizen participation, and/or aimed at negotiating complex social 
change. Jenkins and Bennett suggest the scientific norm is more suited to programmes 
"with well-defined outcomes, limited participation, and a narrow focus" ( 1999, p. 23). 
The "scientific variation" and the complexity of action research, due to its real-world 
social settings and interactions, has meant serious attention has been directed at 
describing and classifying characteristics of the approach. Classification has become 
an important factor validating it as an inquiry approach. However, strict criteria 
classification can prove elusive due to the individual, and changing, nature of socially-
based action research programmes. For example, Watling ( 1997) criticises a cultural 
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studies action research project documented by Julian Sefton-Green and David 
Buckingham ( 1997) for not adequately meeting such a validating list of criteria. In 
reply Sefton-Green and Buckingham ( 1998) suggest Watling has by the very 
establishment of such a criteria list - and assessing an action research project as valid 
or not against that criteria - veered into the more limited abstract prescription of 
traditional scientific methodologies. 
Earlier action programme evaluators debated this same controversy. The combination 
of programme complexity and variability arising from research in social settings made 
Fairweather (1967) recommend a researcher should be in strict control of the entire 
operation so random changes could be avoided. Mann ( 1965) similarly concluded that 
social action settings should be eliminated entirely, in favour of only laboratory based 
programmes, so repeatable research components could be devised and tested. In 
response Weiss suggested that this '·surrender to complexity and retreat to the 
laboratory look like a cop-out" as "in the artificiality of the laboratory, all manner of 
things seem to work that do not survive their brush with operating conditions" ( 1972, 
pp. 94-95). 
In part these kind of debates form part of larger debates. Howarth ( 1998) has charted 
the subsequent proliferation of methodologies challenging positivist approaches in the 
social sciences, to account for social and political phenomena (p. 268). More 
specifically the monitoring and evaluation of action programmes in social settings has 
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substantially progressed but strains of the early criticisms still recur. These are mostly 
directed at the internal variability of action programmes due to changing external 
social conditions which cannot always be predicted through environmental scanning. 
The method's lack of repeatability, due to the one-off nature of many action-research 
projects, and some practitioners apparently using the method as an excuse for poor 
research work, are two specific criticisms (Eden & Huxham, 1996). Counter 
arguments discuss the ability of action research to produce quantities of rich 
descriptive data and insights and suggest this can lead to a greater variety of 
interesting theoretical concepts directly applicable to the social environment, than is 
the usual outcome of traditional approaches (Winter, 1998). 
As a consequence, the adaptability of action research through its flexibly prescribed 
framework, has precise benefits for research in social settings, like this study, 
compared to other approaches. As a relative newcomer, of only 50 years, to the pool 
of academic inquiry such critical discussions have progressed and refined action 
research as a separate genre and led to the development of a comprehensive 
documentation trail. 
3.3: The evolutionary development of action research practice 
One core site of documentation exists in research into education practices as education 
practitioners were the first to recognise the value of the action research approach. 
Stephen Corey (1953) was influential in introducing the method into mainstream 
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education practice and the bulk of early, and more contemporary, academic action 
research documentation still appears linked to this practice category. In the 1990s it 
remained a favorite of education practitioners but action fields had diversified to 
include topics as varied as cultural studies, organisational management, and feminist 
practice (Sefton-Green & Buckingham, 1997; Eden & Huxham, 1996; Gatenby & 
Humphries, 2000, respectively). Also, during the last decade international journals 
have appeared wholly devoted to action research inquiry and its practice fields, and 
many universities around the world have formed special agencies, in partnership with 
community organisations, to carry out community-based action research projects, and 
the inquiry method now features across disciplines. These activities all demonstrate 
the institutional establishment of action research, its increasing appeal as a process for 
social practice inquiry, and its ability to generate fresh theoretical insights. 
Over the years, the interest of a variety of different topic specialists has helped to 
diversify the framework of the inquiry method. For example, as early as 1970, 
Rapoport foregrounded the ethical element of the mode of inquiry. He claimed action 
research "aims to contribute to the practical concerns of people in an immediate 
problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a 
mutually acceptable ethical framework" (Rapoport, cited in Hopkins, 1993, p. 44). 
More recently Zeni ( 1998) discusses the different ethical problems that can arise in 
action research as opposed to more traditional modes of inquiry. The importance of 
ethics to research in a social setting is acknowledged in this study. Ethical 
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considerations were placed at the centre of this action research programme, especially 
during the planning and project management steps of the trial Citizens' Jury. 
There are also authors that concentrate solely on the unique aspects of action research 
evaluation and the involved position of its researchers. Bowes ( 1996) states action 
research must involve explicit feedback about both the interaction between the 
researcher and the field as well as any changes that result from a project aimed at 
altering an area of existing practice (p. 2). Brown ( 1995) describes the manner in 
which an action research evaluator is taken out of the role of being a "faceless judge" 
and into the action while Girard ( 1998) terms this process ''engaged evaluation" (p. 
64). In line with these practices, the different steps of this action research programme 
involved reflective evaluation and research programme monitoring before, during, and 
after the actual research. This continuous evaluation engagement actively assisted 
succeeding research steps. 
As the method has gained wider attention, various reinterpretations of Lewin's 
original definition of action research inquiry have also appeared. Unfortunately, these, 
sometimes inaccurately, include aspects of other social action inquiry methods. For 
example, Deshler and Ewert explain "action research as a process of systematic 
inquiry, in which those who are experiencing a problematic situation in a community . 
. . participate collaboratively with trained researchers as subjects, in deciding the focus 
of knowledge generation, in collecting and analyzing information, and in taking action 
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to manage, improve, or solve their problem situation" ( 1995, p. 2). This definition 
unhelpfully blurs the boundaries of "action research" with other inquiry methods. It is 
more suited to describing the practices of "participatory action research", 
"collaborative research'", or "participatory inquiry". Fals-Borda (1991) explains that 
the single thematic link between all these methods is "dialogue". The importance of 
dialogue and community participation in this thesis was added confirmation that the 
action research method was the most suitable approach for this research study. 
A scan of some documentation about these methods shows observers and practitioners 
of these other real-world social inquiry approaches have to counter the same 
accusations (as action research) about the "looseness" or "unscientific" nature of their 
approach in contrast to mainstream methodologies (Gatenby & Humphries, 2000). 
Consequently, though sometimes criticised, the compilation of criteria, or inquiry 
method characteristic lists, that accurately define and elaborate the unique perspectives 
of action research are both a helpful guide to an action research practitioner, and a 
contribution to its institutional acceptance alongside older academic inquiry traditions. 
3.4: Defining the characteristics of an action research programme 
Three broad components are usually identifiable in any action research programme: an 
aim to change social behaviour; the careful documentation of the research process 
carried out to do so; and a research practitioner expected to have an integral presence 
in the research process. This combination, of real-world action, research analysis, and 
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an experienced involved researcher, has become more carefully diagnosed and refined 
in recent years as an increasing number of action research projects have been carried 
out across a range of disciplines and topics. This expansion of knowledge has led to 
the useful identification of certain characteristics against which any action research 
study can be compared to assess and test its own praxis validity. 
The most authoritative and detailed list produced to date has probably been compiled 
by Eden and Huxham ( 1996). They list and explain 15 characteristics they believe can 
assist in identifying valid action research programmes. The fact these characteristics 
were identified as having a particular relationship to action research involving 
organisations, and research practitioners with a consultancy or practice-based 
knowledge, makes them more applicable to this research study in preference to other 
lists (e. g., Kemmis & McTaggart, 2000; Watling, 1997) on less relevant areas. 
Accordingly, during this study it was decided to use the list of 15 action research 
characteristics compiled by Eden and Huxham ( 1996) as a conceptual reference for the 
Creating Public Dialogue action research programme. The programme examined the 
application of different characteristics during the different research steps. The 
application order of the characteristics varied from their numbered position, and at 
times were combined, but used in this way the list benchmarked this research 
programme's validity as a rigorous example of action research methodology. In turn, 
this research study tests and evaluates the applicability of Eden and Huxham's 15 
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characteristics for an action programme based in a real-world social setting between 
elite media officials and community representatives. Eden and Huxham's (1996) list 
of 15 characteristics are quoted below, but without their explanatory discussions 
which they state are '·crucial to a proper understanding" of each characteristic (p. 530). 
Eden and Huxham's (1996) 15 characteristics for action research 
I. Action research demands an integral involvement by the researcher in an intent to 
change the organisation. This intent may not succeed - no change may take place 
as a result of the intervention - and the change may not be as intended. 
2 Action research must have some implications beyond those required for action or 
generation o.f knowledge in the domain of the project [italics in original]. It must 
be possible to envisage talking about the theories developed in relation to other 
situations. Thus it must be clear that the results could inform other contexts, at 
least in the sense of suggesting areas for consideration. 
3. As well as being usable in everyday life, action research demands valuing theory 
[italics in original], with theory elaboration and development as an explicit 
concern of the research process. 
4. If the generality drawn out of the action research is to be expressed through the 
design of tools, techniques, models and method then this alone, is not enough. The 
basis for their design must be explicit and shown to be related to the theories 
which inform the design and which, in turn, are supported or developed through 
action research. 
5. Action research will be concerned with a system of emergent theory, in which the 
theory develops from a synthesis of that which emerges from the data and that 
which emerges from the use in practice of the body of theory which informed the 
intervention and research intent. 
6. Theory building, as a result of action research, will be incremental, moving 
through a cycle of developing theory to reflection to developing theory, from the 
particular to the general in small steps. 
7. What is important for action research is not a (false) dichotomy between 
prescription and description, but a recognition that description will be prescription, 
even if implicitly so. Thus presenters of action research should be clear about 
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what they expect the consumer to take from it and present it with a form and style 
appropriate to this aim. 
8. For high quality action research a high degree of systematic method and 
orderliness is required in reflecting about, and holding onto to, the research data 
and the emergent theoretical outcomes of each episode or cycle of involvement in 
the organization. 
9. For action research, the processes of exploration of the data - rather than 
collection of the data - in the detecting of emergent theories and development of 
existing must either be replicable or, at least, capable of being explained to others. 
I 0. The full process of action research involves a series of interconnected cycles, 
where writing about research outcomes at the latter stages of an action research 
project is an important aspect of theory exploration and development, combining 
the processes of explicating pre-understanding and methodical reflection to 
explore and develop theory formally. 
11. Adhering to characteristics I to IO is a necessary but not sufficient [italics in 
original] condition for the validity of action research. 
12. It is difficult to justify the use of action research when the same aims can be 
satisfied using approaches (such as controlled experimentation or surveys) that can 
demonstrate the link between data and outcomes more transparently. Thus in 
action research, the reflection and data collection process - and hence the 
emergent theories - are most valuably focused on the aspects that cannot be 
captured by other approaches. 
13. In action research, the opportunities for triangulation that do not offer themselves 
with other methods should be exploited fully and reported. They should be used as 
a dialectical device which powerfully facilitates the incremental development of 
theory. 
14. The history and context for the intervention must be taken as critical to the 
interpretation of the likely range of validity and applicability of the results of 
action research. 
15. Action research requires that the theory development which is of general value is 
disseminated in such a way as to be of interest to an audience wider than those 
integrally involved with the action and/or with the research [ quoted from pp. 530-
538]. 
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Eden and Huxham ( 1996) add, in their review of action research, what could be a 16th 
characteristic, one that is particularly applicable to this thesis. They state that due to 
the demands of the first 14 characteristics ''it is unlikely that action research can be 
written fully in anything shorter than a book-type format" (p. 537). 
3.5: Creating Public Dialogue: an action research programme 
The structural flow and contents of this thesis follows the directional cycles of an 
action research programme. Each action step in the research cycles produced a 
different set of research questions or options. The first question requiring an answer 
was simply: Which action field to consider? Reflection about media regulation as a 
possible topic led to extensive literature reviews of historical material about the 
development of press, radio and television services in New Zealand. This decision 
established the first of the action research cycles (see Figure 2). 
Media Reviews Television Structure Regulatory Citizens' Jury New action opportunities 
Triangle 
2 3 4 5 
Figure 2. Creating Public Dialogue: Action Research Cycles 
The decision, to examine these three mass media, may seem an anachronism in an era 
when other media (e. g., magazines, periodicals, comic books, films) and especially 
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"new media", appear to have a brighter profile but were deliberately excluded. The 
exclusion is justifiable on three main grounds: Firstly because the new media have a 
more niche development and content compared to the mass domestic audiences of 
press and broadcasting; secondly, because my own life experience and values were 
already implicated in the research process (and through reflection were seen to be 
partially guiding the outcome); and thirdly, to keep the thesis within a manageable 
scope. My own practical experience of press, radio and television, allied to 
practitioner knowledge of communications and project management, and an awareness 
of past insider and outsider debates about the organisation of media made my own 
judgement and values an intimate part of the research action field. In confirming the 
impact of practitioner knowledge and experience on an action research field, 
Whitehead (1993) suggests that the very beginning of action research arises from the 
question: "How do I live my values more fully in my practice?" (p. 2). As an 
integrally involved researcher, I found this to be true. The connection between the 
descriptive action field media material and the action plan - to create dialogue between 
citizens and television policymakers - both connected with my practice knowledge and 
values. 
3.6: Exploring the action field and the resulting hypothesis 
The initial exploratory literature reviews of press and broadcasting revealed a 
comprehensive historic and contemporary lack of public participation in New Zealand 
media decision-making. Chapter one identified how government, media 
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organisations, and their officials, used their power, as gatekeepers and collaborators, to 
limit public participation in, and dialogue about, decisions and policies. To further 
explore and gain confirmation of this asymmetrical social power relationship and 
policy dialogue situation a second exploratory literature review and series of 
interviews were carried out. Chapter two contains descriptive material about 
legislation, policies and agencies regulating press and broadcasting. The results of this 
hypothesis testing process proved to be a thematic continuation of the material in 
chapter one while also revealing the possibility the situation could be resolved with 
further investigations. Both chapters examine the situation through narrative 
representation, which is generally agreed to be the intentional construction of a 
sequence of events to formulate an outcome (Czarniawska, 1998; Barthes, 1997; 
Reissman, 1993). 
Using this descriptive approach, and separate case studies of each media, the thesis's 
action research exploratory steps were able to include many different historical and 
contemporary voices in support of its hypothesis of a systematic lack of dialogue 
between media policy-makers and citizens. The approach also clarified the political 
dynamics of who gets to participate in policy discussions, and who does not, as well as 
providing illustrative material on those that have held, and still hold, the social power 
to structure New Zealand's media policies. 
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The results led to an appraisal survey of various theoretical perspectives of social 
power to locate the best explanatory fit for the themes and patterns that emerged from 
these media reviews. While there are a vast number of authors, interpretations and 
analyses about social power the best match for the social phenomena in the descriptive 
media material prescribing the hypothesis was provided by Olsen and Marger ( 1993). 
Accordingly, only fleeting reference is made to other authors and their views 
compared to that of Olsen and Marger's ( 1993) analysis of elite social power and its 
characteristics. 
3.7: The structure and directional flow of this thesis 
The research programme opens with this prescribing descriptive information, in 
preference to others. This is because Fals Borda ( 1979), and other action research 
experts, argue that the intention to change a practice - in this case media policy 
consultation practice - requires a thorough investigation of its reality. In this thesis a 
thorough investigation was undertaken into media practices and their relation to 
citizens and community. Kemmins and McTaggart (2000) describe how descriptions 
of such investigative processes are normally positioned, in relation to methodology 
issues, in an action research programme: 
There are writers of action research who prefer to move immediately from a 
general description of the action research process (especially the self-reflexive 
spiral) to questions of methodology and research technique - a discussion of 
the ways and means for collecting data in different social and educational 
settings (p. 599). 
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However, they argue that this methodologically driven approach is not what makes 
action research "research" and that it can constrain a programme so it lacks the rich 
and multifaceted "social, historical and discursive construction" (Kemmins & 
McTaggert, 2000, p. 599) unique to action research. Accordingly, in line with these 
descriptions of such an approach as best practice action research, this thesrs opens 
with reviews that include substantial historical material and pursues a multifaceted and 
interdisciplinary critical approach to theorising and analysing the descriptive data 
prescribing the action setting. 
The decision to engage in a research programme focused on social change came about 
after a period of critical reflection on the descriptive historical material. Kemmins and 
Mc Taggart explain action research is often a result of such a process and that this can 
lead to "how in practice, things might be changed" (2000, p. 573) and state that a 
multifaceted approach is the only way such a study can be appropriately justified. In 
taking such a multifaceted theoretical approach with an existential edge, action 
research is open, however unwarranted, to academic criticisms of activism and 
theoretical naivete. Nevertheless action research, and its associated inquiry methods, 
often challenge the narrow perspectives of conventional social research through their 
ability to articulate a common sense view of theories in action. Indeed, the praxis-
orientation of action research is considered by some to be a rejuvenating force for 
universities as it encourages the involvement of "creative, critical and analytical 
professionals with a broad and independent understanding of society at large" 
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(Greenwood & Levin, 2000, p. 86). 
Greenwood and Levin (2000) further argue that if the social sciences are to produce 
social research that is functionally relevant to the external community the present 
conceptual boundaries need to be dissolved. They do not just propose a moral 
superiority for action research but claim that action research should replace traditional 
social science practices: 
Central to our argument is the claim that action research creates the valid 
knowledge, theoretical development, and social improvements that the 
conventional social sciences have promised. Action research does better what 
academic social science claims to do (Greenwood & Levin, 2000, p. 87). 
In the context of this study the action research approach has already demonstrated it 
can "uncover" or "unmask hidden forces" in situations "and illuminate and clarify 
interconnections and tensions between elements of a setting" (Kemmis & Mc Taggart, 
2000, p. 573). By engaging in these initial processes in chapters one and two, the 
thesis identified an action site for social transformation. 
3.8: Television as the action site for a change in organisational practice 
The directional hypothesis that there is a historic lack of public participation in 
television policies, even those with a widespread community impact, along with the 
many implications of that medium, especially in relation to issues of domestic 
audience size, regulation, politics and research in relation to community (outlined in 
chapter two) made broadcast television the more obvious focus, in contrast to press 
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and radio, for an action plan aimed at organisational change. Other factors 
contributing to this decision were the nationwide disgruntlement about television 
organisation over the decades, the on-going level of public frustration about its 
operational goals, and its repeated restructuring by successive governments which are 
all related in chapter one. The emergent action field hypothesis had been confirmed 
by the review of the regulatory environment for New Zealand's press and broadcasting 
described in chapter two. 
In addition the descriptive material from both chapters one and two identified how 
British and American regulatory principles were entwined in the structures of New 
Zealand's press and broadcasting. This inter-nation mix was first proposed as a 
suitable model for New Zealand broadcasting in the policy report prepared by E. A. 
Shrimpton, back in 1903. At that time the proposal was rejected. Decades later the 
press industry and broadcasting both adopted British regulatory models and principles 
(e.g., their public complaint agencies). However, it was only in the 1990s, when 
government market force policies became fully operational, that the inter-nation model 
became most transparent. The impact of these two overseas regulatory regimes is 
clearly visible in the structural organisation of the two publicly owned Free-To-Air 
broadcast television channels of Television New Zealand (TVNZ). The British and 
American influences are now both well mixed in New Zealand broadcast television 
and the situation emerges as a "regulatory triangle". This triangulation of television 
regulatory models is discussed in chapter four. 
92 
The discussion is supported by information gathered during interviews with officials 
working for public and commercial television, as well as executives with television 
regulation agencies in Britain and America. Further material, informing 
chapters two and four, was gathered from interviews with both academic and 
professional researchers in media related positions and agencies in these two 
countries. These were supplemented through interviews with a number of television 
executives and government appointed officials in New Zealand. 
3.9: Bridging the divide between television policymakers and citizens 
The study of broadcast television stimulated the decision to actively demonstrate a 
solution to the lack of public participation in media policymaking. Chapter two's 
review of television regulation pointed to an appropriate area of public policy: The 
Codes of Practice for Free-To-Air Television supervised by the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Standards Authority. The Codes, which dictate such community 
standards as ''good taste and decency" for on-air programme content, were chosen for 
four reasons: 
1. The Broadcasting Act ( 1989) encourages broadcasters to engage in a 
consultation process when the Codes are periodically reviewed 
2. The Codes for programme standards are stated to be a problematic policy 
area due to ever-changing social standards 
3. The Codes have a widespread community impact 
4. The Codes were due for review by television broadcasters in the Year 2000 
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The Codes of Practice compiled by television broadcasters and the operation of the 
Codes by the Broadcasting Standards Authority are discussed in chapter two. As one 
of the most problematic, the "good taste and decency" Code was chosen to be the 
sample policy topic for a trial Citizens' Jury designed to engage television policy-
makers and citizens in symmetrical consultative dialogue. In a case study of the 
Citizens' Jury method in chapter five the dialogue method's origins are traced from 
Ancient Greece to its current status and use in international contexts. Since New 
Zealand media organisations are ignoring these practices, and their resulting 
organisational benefits, the chapter begins with a review of public participation and 
public consultation practice in New Zealand. 
Chapter six contains details of the complex management arrangements required to 
construct a theoretically sound three-day Citizens' Jury action project. A summary 
of the Waikato Citizens' Jury project held from Friday 2 July to Sunday 4 July 1999 is 
provided in chapter seven. The summary includes brief details about each of the 
agenda sessions including the content of each expert presentation and comments and 
questions from Jury members. The results and evaluation of the Waikato Citizens' 
Jury are discussed separately in chapter eight. The EPPT (Equal Preparation 
Participation Time) code, generated by the Jury event to enhance public consultation 
practice, is also explained in this chapter. 
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In chapter nine, a concluding assessment is made about the historic and contemporary 
actions of television, and other media, policymakers towards their largest stake-holder 
group, the community. This assessment argues that New Zealand governments and 
media authorities have consistently employed a practice of "institutional NIMBYism" 
[Not In My Back Yard] towards public participation and the inclusion of citizen 
dialogue in community related policies. This assessment is both determined and 
justified by the long-term review of their activities in this research study. A number of 
contributions arising from this action research programme, along with their 
limitations, are also discussed in this final chapter. 
A postscript section has been added to cover a number of recent developments relating 
to issues discussed in the research programme. This section also contains details of a 
second Jury event held on 8 July 2000 to gather a group of citizens's opinions about 
the current rewrite of the Codes of Practice for Free-To-Air television. The Waikato 
jurors discussed the draft document and made a number of comments that were 
forwarded by this researcher on their behalf to the New Zealand Television 
Broadcasters' Council. Significantly the Council had compiled the draft without any 
grassroots community dialogue. The postscript also updates the action research field 
of media regulation, as the Labour-Alliance coalition government has proposed major 
changes to the organisation of broadcasting and the programming direction of the 
Television New Zealand network. 
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Like the opening preface the postscript communicates some reflections about the 
research process. These preface and postscript sections are designed to show that "an 
appropriate degree of reflection" by the researcher was part of this action research 
programme (Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 534). Also, stated in the preface, both these 
sections are deliberately included because Eden and Huxham (1996) suggest best 
practice action research "must include some means of recording both the reflection 
itself and the method for reflection" as action research demands a high degree of "self-
awareness" (p. 533) by a researcher. Together these two dialogue sections 
demonstrate how reflection and self-awareness formed an integral part of this action 
research inquiry process. 
3.10: Summary 
This chapter reviews and discusses action research as a method of inquiry and practice 
for research in a social setting intended to address a complex problem situation and 
initiate organisational change. It shows how the action research method is the best 
approach to theoretically frame this study through a discussion of the emergence of the 
action research method, its theoretical evolution, and some of its critical dialogues. 
Particular attention is paid to Eden and Huxham' s ( 1996) 15 characteristics of action 
research as a means of testing the project as conforming to valid action research. In 
addition the thesis research confirms the ongoing relevance of the list of 
characteristics in the course of a specific action research programme (although it is 
accepted that this process has a degree of circularity). Nevertheless, this action 
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research programme already "recognises that description is prescription" by the 
descriptive review material in chapters one and two prescribing the hypothesis, and the 
topic for the action plan project. (See Figure 2.) 
Other listed action research characteristics are embedded in the opening chapters. The 
"integral involvement" of the researcher in an "intention to change an organisation" is 
present, as is a '·systematic and orderly" (Eden & Huxham, 1996, pp. 530-538) linkage 
between early data results with later findings ( e. g., the 1903 proposed inter-nation 
broadcasting triangle emerging in the 1990s ). In addition, a process of "theory 
elaboration" has been initiated as a part of the early research investigations, the 
research design is shown to relate to the action plan and the inquiry theories that 
inform the design and, finally, reflections by the researcher are shown to be an integral 
part of the research process. 
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-4-
A Triangle of Regulatory Influences 
This chapter explores influences from Britain and America in the regulation of New 
Zealand television elaborating on information revealed in chapters one and two. This 
research direction was a deliberate action step taken towards solving the lack of public 
dialogue informing New Zealand television policies. An international strategy was 
chosen as the historical reviews of New Zealand press and broadcasting disclosed that 
their officials had found solutions to policy dilemmas overseas, usually in Britain. 
This pattern was so consistent I thought it highly probable a similar result could occur 
if a similar approach was undertaken. 
4.1: The orientation and structure of this chapter 
At the heart of this international research strategy was the decision to find a suitable 
symmetrical consultation method to demonstrate to New Zealand television 
policymakers. Locating such a method would enable citizen opinion to be gathered to 
inform problematic policies like the "good taste and decency" Code of Broadcasting 
Practice for Free-To-Air television. I also thought finding such a method could 
resolve not just the historic lack of public dialogue informing this particular 
community policy but potentially open a new era of public debate, documented by 
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many as being absent in the New Zealand community (Thompson, 2000; Chatterjee, 
Conway, Dalziel, Eichbaum, Harris, Philpott & Shaw, 1999; Hayward, 1997; Smith, 
1996; Vowles & Aimer, 1993). 
The overseas information is structured as two case studies. The first describes the 
philosophy and practice of the American competitive market model for broadcasting 
and the second describes the British public service tradition. Much of the information 
was collected during research visits to Britain and America. To explore both these 
national regulatory systems in detail was not the purpose of this action step. The 
British and American material was chosen as it connected with the New Zealand 
information in the research programme and the action plan - to resolve the lack of 
public participation in media policies that have a widespread community impact -
which is at the core of this thesis. The case material is also used to benchmark the 
New Zealand model of television broadcasting in order to make an assessment about 
the evolutionary pathway of New Zealand broadcasting. 
The case material is therefore "instrumental", like in chapter one, as it is used to 
facilitate understanding of something else and the two different national broadcasting 
regimes are only of "secondary interest" (Stake, 2000, p. 437). Similarly, just as the 
case studies in chapter one supported the use of asymmetrical social power in New 
Zealand's media development, those in this chapter describe aspects of British and 
American broadcasting to draw conclusions about policies informing New Zealand 
broadcasting. They were also a strategy to locate a solution to the thesis problem. 
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Like the descriptive information in chapter two, the information material in this 
chapter is an action research step to "explicate pre-understandings" in preceding 
chapters and to elaborate theory (Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 537). The validity of this 
step is confirmed by Elden and Chisolm ( 1993). They advise action research should 
be always concerned about what could be, rather than what is. Accordingly, as in 
proceeding chapters, the information in this chapter is prescribed by the preceding 
chapters, and is prescribing the next action step which is related in chapter five. 
The chapter begins by determining the mix of overseas influences in New Zealand 
television broadcasting and discusses factors found to be limiting public participation 
in media decision-making. The American and British traditions of regulating 
television are then separately examined and the chapter ends with a concluding insight 
about New Zealand's tradition of broadcasting informed both by the overseas reviews 
in this chapter and the local reviews in chapters one and two. 
4.2: A triangle of influences in New Zealand television 
New Zealand media regulation is a mix of local and imported socioeconomic ideas. 
The reviews of New Zealand press and broadcasting development, related in chapters 
one and two, revealed policies and operational functions copied from British and 
American media models and principles. For example, the press industry thoroughly 
investigated the British Press Council before copying its design and procedures and 
both radio and television were initially private for-profit enterprises, like those of 
America, until government initiatives ( e.g.nationalisation and content control policies) 
100 
transformed their operation with principles copied from the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC). 
However, unlike Britain or America, New Zealand has only ever had commercially 
operated television services despite government quickly applying a public license fee 
levy in July 1960, one month after public transmissions began. Boyd-Bell ( 1985) 
explains that while the license fee was introduced to assist with operating costs it was 
really a mechanism to gauge audience numbers for commercial broadcasts. He reports 
that by early 1961, within a year of television beginning, up to 72 commercials were 
being broadcast in any four-hour period of Saturday night viewing (p. 76). 
Some recent policy actions have enhanced this American market trend within New 
Zealand's television organisation, in spite of a continuing political and administrative 
adherence to public service related principles. For instance, the Broadcasting Act 
(1989) and the abolition of the public license fee levy, by the Labour-Alliance 
government in July 2000. These actions respectively encouraged greater self-
regulation by broadcasters and eliminated the continuing anomaly of a public fee levy 
in an era promoting minimal regulation and market competition for broadcasting while 
the establishment of the Broadcasting Standards Authority is a beacon institution of 
public service tradition. 
This inter-nation mix of operating principles, particularly evident in publicly owned 
television services, emerges as a triangle of influences. Figure 3 illustrates the 
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decades long flow of British and American regulatory concepts into the New Zealand 
model. 
New Zealand television broadcasting 
British public service model United States market model 
Figure 3. The triangulation of influences in New Zealand television. 
The extensive historical reviews exposed this regulatory triangle, as well as the lack of 
public dialogue informing television standards policies. Harvey (1998) confirms this 
mix of influences can appear. She states there can be different "capitalist roads rooted 
in different histories and cultures that deeply affect the organisation and content of the 
media'' (Harvey, 1998, p. 535). Harvey also points out that long-term reviews, as in 
this research programme, are necessary if any assessments of media activity are to be 
made. The lengthy reviews of New Zealand's media development described in 
chapters one and two revealed the pattern of British and American socioeconomic 
influences in New Zealand's media policies, and the consistent lack of public dialogue 
informing those policies. 
4.3: Factors influencing television regulation and citizen dialogue 
A lack of genuine public debate or representation persists in policies regulating 
broadcast television despite its regulation being a hot topic of discussion in New 
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Zealand and overseas in recent years, mostly due to changing delivery technology and 
systems's convergence (e.g., Hobbs, 2000 July 6; Thomas, 2000; Whittle, 1998). 
This situation suggests dialogue with citizens has long been considered irrelevant, in 
comparison to the opinions of those positively charged by governmentality. 
Critics over the years have commented about this lack of dialogue between New 
Zealand broadcasters and citizens. Wilson ( 1946) claimed this situation resulted in 
programmes being produced for an audience that was a "nonexistent abstraction" due 
to a complete absence of any public opinion research while Mackay (1953) asserted 
that "nowhere else in the English speaking world was broadcasting so rigidly 
controlled" by its bureaucrats (pp. 12-13; p. 21 respectively). Examples in chapter 
two illustrated media regulation is still considered a task fit only for consultation by 
experts. These expert discussions tend to float above communities and are only 
sometimes downloaded in simplistic fragments in news items, mediated by other elite 
experts. The views of citizens in whose community television technologies operate, 
and in whose homes they are received, are excluded from such discussions. 
Reasons often cited for this situation include comments that policy issues are 
··complex" and "the rubies under which media regulation are now being considered 
are significantly different" (Turner, 2000, p. I) to those of the past. However, these 
reasons do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact the past is influencing current television 
regulation to such an extent that the policies being formulated often remain no 
different to past decades. A report published by the New Zealand Planning Council 
103 
discussing the formulation of regulation describes how past policies, rather than 
complexity, continue to influence present policies: 
It would seem important to give serious attention to the way in which 
regulation comes about, and in particular, to bear in mind its historical 
elements. Very often rules will have been made in response to some past 
problem or circumstance. But circumstances change over time, as does the 
meaning or relevance of the rules, although the rules themselves atter little, if 
at all .... There is a natural instinct to favour what is familiar and to avoid risk, 
and this adds up to a powerful body of influence resisting major change 
(Economic Monitoring Group, 1985, p. 5). 
In regard to New Zealand media regulation, two motivating factors can still be clearly 
discerned today, as in past decades. The first is the struggle by media organisations to 
achieve and maintain commercially competitive positions, and the second the political 
philosophies and economic policies of central government. A third but less dominant 
factor is the view that television technology has special powers due to its ability to 
communicate to mass audiences in domestic environments (Kunkel, 1998; Barnouw, 
1998; Gauntlet, 1995; Biocca, 1991; Seiter, Borchers, Hreutzner, & Worth, 1989; 
Lodziak, 1986; Minow, 1964). 
In a paper outlining the Labour-Alliance government's broadcasting policies the 
power of television is a reason given for the government's involvement. Such an 
argument is perhaps based not so much on technology ownership, or television's 
attractive communication ability, as the knowledge that in any average home people 
watch it for hours each day (Krattenmaker & Lucas, 1994). Political views about 
television being a powerful communication medium also influence its regulation: 
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Broadcast media are uniquely pervasive: they have the potential to reflect and 
explore every aspect of a nation's I ife and thus contribute to the shaping of its 
identity. They can exert a powerful influence on the kinds of information 
readily available to its citizens, helping, for better or worse, to shape opinion 
and condition perceptions. They have an unparalleled capacity to provide a 
shared experience, make minority voices heard and through programme 
selection and exposure, influence the agenda of topics and issues which is 
presented for the attention and consideration of the public (Minister of 
Broadcasting, Hon Marian Hobbs, 2000, July 6). 
This government attitude can be traced back decades to early studies examining the 
power of mass communication (i.e., McLuhan, 1968; Lasswell, 1948; Blumer, 1939), 
and forward into studies covering every branch of the media landscape from 
psychological effects research, advertising and culture, to the impact of cross-media 
ownership, and public interest conflicts arising from media profit maximisation and 
commercialism (Jesson, 1999; McGregor, 1999; Mulgan 1997; Wood & Maharey, 
1994; Zanker, 1993). 
Another influence in television organisation and regulation is "the history and culture" 
of different societies (Harvey, 1998; Mills & Simmons, 1995). Consequently, the 
principles and cultural forcefields behind television regulation in Britain and America 
are quite different and these inherent differences explain many of the contradictions 
within the historic and contemporary policy mix regulating New Zealand television 
broadcasting. In investigating this regulatory mix, the thesis suggests that one set of 
possible origins for the lack of public dialogue identified in New Zealand media 
policies lies in the commercialism and emphasis on governmentality and 
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managerialism in New Zealand so that broadcast television works to exclude public 
participation in policies, as it does in America. 
4.4: (Case 1) American Television, A Competitive Market Commodity 
An elite business-political partnership defines and motivates the regulation of 
American broadcasting, especially television. The setting for the first public television 
transmission in America illustrates the importance of this partnership. In April 1927 
the US Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, delivered a speech in Washington to 
an "invited audience of business executives, bankers and newspaper editors" in New 
York (McQueen, 1998, p. 13). This elite broadcast by a government executive to 
business executives transmitted by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(AT&T) illustrates the market philosophy that began, and continues to underpin the 
regulation of television in America. Indeed, the successful commercial development 
of television as a commodity is even credited with assisting the growth of America's 
economy after World War 11. Browne explains this commodity attitude towards 
television in America: 
For a fee, television delivers audiences, measured in thousands, to advertisers. 
That is, the business of television is showing ads to audiences. To attract 
viewers for the ads, the networks contract with program suppliers for the rights 
to distribute programs on their systems .... The popularity of a program, its 
ratings as measured by the Nielsen Television Index, determines the fee that an 
advertiser can be charged .... Nielsen advertises itself: "The Industry 
Standard for Buying, Selling, Planning, and Programming National 
Television'" ( 1989, p. 71 ). 
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The American regulatory pattern for broadcast television 
In the United States the regulatory environment for television broadcasting reflects 
this commercial use of the medium. For example, the Mass Media Bureau (MMB) 
which regulates television and radio stations in the United States is one of six 
divisions within the Federal Communications Commission (FCC website, April 1998). 
However, in contrast to television regulation in New Zealand, this American 
government bureau, like the other FCC bureaux, is only concerned with technical 
conditions such as the issuing of broadcast licenses and the investigation and 
supervision of those license conditions. The FCC does not "generally" govern 
programming standards though there are now three FCC rules for "restrictions on 
indecent programming, limits on the number of commercials aired during children's 
programming, and rules involving candidates for public office" (FFC website 
homepage, 1998). 
Minow claims the FCC has little power over broadcasting activity and is influenced by 
political realities (cited in Krasnow & Longley, 1973). This former chairman of the 
FFC also claims that while the FCC may initiate policy, Congress, broadcasters and 
their powerful business friends determine the fate of such policies. All FCC rule 
proposals are submitted to lengthy scrutiny. This scrutiny includes registering 
proposals as public notices, and a process of hearings and testimony from widely 
diverse interested parties, sometimes in different States, which can be similar to a 
defended court case (Condry, 1989). 
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Although the FCC regards both operators and users of television services as its 
customers, any mention of the FCC or the Mass Media Bureau performing in the 
public interest is strictly limited to ensuring there is interference-free transmission of 
broadcasting (FCC website, I 998). Customer complaints are invited but only about 
transmission difficulties. The First Amendment of the American Constitution is 
deemed to be responsible for prohibiting "government intervention with regard to 
most of the content of television'" (Condry, I 989, p. 229). 
Legislation protects the voluntary nature of television practice codes 
The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) invokes the First Amendment of the 
American Constitution to emphasise the voluntary nature of its Codes of Broadcasting 
Practice: 
Both NAB and the stations it represents respect and defend the individual 
broadcaster's First Amendment rights to select and present programming 
according to its individual assessment of the desires and expectations of it 
audiences and of the public interests (NAB website, I 999, p. 3). 
In I 999 the NAB board of directors adopted a Statement of Principles to act as a 
guideline for the commercial radio and television stations it represents (NAB website, 
I 999). The Statement broadly covers issues relating to children's programmes, on-
screen violence, drug use, and sexually orientated material. It also confirms the 
voluntary self-regulatory nature of the American industry's broadcasting standards: 
This statement of principles is of necessity general and advisory rather than 
speci fie and restrictive. There will be no interpretation or enforcement of these 
principles by NAB or others. They are not intended to establish new criteria 
for programming decisions, but rather to reflect generally-accepted practices of 
America's radio and television programmers .... Specific standards and their 
108 
applications and interpretations remain within the sole discretion of the 
individual television or radio licensee (NAB website, 1999, p. 3-4). 
This 1999 Statement of Principles is the latest version of the Code of Good Practice 
first adopted by National Association of Broadcasters in 1929. This first Code was 
initially formulated to demonstrate responsible industry self-regulation was "the best 
alternative to government regulation" (Limburg, 1994, p. 50). This action and 
intention is reflected in the actions of the New Zealand press industry when it 
established the Press Council and the independent ability of the New Zealand 
Television Broadcasters' Council to set programme standards·s codes. 
The first NAB Code mainly regulated the amount of advertising. The Code had eight 
rules with four to control advertising. However, in spite of these industry rules the 
advertising minuteage per hour substantially increased over the years. Minow says the 
FCC supported an enforcement ofNAB's rules on advertising limits but Congress's 
House of Representatives made it clear the FCC should not get involved in the issue 
(cited in Krasnow & Longley, 1973). A similar situation happened in New Zealand. 
Advertising minutes per hour first substantially increased outside voluntary industry 
rules in 1961 but though there was an investigation by the Minister of Broadcasting no 
rule enforcement took place (Boyd-Bell, 1985). 
Decades later, in the 1980s and 1990s, excess commercial increases produced 
complaints from members of the advertising industry in both countries. They argued 
that their commercials were less visible due to the clutter caused by the multiple 
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advertisements in each commercial segment (Limburg, 1994; Zanker, 1993). In 
contrast to these industry complainants ''viewers in America have nowhere to 
complain" (Kunkel, personal communication, 1999, October 26). This is a major 
difference to television regulation in both Britain and New Zealand. 
Assessing community standards for American television 
The lack of broadcasting institutions to represent the interests of American citizens 
and administer programme complaints has led to the growth of activist groups and a 
thriving media research industry. In America over $50 million is spent annually on 
television related research to investigate a variety of media trends and issues, 
especially those related to children and mental health (Vogel, 1994). These research 
studies are usually industry commissions or carried out independently, often by 
academics, and funded by large charitable foundations. 
For example, a group of Californian based university researchers, Kunkel, Farino la, 
Cope, Donnerstein, Biely and Zwarum ( 1998), carried out a two-year study to assess 
the television industry's use of V chip ratings funded by one such Foundation. The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation has an Entertainment, Media and Public Health 
Programme specifically "established to examine the impact of entertainment media in 
society, and to work with the entertainment industry, researchers and policymakers on 
important public health issues" (see Kaiser Family Foundation Report in Kunkel et al., 
1998). This research group's study follows a lengthy American-based research 
tradition into the effects of television content, particularly screen violence on public 
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health. Over the years such studies have concluded that "exposure to televised 
violence contributes to aggressive attitudes and behaviours, to desensitization to the 
victims of violence, and to increased fear among children'' (Kunkel et al., 1998, p. 3). 
However, despite these conclusions, and the FCC adopting the V-chip censor system 
in 1997, there is no industry consensus or action on such issues, due to the·self-
regulatory nature of the American television industry. 
In America it is television industry officials, programmers and advertiser interest that 
establish viewer interests. Their authority flows from the free-market cultural and 
economic policies of government. Browne ( 1998) defines the commercial philosophy 
and regulation of American television in relation to community. He states that 
television in America "is a discourse conducted in the name of the audience but-
through the medium of money-it proceeds on the power of the corporation and the 
authority of its commodity" ( 1998, p. 74). The American system for regulating 
television excludes public dialogue at any organisational level and those promoting 
industry issues or policies on a community's behalf are those who could be considered 
to have either elite bureaucratic or expert in-group positions, in comparison to citizen 
viewers. 
Corporate business attitudes, elite relationships between industry members and 
politicians, and a competitive market constitutional philosophy combine to not just 
exclude citizen dialogue, but position citizens as consumers and television as a 
commodity. These conclusions about American television are reflected in the current 
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organisation of New Zealand television. A review of television regulation and 
operations in American revealed no pattern of public participation or avenue for 
community representation. The Codes of Practice operated by the National 
Association of Broadcasters also revealed no commitment to engage in citizen 
dialogue to inform these policies. 
4.5: (Case 2) The Public Service Tradition of British Television 
In contrast to America television regulation in Britain is founded on a long tradition of 
public service principles that are embedded in all broadcasting structures and 
operations, both non-commercial and commercial. These principles were first 
espoused by Lord John Reith, the first Director-General of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), in a manifesto to the Crawford Committee in 1925 (McQueen, 
1998, p. 199). Reith thought that the commercial operation of broadcasting would 
mean the pursuit of trivial entertainment which would be "an insult to the character 
and intelligence ofthe public" (cited in Juneau, 1997, p.12). The Reith ideal of public 
service linked broadcasting to the public deliberation ideals espoused by the press 
industry. 
The BBC derives its status from a Royal Charter and Agreement, granted in 1924, 
which set out its purposes and powers (BBC, 1997). Consequently, two characteristics 
- public service and editorial independence - still underpin the role of the BBC. The 
Charter made the broadcasting organisation independent of any political party and 
outlined two specific duties: the provision of impartiality and balance and the intention 
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to educate and entertain (Inglis, 1990, p. 123). The Charter, enshrining Lord Reith's 
views, set British broadcasting on a mission-like pathway that infused Reith's 
"education, information and entertainment" as a brand across all services (Atkinson, 
1997). 
Over the years, critics have complained about the BBC's stuffy gentility, elite ideals, 
paternalism, and stilted manner, but the Corporation has remained a unique social 
institution mainly due its attempts to holistically represent the British lifestyle 
(Branston, 1998). The 12 Governors of the BBC Board are appointed by the Queen 
and take their community obligations seriously. For example, the Governors conduct 
formal public consultations about any changes to BBC services funded by the public 
broadcasting levy, host public seminars, consider complaint appeals and publish a 
Statement of Promises to Viewers and Listeners each year which is sent to all license-
payers (BBC, 1997). This community inclusiveness has made British broadcasting a 
standard for public service broadcasting in other nations, such as Canada and 
Australia. 
The Royal Charter and government legislation protects British broadcasting from 
political or commercial pressures and any need to cater to advertiser and business 
interests, at the expense of community interests. The BBC is also insulated from such 
pressures by its funding, as it receives all the proceeds of the public broadcasting 
license fee levy for its operations (Steel, personal communication, 1998, October 12). 
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Atkinson describes the pub I ic service tradition of broadcasting as the "antithesis of the 
American model'' ( 1997, p. 20). This is because it rejects the notion that "in 
broadcasting the public interest could be accommodated with the private interests of 
private enterprises which were seeking first and foremost to make their activities 
profitable" (Salter cited in Atkinson, 1997, p. 20). This assessment, however, is 
flawed as public service principles, through legislation and license regulations, also 
guide all operations of the Independent Television (ITV) commercial network, and 
citizen dialogue is gathered in face to face events to inform policies. I suggest that all 
British television, and radio, can be defined as public service for two main reasons: 
firstly because broadcasting is a public service responsibility delegated by 
government, and secondly those institutions delegated to carry out the services 
interpret it as a "public service" in their regulations and activities (Scannel, 1992). 
Regulating institutions for television and their public service functions 
The first two television channels in Britain were non-commercial and operated by the 
BBC. The Royal Charter and the tradition of broadcasting already present in BBC 
radio shaped their development and operation. Then in 1954 commercial television 
was approved by Parliament despite great opposition (Inglis, 1990). The Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (later transformed into the Independent Television 
Commission) was set up to grant and supervise the commercial licensees under 
Charter conditions and public service ideals. This system for commercial television 
operation was very different to that of America and New Zealand where commercial 
forces influenced television's earliest transmissions. 
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Commercial television in Britain is regulated and monitored more comprehensively on 
behalf of viewers and there are multiple avenues for public representation. There are 
three public complaint institutions in addition to the broadcasters: the BBC Board of 
Governors, the Independent Television Commission (ITC), and the Broadcasting 
Standards Commission (BSC). Fraser Steel, Head of the BBC Complaints Division, 
explains the differences between the three institutions and the problems that can arise: 
The BBC is regulated by its governors anonymously in house and a pattern of 
other external and regulatory clients, such as the Independent Television 
Commission and commercial radio. They can all be inconsistent with the BBC 
department of internal regulation which also has to grapple with further 
inconsistencies like having to be accountable in some respects but not others, 
to the Broadcasting Standards Commission. The Commission broadly falls in 
the category of a regulatory body when technically it isn't. The end product is 
that you can have the BBC finding one way on a complaint and the BSC 
finding another and so on. Overall, we agree with the BSC on about 95% of 
the cases that come before us but of course, the 5% that we disagree on are 
usually the most high profile and interesting cases 
(Personal communication, 1998, October 12). 
As Steel explains there are multiple institutions in Britain monitoring programme 
standards and adjudication decisions can occasionally vary between institutions but, 
this is not considered a problem. The Broadcasting Standards Commission views such 
differences to be in the public interest "as sensitive problems or arguments are not 
always black and white but gray" and the dispersed power of decision-making 
amongst different institutions ensures decisions are "authoritative rather than 
authoritarian'' decisions (Ketteringham, personal communication, 1998, October 15). 
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The role of the Broadcasting Standards Commission is somewhat different to that of 
the other regulators (i. e., BBC, Radio Authority and ITC). Ketteringham describes 
the role of the Commission and its relationship to the other regulatory bodies: 
The BSC is a statutory body established under the 1996 Broadcasting Act and 
it's an advisor to the broadcasters and the broadcasting regulators. It doesn't 
consider itself a regulator although it is part of the regulatory process. Our 
remit is to cover issues of fairness and privacy and standards of taste and 
decency and the Act requires us to produce Codes about these that are reflected 
in the Codes of broadcasters and the other regulators. They have to look to our 
Codes and decisions as guidelines and we have to provide redress for the 
consumer in broadcasting if he or she feels they have been unfairly treated. A 
viewer can come direct to us and as we are independent of broadcaster and 
government so we are seen to be a quicker, more user-friendly alternative to 
courts of law. We are a first port of call rather than an appeal authority (1998). 
As well as dealing with public complaints the Commission initiates independent 
research, consults with broadcasters about operational principles and practice codes, 
and monitors programmes. Like in New Zealand, the "good taste and decency" Code 
in Britain attracts most complaints. For example, the BSC received "about 3,000 
complaints in this category this year in contrast to 150 about fairness and privacy 
(Ketteringham, 1998). A key difference to New Zealand is that British complaint 
institutions do not require public complaints to be lodged against a specific Code. 
British complainants can just write "they watched a programme and consider the 
language used was inappropriate" (Ketteringham, 1998.). 
In an era of wide-ranging debates about technological convergence and the possibility 
in Britain that regulation could be combined under the umbrella of a single regulator 
in future Kettingham believes, like Steel at the BBC, and Aldridge at the ITC, that any 
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regulator now and in the future should represent the interests of consumers rather than 
the broadcaster and the programme maker: 
If there are any changes we need a body to which individuals can look for 
redress against broadcasters and that body has to be independent, and seen to 
be independent and we also believe that there is still a need for codes of 
guidance on matters of taste and decency and that those issues can be 
undertaken by an advisory body perhaps like ourselves not part of the 
regulatory process, not authoritarian but winning by the power of its argument 
( 1998). 
Assessing community standards and regulating television content 
In Britain each broadcaster and regulatory body compiles Codes of Broadcasting 
Practice. These must reflect the standards in Codes compiled by the Broadcasting 
Standards Commission. The Commission has a large research budget like the other 
regulatory agencies and, like the others, it independently commissions projects to 
monitor community attitudes to television broadcasting. In 1997, for example, the 
Independent Television Commission undertook a survey of viewers' opinions about 
the ITV channels, and Channel 4 and Channel 5. Aldridge ( 1998) explains this annual 
survey has a number of core questions that have been asked since 1970 and questions 
are added as services evolve. These surveys also replicate questions the BBC asks 
about its services as a comparison. An increasing level of complaints about a single 
issue can also trigger research projects by the various regulatory agencies. 
In October and November 1997 the ITC used Citizens' Juries for the first time to 
investigate community opinion about the "taste and decency" Code of broadcasting 
practice. The ITC commissioned two Citizens' Juries which successfully 
demonstrated they have the capacity to act as symmetrical dialogue structures between 
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television policymakers and citizens. The recommendations of these two Juries were 
used by the ITC to inform the Code policy being reviewed (Hanley, personal 
communication, 1999, November 9). Later in 1998 research was carried out into 
children's perceptions of action cartoons, complaints about Free-to-Air versus 
subscription television, and in 1999 a Citizens' Forum of 200 citizens deliberated 
about options for Internet regulation to assist ITC policymakers (ITC, 1997; ITC, 1997 
November; ITC, 1998 March; ITC, 1998 August; ITC, 2000 January respectively). 
The Independent Television Commission was set in place by legislation like the BSC, 
"but a key difference is the ITC having the authority to fine the licensees it supervises, 
and even take them off air, while the BSC can't" ( Aldridge, personal communication, 
1998, September 25). The ITC through its supervision and programme monitoring 
holds commercial operators to the programming promises in their licenses. Aldridge 
explains the license application process for commercial television operators in Britain: 
When they apply for their license they have to give us an outline of their 
programming plans and it has to include a diversity of programming and a 
certain amount of each strand of programming. For example, each licensee has 
to provide an amount of regional programming that is specific to the region 
wherever it is based and they have to show a knowledge of the region and what 
people living there actually want to see. We hold them to that and it is 
monitored and assessed each year when we come to do their annual appraisals 
and if there is any sort of foreshortening in any strand then they are held to 
account and have to make up that difference. There are all sorts of things like 
subtitling they have to provide and even technical output quality is judged 
(Aldridge, 1998). 
This tight licensee control on behalf of viewers is carried out by a report of each 
commercial channel's operation for the past 12 months. Aldridge ( 1998) explained 
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that after the reports are published the licensees come in for meetings to argue any 
problems that are noted. To achieve this level of operational television knowledge the 
staff in the programming division of the ITC are each responsible for monitoring a set 
number of programme hours each week. This task includes programmes on cable and 
satellite channels. The staff members write evaluation reports about programme 
quality and any Code violations or other concerns observed (Aldridge, 1998). 
Another area of public service appears in the programme strands for commercial 
television operators called "positive programme requirements". They derive from 
different Sections of different Broadcasting Acts (ITC, 1997 October). For example, 
the programme requirements for Channel 4 are documented in Section 25 of the 1990 
Broadcasting Act which states: 
Channel 4 programmes must contain a suitable proportion of material which 
will appeal to taste and interests not generally catered for by ITV: to be 
innovative and experimental; to have a wide range in subject matter and that 
Channel 4 should be provided as a public service for disseminating 
information, education and entertainment and generally have a distinctive 
character of its own (ITC, October 1997, note no. 6). 
The strength of these license conditions is illustrated in the public debate that took 
place in 1998 when ITV proposed its News at Ten programme be rescheduled on 
weekdays to a 6.30pm time slot instead of 1 Opm to enable the broadcaster to schedule 
feature films in the evenings (ITC, 1998 September). The ITC held public 
consultations to gauge viewer reactions and a fierce debate was waged in the press as 
to whether this proposal was "the first step in an ITV campaign to shed one public-
service responsibility after another'' (Snoddy, 1998). These actions and the tradition 
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of regulations for both standards and programmes across all broadcasting options, 
including commercial television, display a consistent commitment to operate 
broadcasting as a service on behalf of British citizens. 
The theoretical pattern of British television regulation 
This review reveals that British commercial television exhibits "broadcasting 
pluralism" through its multiple institutions and regulations for programme content 
diversity, and "neo-pluralism'' through its inclusion of community opinion in policies. 
Held ( 1987) defines neo-pluralism as a deliberate state intervention to ensure 
participation by groups that otherwise would lack representation in market-led 
broadcasting. 
Drummond, Paterson and Willis ( 1993) split broadcasting pluralism into two 
perspectives. These are external pluralism or a system that has "a number of parallel 
broadcasting institutions" and internal pluralism or "the provision of a broad range of 
programmes and opinions within one or sometimes more broadcasting services (p. 52). 
The British regulatory system across all broadcast television services displays both 
pluralism perspectives. This system has only evolved as the fundamental principle 
overriding all others at the heart of British broadcasting regulation is the decision to 
put the interests of viewers first (Smee, 1997). 
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4.6: Two theories in action define New Zealand broadcasting evolution 
At the close of the media review chapters informing this action research programme a 
concluding insight is offered about the contradictory evolution of New Zealand 
broadcasting. This insight is a result of reflections about New Zealand's media 
development compared to the overseas models. It is proposed that institutional 
pluralism and managerialism are key ingredients influencing the organisation and 
operation of New Zealand broadcasting, rather than the British public service or 
American market models. These two ingredients, however, exist and are displayed in 
these overseas traditions and both relate to different distributions of social power, as 
do the overseas models described. 
Mosco and Rideout (1997) state social power that operates in specific "situational" 
circumstances over '·specific issues" defines the pluralist perspective. This is 
confirmed in New Zealand by governments using their legislative and executive power 
to periodically restructure broadcasting regulation and form different institutions. 
Chapters one and two revealed such changes to be mainly a negotiation between 
political and economic interests, rather any clear long-term philosophical direction. 
New Zealand governments through such actions display a functionalist approach to 
broadcasting regulation. The many restructurings of broadcasting, and the rule-like 
procedures and executive interventions guiding its operation display a preference for 
elite bureaucratic organisation and a resulting dependence on managerialism. 
Managerialism with its constraining focus and pluralism's power dispersal are 
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contradictory, as is the pathway of New Zealand broadcasting (Mosco & Rideout, 
1997). 
The case studies of the two overseas triangle partners reveal market and public service 
principles which are both patterns in New Zealand broadcasting but these are not 
oppositional choices - in spite of public debates positioning them this way - as both 
systems attract similar debates about quality and public accountability. What is 
apparent is that over the years a political attempt has been made to provide a structure 
for viewer representation and local programme interest. For example, the 
establishment of the Broadcasting Standards Authority and NZ On Air in the 
Broadcasting Act ( 1989) were steps along the pathway of "pluralism" in New 
Zealand's broadcasting. Examined alongside the philosophies underpinning the 
development of American and British broadcasting, New Zealand's brand of 
broadcasting philosophy can be interpreted as a lengthy evolvement towards 
·'institutional broadcasting pluralism" rather than either of their national regulatory 
styles. 
There has been confusion and arguments about what model New Zealand broadcasting 
represents since the first transmissions and regulations. The mixed funding system, its 
public service ideals, strict bureaucratic organisation, competitive free market policies, 
government demands for profit maximisation, and the application of corporate 
attitudes have all masked any definitive tradition or purpose. Rennie explains these 
debates: 
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Our confusion of understanding can be seen in the very language we use. 
Public sector broadcasting? Or public broadcasting? Or public service 
broadcasting? Our public broadcasters call their competitors private 
broadcasters. Our private broadcasters call themselves independent 
broadcasters, and snipe at the public broadcasters and state broadcasters. 
Services which take money from government or audience are non commercial. 
By implication, non-commercial broadcasting is the same as public 
broadcasting ( cited in Hawke, 1990, p. 19). 
While New Zealand's publicly owned broadcasting has always reflected aspects of the 
British and American systems it has never sufficiently matched their broadcasting 
models to provide precise policy directions or conclusions. Historically the 
authoritarian style of central government and its political interventions have 
overwhelmed the egalitarian pattern of New Zealand society which is now more 
visible in its commitment to "broadcasting pluralism" during an era of broadcasting 
deregulation. For example, ex BBC employees like Ormand Wilson ( 1946) were 
critical of early broadcasting for its lack of attention to radio listeners in the tradition 
of British radio. However, New Zealand officials were in their own way committed to 
ensuring all New Zealanders received a radio service of some description with a 
variety of programming not dissimilar to Reith's public service tradition of 
information, education and entertainment. This was not an easy commitment with the 
diverse geographical terrain of the country. These geographic difficulties led to the 
formation of a state-operated transmission company, Broadcasting Communications 
Limited (BCL), which still controls the transmission distribution network today. 
This same social commitment was visible in the production policy for television, 
established by Gilbert Stringer in the 1960s. This turned regional television stations 
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into local production houses for separate genres so different programme strands were 
provided for viewers. Critics of New Zealand broadcasting often base their views on a 
polarised choice between public service or market policies (Smith, 1996; MacKay, 
1953; Wilson, 1946) rather than its development as a public good (Maharey, 1990). 
4.7: Pluralism and managerialism at work in New Zealand television 
If viewed as a pub I ic good the mode of operation long practiced by New Zealand 
television policymakers more closely resembles a process of politically imposed 
"institutional broadcasting pluralism" than the entrenched philosophies of either 
Britain or America. A progressive commitment to both external and internal pluralism 
can be discerned in the policies of both the government and broadcasters. This has 
affected the programming of even private for-profit operators. For example, 
Can West's TV3 and TV4 Network produces local children's programmes, Maori 
language programmes and documentaries, all traditionally the genre domain of public 
service style television, and both public and privately owned broadcast channels 
promote their public complaint services on screen, in response to the rules of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority. 
The triangulation of overseas influences has assisted the formation of this pluralism 
discourse as New Zealand institutions reflect the functions of overseas models. 
Institutions such as the Broadcasting Standards Authority and NZ On Air work with 
broadcasters to achieve programme standards and diverse topic strands through local 
productions. External and internal pluralism became a more obvious broadcasting 
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framework during the government era promoting minimal regulation and free-market 
economic policies. 
The one factor still lacking in New Zealand's development of broadcasting pluralism 
is a commitment to directly consult citizens to inform community impact policies. 
The in-depth evaluation of the role and impacts of New Zealand's political economy 
on broadcasting allows this assessment. The integration of citizen opinion in 
broadcasting policies would complete the pluralism cycle and eliminate a current 
organisational deficiency. Presently, citizens are displaced from any participation in 
broadcasting policies by elite in-group experts and they are further distanced by their 
being positioned and identified as an audience, instead of citizens (Karim, 1991, p. 
58). New Zealand citizens in broadcasting matters continue to have no power despite 
the years at the end of the century being an era that recognises the supremacy of 
consumer power and its sovereignty (Offe, 1984). 
Gathering and integrating citizens' opinions in public policies would reconcile the 
contradictions that have plagued New Zealand broadcasting regulation. Such an 
ethical, and democratic, policy if enacted by government and broadcasters could also 
synthesise the reflected functions of the triangle partners into a unique pluralist 
framework and transform the current managerial incompatibilities of public service 
and market, especially in a publicly owned organisation, such as Television New 
Zealand. A commitment to gather citizens's opinions to inform policies will also give 
policies with a widespread community impact a public mandate. This mandate can be 
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achieved through Citizens' Juries as proposed in this thesis. The background and 
design of Citizens' Juries, and their international use, are discussed in chapter five as 
an action step towards organising a trial Citizens' Jury involving New Zealand 
television policymakers and a group of citizens. 
4.8: Summary 
The research direction and action plan to locate a public consultation method to 
engage citizens and television policymakers in policy dialogue were successful. 
During an interview with a senior research officer at the Independent Television 
Commission in London, the Citizens' Jury method was discovered. After 
investigations, it proved to be a suitable method to trial with New Zealand television 
policymakers to show they could easily gather citizens opinions. 
The material in this chapter reveals the regulation of British commercial television to 
be based on public service principles with attention paid to community interests and 
opinions. This is achieved by positive regulations for diverse strands of programming; 
programme monitoring; commissioned research projects, and citizen dialogue 
methods. American television reflects the minimal regulation and lack of attention to 
public opinion and community interests consistent with corporate dominance and 
competitive market principles. The organisation of New Zealand television reflects 
aspects of both the British and American broadcast systems in an ebb and flow manner 
according to the political philosophies of the government in power. 
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Consequently, it is still the political beliefs of government dispersed through 
bureaucratic policymakers and officials, rather than any particular long-term 
philosophical commitment, which continues to influence New Zealand television 
regulation. Therefore, it is concluded even these reflections are a deliberate result of 
the social power of successive governments to control and dictate the media regulatory 
environment. This is because the continual political restructuring of New Zealand 
television organisation differs from the broadcasting traditions of the triangle partners, 
Britain and America, where regulatory environments were designed to act long-term 
either in the public interest, or to encourage market competition. 
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- 5 -
Citizens' Juries: Dissolving Dialogue Boundaries 
In the preceding four chapters, I have linked description and hypothesis with an 
"intention to change'' (Eden & Huxham, I 996, p. 530). This chapter investigates the 
potential of Citizens' Juries to offer a resolution of the distant relationship between 
television policymakers and New Zealand citizens. The choice of the Citizens' Jury 
model stems primarily from their ability to equalise communication among 
participants by dispersing elite social power. It followed a review of the international 
use of Citizens' Juries that showed, firstly, how they might transform the present elite 
and insulated dialogue circle of television, and other media policymakers by 
introducing community representative opinions, and, secondly, also fulfill the 
increasing legislative moves towards encouraging public participation practices. 
In line with action research practice, the material of this chapter produces theories 
applicable to this particular action research cycle. Its theory building moves forward 
incrementally "from the particular to the general in small steps" (Eden & Huxham, 
I 996, p. 537) so that the preceding data, which ''informed this intervention and 
research intent" (p. 533), is systematically implicated in the progression of each action 
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research step. Consequently, this chapter begins by reviewing the data prescribing the 
action plan intervention, as it is the critical foundation for this action research cycle. 
5.1: Thesis data prescribing this action cycle and the action plan 
The descriptive examples in chapters one and two revealed television broadcasting to 
be established by government as a social service for New Zealanders. At the same 
time they also charted how, through top-down social power, governments and 
broadcasting officials acted as elite controllers dictating policies influenced by their 
political and economic interests. This situation was shown to exclude consultation 
with citizens even about changes to policies with a wide spread community impact, 
such as the Codes of Broadcasting Practice. 
The case studies of British and American broadcasting regimes in chapter four 
unveiled different national understandings about television regulation, and their 
relationship to a community. The international case material highlighted one key area 
of divergence from New Zealand. By consulting with grassroots citizens directly 
about policies (through Citizens' Juries and Citizens' Forums), policymakers at the 
Independent Television Commission in Britain acted as if broadcasting were more of a 
social service and illustrated a willingness to share decision-making power. Despite 
Television New Zealand (TVNZ) being a publicly owned network, I could not locate 
any similar actions by New Zealand television officials. One US Federal 
Communications Commissioner explained such a contradictory situation through the 
idea that "institutions .... are sometimes like people as they simply act primarily in 
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their own self-interest" (Powell, 1998, p. 1 ). His explanation fits the New Zealand 
experience. The reviewed material shows Television New Zealand officials to be 
aligned with profit maximisation policies through a Statement of Corporate Intent 
rather than any organisational culture of community service. 
In the course of this study, in analysing how the action research field of New Zealand 
media regulation operates, and in whose interests, my role as an action researcher 
became "integrally" (Eden & Huxham, 1997, p. 537) positioned. This occurred when 
in line with the historical research, contemporary participation in television practice 
policy discussions proved to be closed to anyone not judged to have media 
govemmentality and elite social power. Such a closet elite arrangement by New 
Zealand television policymakers appeared to be socially out of date in an era widely, 
and actively, promoting the benefits of public participation and public consultation 
practices for both organisations and their community stake-holders. As a change-
agent researcher, therefore, I decided the situation had to be redressed so that 
television policies could be compiled more on behalf of the national community than a 
small elite. In order to facilitate such an action step, I required an intervention 
response mechanism. My problem-solving action plan involved organising a trial 
Citizens' Jury to demonstrate one solution to getting beyond the existing asymmetrical 
policymaking. 
The Citizens' Jury decision linked back to theoretical themes of democratic idealism 
and public participation values, which, in tum linked back to the notion of media 
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playing a democratic and public deliberation role in society (e. g., Veis, 2000; Page, 
1996; Dahlgren, 1995; Keane, 1991). Proponents ofthe Citizens' Jury model valued 
its ability to gather citizen representative knowledge to assist policy discussions and 
other organisational decision-making (Jefferson Center, 2000; Institute of Public 
Policy Research, 1998; Fishkin, 1991 ). This historical and international context had 
not had much influence within New Zealand. 
5.2: The status of public consultation practice in New Zealand 
In order to situate the action plan in this country, I want to outline public consultation 
and public participation practice advocacy in New Zealand before examining, in a 
single case study, the philosophy and methodology underpinning Citizens' Juries. The 
hierarchical citizen exclusion exhibited by contemporary New Zealand media 
policymakers, especially in relation to publicly owned broadcast television, is out of 
step when compared to the multiple promotions of public consultation by government. 
Chen ( 1994) reports that "since 1987 there have been over 3 73 instances of the use of 
the word 'consultation' in new legislation" (cited in Hayward, 1997, p. 411). While 
the enshrining of consultative practice in legislation may have gained increased 
attention towards such a practice, actual results have been more in line with the norn1s 
of public participation, rather than the face to face symmetrical consultation or 
dialogue engagement proposed in this thesis, as exemplified by the Independent 
Television Commission in Britain. 
131 
Hayward ( 1997) defines pub) ic consultation as "lay community involvement in the 
policy process" and clarifies its form through its 1992 description by Chief Justice Mr 
McGechan (p. 411 ). The Chief Justice describes public consultation as: "The 
statement of a proposal not yet finally decided upon, I istening to what others have to 
say, considering their responses, and then deciding what will be done" (McGechan 
cited in Hayward, 1997, p. 411 ). Hayward also cites McGechan to the effect that 
public consultation is not "merely telling or presenting information" (I 997, p. 4 I I). 
Such explanations have been expanded into key defining elements - of the public 
consultation process - by the Ministry for the Environment and Local Government 
Commission (1994). 
They include: providing sufficient information to consulted parties; ensuring 
sufficient time for consultation and subsequent deliberation on advice; genuine 
consideration of the advice given; and an open mind and willingness to change 
( cited in Hayward, I 997, p. 4 I I). 
All these elements of consultation practice are present in the Citizens' Jury model and 
some international Citizens' Juries but not in a Citizens' Jury organised by 
Wellington's City Council in I 996. This Citizens' Jury attracted negative comments 
and accusations about its planning, and treatment of the citizen participants. 
Public consultation differs from public participation, which is a more asymmetrical 
activity regularly conducted by many organisations. The latter process covers a 
variety of actions ranging from public meetings to opinion gathering polls, to 
leafleting, and house to house interviews (Loew, I 979). 
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In New Zealand public participation and community consultation are both strongly 
promoted, for example, by local government legislation (e.g., Ministry for the 
Environment and Local Government Commission, 1994). But despite such 
legislation most Councils only engage reluctantly in public participation activities and 
criticise the practice of public consultation mainly because "it could make decision-
making unduly prolonged" (Brown, 1996, p. 38). This attitude contradicts the idea 
that a high public approval rate should be a core value of local government operation 
(Erik-Lane, 1993). The disabling contradiction applies equally to Television New 
Zealand since a high level of public approval could only increase viewer numbers and 
enhance its operational success. 
Brown's (1996) research further reveals that the acceptance of public consultation 
practice by local government authorities - as a statutory requirement to consent - is not 
universal and councils vary in their efforts citing sporadic public interest in defence of 
their practices. Such defences go against her evidence, which suggests those councils 
that use creative methods get a better response "than those who simply hold public 
meetings and advertise in the classified section of local papers" (Brown, 1996, p. 39). 
In contrast to New Zealand the use of Citizens' Juries by local authorities in both 
Britain and America is becoming more widespread as their citizen consultative value 
is increasingly valued in comparison to the norms of public participation. 
In summary, it would appear that a belief in public participation is a core requirement 
if public consultation is to be implemented by an organisation, and become a regular, 
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ethically produced organisational practice. The reviews of New Zealand media 
policies revealed no evidence of public consultation, or public participation practice. 
However, government legislation and department documents both signal a strong 
commitment to encouraging organisations to utilise public consultation techniques and 
put forward public participation as a foundation for strong communities. 
5.3: The importance of public participation to organisational well-being 
Such positive government attitudes to public participation practice can be found in, for 
example, an Internal Affairs's (1997) working document that promotes public 
participation as a building block for strong communities. Figure 4 illustrates that this 
government department's vision is linked to a strategy of active public participation so 
that all citizens, including leaders of organisations, benefit. 
Participation 
*self-worth develops 






*Core values shared 
*Diverse identities respected 
*Sense of identity and belonging 





Figure 4. Participation's Role in Building a Strong Community 
(Figure 4 was adapted from: Factors that Build Strong Communities, Department of Internal Affairs. 
1997. This source was a working document. not established policy). 
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The diagram (Figure 4) emphasises public participation as a cohesive factor for 
achieving strong a New Zealand community and a number of positive benefits are 
listed for those organisations willing to work cooperatively and share decision-making 
power. The benefits include organisational leaders gaining information to clarify 
priorities and citizens, through an active involvement in such decision-making, 
gaining a sense of self-worth. 
Clearly my decision to encourage public participation in television policy 
consultations through a trial Citizens' Jury aligns directly with this government 
department's vision of cooperation between different community sectors and the 
development of an involved, and rejuvenated, citizenship. Public participation, 
according to the Internal Affairs Department, can assist the realisation of many 
organisational objectives. These include: a better and more efficient use of resources; 
goals being easier to achieve; trust developing between participants, and notably 
"better informed" decisions. In addition, the Internal Affairs Department's analysis 
indicates that leaders who inspire and integrate participation in their organisations will 
be supported by teamwork, be more likely to be retained, and attract core values such 
as cooperation and a sense of identity and belonging in their organisations. 
These values arising from public participation practice reflect a list of core values 
provided by the International Association of Public Participation (IAP2). The 
Association summarises these as: 
I. The public should have a say in decisions about actions that affect their 
lives 
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2. Public participation includes the promise that the public's contribution will 
influence the decision 
3. The public participation process communicates the interests and meets the 
process needs of all participants 
4. The public participation process seeks out and facilitates the involvement 
of those potentially affected 
5. The public participation process involves participants in defining how they 
participate 
6. The public participation process communicates to participants how their 
input affected the decision 
7. The public participation process provides participants with the information 
they need to participate in a meaningful way (www. IAP2 Homepage, 
I 999). 
The flow of positive benefits from public participation is an argument in favour of 
citizen representative dialogue being gathered and being allowed to inform policy. It 
has obvious relevance to community impact media policies, especially broadcast 
television's Codes of Practice. Indeed I intend to show how the list of benefits and the 
core values of public participation practice can all be achieved through the use of 
Citizens' Juries. The following case study describes the design and operational 
features of the Citizens' Jury model through the writings of Jury proponents and 
political theorist James Fishkin. 
5.4: (Case) Citizens' Juries: A Strategy for Citizen Participation 
In Democracy and Deliberation James Fiskin ( I 991) relates his quest to bring greater 
participation power to American citizens. He tells how the journey led him to 
examine the functions of Athenian democracy in order to design a public consultation 
method suited to modern nations. His review of Athenian democracy identifies it as 
an institutional practice of citizen inclusion that worked to share decision-making 
power in a manner that matches: the list of public participation benefits promoted by 
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Internal Affairs ( 1997); the list of core values of the International Association for 
Public Participation (1999); and the government's multiple legislative advocacy of 
public consultation practice. 
The practice of citizen representative democracy carried out by citizens in the 
governing of Ancient Greece underpins the methodology of Citizens' Juries and their 
variants (e.g., Citizens' Forums, Deliberative Public Opinion Panels and Deliberative 
Polls). The Citizens' Jury model incorporates the face to face group consultation -
with its equalisation of social power - of citizens in this ancient democracy into a 
model that can act as a mechanism for political equality and deliberation between 
elites and grassroots citizens (Fishkin, 1991 ). 
The particular problem Fish kin wished to resolve was a lack of debate equality for 
citizens in the American electoral system for selecting presidential candidates, due to 
agenda-setting by candidates and media. He used principles from Athenian society as 
a basis for his deliberative poll model and, in so doing, sets out the principles and 
operational components of Citizens' Juries. Fishkin's (1991, 1995) analysis ofthis 
process is referred to by leading organisers of Citizens' Juries, such as the Jefferson 
Center in Minnesota, and the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Opinion 
Leader Research (OLR) in London. 
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Distinguishing features of the Citizens' Jury method 
The following criteria are generally considered to be distinguishing features of the 
Jury method (Jefferson Center, 2000; ITC, 1998; Hanley, 1999, Meaden, 1999). The 
organisation of a Citizens· Jury begins with the random sampling of a population to 
select a representative group of citizens from that population (Fish kin, 1991, 1995). 
This means everyone has an equal chance of being chosen to participate in the group 
and the results of the group interaction will provide a snapshot picture of the opinions 
of the entire population sampled. A second layer is added to this sampling process. 
The sample group is given the opportunity to engage in face to face dialogue with 
experts about a public issue and deliberate thoughtfully before presenting their 
opinions about the issue. This information sharing and debating with expert witnesses 
establishes the foundation for the informed deliberation or consultation, which is 
carried out by the sample group. Fiskin states these two processes combine to provide 
"a statistical model of what the electorate would think if, hypothetically, all voters had 
the same opportunities that are offered to the sample'" ( 1991, p. 4 ). 
The Jefferson Center in America, which has been organising Citizens Juries since 
1974, refines these features into five essential characteristics for any Jury event and 
these, along with Fishkin's theoretical analysis, are later used to evaluate the Waikato 
Citizens' Jury: 
Random Selection The members of the jury pool are randomly selected 
through scientific polling techniques 
Representative Jurors are carefully selected to be representative of the 





Witnesses [experts] provide information to the jury on 
the key aspects of the issue. Witnesses present a range 
of perspectives and opinions. The jury engages the 
witnesses in a dialogue to guarantee that all questions 
are answered. 
Witness testimony is carefully balanced to ensure fair 
treatment to all sides of the issue. 
The jury deliberates in a variety of formats and is given 
a sufficient amount of time to ensure that all the jurors 
opinions are considered 
(Jefferson Center website, 2000). 
Fishkin (1991, 1995) claims these characteristics distinguish deliberative polling 
methods, such as Citizens Juries, from ordinary polling methods. In his estimation 
ordinary public opinion polls only "model what the public thinks, given how little it 
knows'' whereas opinion poll methods with information sharing and deliberation 
"model what the public would think, if it had a more adequate chance to think about 
the issues" (Fishkin, 1991, p. l ). Fishkin also describes the results of deliberative style 
polls to be prescriptive rather than predictive "because they are the voice of the people 
under special conditions where the people have had a chance to think about the issues 
and hence should have a voice worth listening to" ( 1991, p. 4 ). 
Following Fishkin: Tracing the theoretical pathway to Citizens' Juries 
In his search to define conditions for a democratic model of citizen representation, 
Fishkin investigates a wide range of theories and ideas about democracy from the 
philosophic writings of Aristotle and Rousseau to Madison and Montesquieu (I 991, 
pp. 14-25). Many arguments about such a model relate to how democratic principles 
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can or cannot operate in relation to population size and the subsequent limitations to 
democratic principles. 
Fishkin (1991) cites three democratic value conditions espoused by Madison (1974) as 
defining conditions for any democratic method of citizen representation. These are 
deliberation, non-tyranny and political equality - all of which are found within the 
Citizens' Jury methodology. Fishkin (1991) describes the functions of each condition 
in considerable detail but the following quotation provides a concise summary of their 
importance and relationship to each other: 
Without political equality, votes are not counted equally or the voices of some 
do not get an effective hearing. Without nontyranny, the essential interests of 
some groups are destroyed when such outcomes could be entirely avoided for 
everyone. In other words, when tyranny of the majority is the result, the moral 
claims of democracy are undermined. Without deliberation, democratic 
choices are not exercised in a meaningful way. If the preferences that 
determine the results of democratic procedures are unreflective or ignorant, 
then they lose their claim to political authority over us. Deliberation is 
necessary if the claims of democracy are not to be de-legitimated (Fishkin, 
1991, p. 29). 
The three value conditions do not exist in statistical sampling techniques (i. e., public 
opinion polling). Their lack of deliberation and potential for a tyranny by a majority 
made Fishkin discard these as suitable techniques for a democratic public consultation 
method. In support of his dismissal of these popular polling methods, he discusses 
the analysis of poll research carried out by several people, including Philip Converse 
( 1970). Converse concluded, that when polled in this manner about many issues, four 
out of five citizens do not have stable, nonrandom opinions. Instead they have what 
he terms ''nonattitudes" and he estimates that 80 to 90 percent of a population will 
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invent opinions on the spot (cited in Fishkin, 1991, p. 83). Fi skin also claims this type 
of poll, through being quoted widely in mass media, can result in non-existent 
opinions, and inaccurate poll results, taking '·on a life of their own" (1991, p. 84). 
Consequently, Fishkin considers public opinion polls to be an incomplete system for 
citizen representation due to their lack of deliberation and says this makes them only 
"half a vision" of democracy (1991, p. 24). 
Combining deliberation and Athenian juries into a full democratic vision 
The integration of information sharing by elites with citizen deliberation makes the 
Citizens' Jury method a more democratic and socially equal consultation model for 
public participation practice. In The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and 
Democracy ( 1995) Fish kin adds "participation" as a fourth value condition to his 
previous foundation three (i.e., deliberation, non-tyranny and political equality) and 
states that efforts to realize all four have usually been unsuccessful (1995). This, he 
states, is because most notions of democratic participation accept the values of 
political equality, non-tyranny and participation, but still neglect deliberation (Fishkin, 
1995). 
Brown's (1996) research revealed local government authorities believed public 
consultation, as opposed to other participation practices, could delay or lengthen a 
decision-making process. It is the deliberation component they judge to be the 
delaying factor, but deliberation is a necessary component if citizens are to respond 
with informed and appropriate opinions and recommendations about a topic. The 
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element of deliberation means public views are refined and enlarged by what Dahl 
terms '·enlightened understanding" ( cited in Fishkin, 1991, p. 36). Dahl explains the 
criteria necessary to achieve this situation: 
In order to express his or her preferences accurately, each citizen ought to have 
adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and validating in the time 
permitted by the need for a decision, what his or her preferences are in the 
matter to be decided ( cited in Fishkin, 1991, p. 36). 
To this explanation Fishkin adds the criterion that "the participants must be willing to 
consider the arguments offered on their merits and listen and participate with an 
openness to the reasons given on one side or another" (I 991, p. 3 7). Fishkin also adds 
that it is up to the participants deliberating about an issue "whether they will finally 
decide in terms of their personal interests or values or the interests or values of some 
group or region'' ( 1991, p. 3 7). 
Following Follett: The coactive arrangement of power in Citizens' Juries 
All the previously explained value conditions and criteria combine in Citizens' Juries 
to describe a decentralised system of social power that connects to the pluralist 
perspective of social power. Olsen and Marger (l 993) follow the same pathway, from 
Aristotle to Madison, as Fishkin in their discussion of pluralist social power (pp. 83-
87). They point out that in order "to disperse power and involve nonelites in power 
processes" there must be a pro I iferation of autonomous groups, associations and other 
organisations located throughout a society'' (p. 84). This type of grassroots activity is 
already widespread in New Zealand but the network is not characterised by any ability 
to wield sufficient power to influence government decision-making or other elite 
organisations such as television broadcasters. Instead such activity in regard to 
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television (e.g., Friends of Public Broadcasting and Children's Media Watch) more 
closely matches Olsen and Marger's (I 993) category of "mediation pluralism" (p. 84). 
This category is effectively extended in the symmetrical citizen-elite dialogue of 
public deliberation models. Such an extension, however, requires a willingness by 
elite executives, and their organisations, to participate with grassroots citizens - and 
share social power - as in the "coactive" power sharing principle advocated by Follett 
( 1965). 
Follett's promotion of jointly exercised or "coactive" organisational social power 
describes the manner in which social power operates in Citizens' Juries (Gilbert et al., 
1992, p. 45). She emphasises the benefits of "power with people" instead of the 
"power over people" approach found to be evident throughout the reviews of media 
development in this study. Follett examined the arrangement of social power in large 
organisations in the same era Max Weber formulated his bureaucracy concept but 
proposed "it was important to rethink the traditional notions of authority and power" 
(cited in Gilbert et al., 1992, p. 45) to achieve better decision-making. 
Another concept from Follett effectively describes the consultation and deliberation 
processes carried out in Citizen Jury events. She explains "constructive conflict" to be 
an opinion refining process and suggests that "conflict is neither good nor bad" but 
just "the appearance of difference, difference of opinions, of interests" (Follett cited in 
Metcalf, 1965, p. 30). During Citizens' Juries there can often be a clash of diverse and 
sometimes forcefully expressed opinions but these serve to progress the consultation 
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and deliberation ··coactively" towards what Dahl ( 1979) described as "enlightened 
understanding''. 
Fishkin, like others, discovered these two processes (coactive power and constructive 
conflict) occurred in the jury system of Athenian society. In addition, he found the 
four conditional democratic values (political equality, nontyranny, deliberation and 
participation) were combined within the lottery system of Athenia to select citizen 
juries (Fishkin, 1991, p. 86). Fishkin explains: 
Of all the ancient Greek institutions that employed the lottery, the one that 
most closely parallels our proposal is the use of citizens' juries. The juries had 
a much broader range and discretion than do our modern juries, and they 
would typically number around five hundred .... They were miniature, 
statistically representative versions of the entire citizenry who were given wide 
discretion in making political judgements for the polity (p. 87-88). 
The institutionalisation of Citizens Juries as a societal benefit 
Citizens Juries and other deliberative methods are increasingly being seen to be a 
preferable, and more democratic alternative, to the present wholesale, and incomplete, 
elite mediation of public issues by mass media and asymmetrical polling methods. 
This vision extends to include their institutionalisation, just as the legal system's jury 
service has been, with similar obligations of citizenship. Fishkin describes the 
similarity between the legal jury concept and the Athenian based jury model: 
Both are meant, in some sense, to be representative of ordinary citizens. Both 
are premised on the notion that ordinary citizens, when immersed in the 
relevant materials, can deal with difficult intellectual questions (1991, p. 9). 
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The similarity gave modern Citizens' Juries their name. Fishkin's desire to find a 
strategy that could bring power to the people "under conditions where people could 
exercise their power thoughtfully", and in informed fashion, but unconstrained by 
elitist agendas is realised in the deliberative Citizens' Jury model ( 1991, p. 12). Such 
face to face public deliberation is preferable if public policy is to authentically reflect 
community preferences and an "organised, articulate Public" is to come into being 
(Dewey cited in Page, 1996, p. 2). 
Finally, Fishkin notes that citizen participation in serious deliberations about issues 
appears to have had a galvanising effect in Athenian society on a participant's interest 
in public affairs. Hamilton ( 1942) claims the Greeks realised that life is a dynamic 
process requiring "the exercise of vital powers along lines of excellence in a life 
affording them scope" (cited in Feinberg, 1973, p. 26). If this situation is replicated it 
is entirely possible that one participation outcome would be a rejuvenation of the sense 
of citizenship and public debate already documented as lacking in New Zealand 
society. The face to face consultation and coactive distribution of social power of 
Citizens' Juries could resolve both the lack of citizen engagement in public issues and 
the use of top-down social power by television broadcasters, and other policymakers. 
A review of some international Citizens' Juries confirms they can produce increased 
citizen interest in public issues and a corresponding appreciation of citizen wisdom by 
policymakers and organisational leaders. 
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5.5: An international review of some Citizens' Juries and their topics 
During the 1990s Citizens' Juries grew in popularity and many different organisations, 
especially those related to public services, in a variety of countries (e.g., Britain, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Australia) chose to use them to investigate citizen 
opinions to inform policies and decision-making. The variety and complexity of 
topics deliberated by Juries, and the different types of organisations using them, 
confirms the versatility of the model. For example in Australia, the issue of 
genetically modified food was debated by a panel of 14 citizens in the country's first 
Citizens' Jury held in Canberra in March 1999 (Templeton, 1999). However, it is in 
Britain and America that their use has spread to the point of institutionalisation. A 
review of Jury projects in these countries shows the method consistently works to 
equalise social power between elites and grassroots citizens to produce an atmosphere 
that is conducive to information sharing, and equitable coactive consultation to assist 
elite policy decision-making. 
In American the Jefferson Center in Minneapolis has been an organiser of Citizens 
Juries at local, state and national levels since 1974 (www. Jefferson Center, 
Homepage, 2000). The Center says their mission is "to determine the will of an 
informed public and present those views clearly and actively to the individuals and 
organisations responsible for making policy decisions" and states that "involving 
citizens in high quality dialogue about a key issue ultimately leads to increased public 
support for the resulting policy" (p. l ). These views reflect the benefits of public 
participation listed by the Internal Affairs' Department (l 997). 
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Citizens' Juries organised by the Jefferson Center have deliberated on topic issues 
ranging from Physician Assisted Suicide and Minnesota's Electricity Future to At-
Risk Children, Health Care Reform, The Federal Budget, Low Income Housing, 
Organ Transplants and even Hog Farming. On their website the Center also describes 
the manner by which the results of a Jury project should be reported. They suggest 
Jury findings and recommendations "appear in language that the jurors themselves 
develop and approve" and that a final report be produced shortly after the Jury 
concludes. The Center describes this reporting process: 
The final report includes additional information about the project, as well as 
the Jury recommendations. The recommendations remain in language that is 
approved by the jurors. The report is given to involved decision-makers and is 
also made available to the public (Jefferson Center webpage, 2000, p. 2). 
In Britain, the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Opinion Leader 
Research (OLR) initiated the use of the Citizens' Juries in March I 996 (IPPR, October 
1997). The method is openly championed by Prime Minister Tony Blair and "the 
Labour government has required local authorities and health authorities to use 
Citizens' Juries to consult their people" (Coote cited in IPPR, I 998, p. 7). Successful 
British projects include a Citizens' Jury organised by the East Sussex health authority 
to explore new options for coordinating local health services in the region. The health 
authority convened a panel of I 4 citizen jurors "to deliberate on provision of local 
gynaecological cancer services" (IPPR, I 998, p. 2). The health authority accepted the 
unanimous Jury verdict and is implementing their recommendations. A health 
authority spokesperson commented that though the Jury appeared to be "a disparate 
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bunch of people tackling one of the most complex decisions in healthcare we couldn't 
have come up with better answers" (Nicholson cited in !PPR, I 998, p.2). 
The procedures for Citizens' Juries described by the Jefferson Center, and the 
democratic features of public deliberation models, as explained by Fishkin (I 99 I, 
I 995), were part of the planning process for two Citizens' Juries instigated by the 
Independent Television Commission (ITC) in October and November I 997. These 
two juries were the first to be convened by a regulatory body in Britain (ITC, March 
I 998, p. 3). The purpose of these two Citizens' Juries was to gather public views 
about what constituted current community standards for "taste and decency" as the 
Commission believed "there are obvious dangers in relying simply on submissions 
from complainants and broadcasters, as this ignores the broad spectrum of viewers' 
attitudes" ( ITC, March I 998, p. 5). The Independent Television Commission used the 
Juries to tap into this "silent majority" to update its policies and "to establish whether 
its decisions were being based on sound criteria" (ITC, March I 998, p. 5). The draft 
report sent to each juror for their initial approval provides a summary of the Juries: 
I 7 jurors were selected in Uxbridge to represent a cross section of the local 
community and I 5 jurors were chosen the same way in Oldham. Each jury sat 
for four days and were asked to produce a series of recommendations which 
would advise the ITC on their policies for regulating the content of television. 
They heard from a number of witnesses who had expertise in the area and 
watched clips from television to make their own regulatory decisions .... 
At the end of the four days each jury produced a set of guidelines to be used 
when making regulatory decisions about the content of television 
(IPPR, I 997,0ctober). 
The recommendations of these two ITC organised Citizen Juries now informs the day 
to day decision-making of ITC staff, a revision of the Programme Code, as well as 
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other television related regulatory issues (IPPR, 1997, October, p. 8). In postjury 
questionnaires, the citizen jurors expressed their appreciation at being invited to 
participate, and note their increased knowledge of television regulation, while the Jury 
report mentions an appreciation of the knowledge contribution made by the citizen 
jurors to inform and benchmark ITC policies. 
5.6: The Wellington Citizens' Jury 
In contrast to the descriptions of these successful Citizens' Juries, and the appreciation 
expressed by both participants and organisers, a Jury commissioned by the Wellington 
City Council in March 1996 shows how they can be easily discredited when their 
ethical methodology is disrupted by an organisation's intention to retain elite social 
power. It also illustrates how poor community engagement can negatively affect an 
organisations's relationship with its community stakeholders, in contrast to the 
positive benefits that can flow to an organisation genuinely committed to a public 
participation event and allowing public dialogue to inform decision-making. 
In February 1996 the Wellington City Council commissioned its Communications' 
Team to organise a Citizens' Jury with the Jury selection contracted out to MLR Ltd, a 
market research company (Cutler, 1996). The Council had decided to use a Citizens' 
Jury as a public consultation mechanism "to gauge the view of the public on the 
Council's loss of control in Capital Power Ltd" resulting from a possible divestment 
of its remaining shareholding interest (Cutler, 1996, p. 2). Cutler's ( 1996) report 
reviewing the effectiveness of the Jury notes a number of points which can be seen to 
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diverge from ethical public participation and valid Citizens' Jury practice. For 
example, he recommends that Council only use the Jury method in future if it agrees 
to either "accept the recommendations of the Jury" or "when the purpose of a Jury is 
to outline options on an issue early in the process of consultation" (Cutler, 1996, p. 1 ). 
The report also states the juror selection process was not random as the MLR company 
selected jurors from their in-house list of people used for their regular market research 
practices. In addition, advertisments for expert witnesses were placed in the press a 
week before the event and the entire planning of the Jury was carried out hurriedly in 
only four weeks. 
The evaluation report reveals a lack of knowledge, including the use of Jury findings 
and the sampling process for selecting jurors, about the methodology of Citizens' 
Juries. These and other points are reflected in some of the negative headlines of press 
articles and citizens's letters after the Jury event: "Citizens' Juries to be dumped by 
council" (Moran, The Dominion, 1996, July 4, p. 9); "Why waste money on 
consultation?" (Boswell, The Evening Post, 1996, June 4, p. 4); "Politicians disregard 
the popular will" (Trotter, The Dominion, 1996, May 17, p. 6). 
Not only did the Wellington Jury organisers ignore established Jury planning 
procedures, they also neglected the established value conditions for any public 
consultation or public participation event (Hayward, 1997; IAP2, 1999). Edwards 
describes the outcome of this situation: 
Not that it was a bad idea to ask citizens to help make the decision. It was 
simply that the council had already made its decision. So when the jury voted 
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12 to 2 not to sell Capital Power, the council proceeded with the sale anyway. 
Wellingtonians were left feeling their views didn't matter. The citizens' jury 
was not seen as a serious attempt by the council to consult with its voters 
(Evening Post, 1996, April 7, p. 7). 
Anna Coote, deputy director of the London-based Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR), which promotes and organises Citizens' Juries in Britain, agrees with 
Edwards. During a New Zealand visit she stated, "There is a way to have citizens' 
juries, which will not erode public confidence" and she proposed that the Wellington 
City Council did democracy a disservice as citizens' juries should not be used "simply 
as a new way of hoodwinking the public and raising expectations about being involved 
which are dashed" (Coote cited in Edwards, 1998, p. 7). An elaboration of this kind of 
situation by Heraud suggests Coote is right and that this Jury event could have been a 
public diversion tactic, from a decision already made the Wellington City Council, 
rather than a genuine public consultation effort: 
The attempt to involve people in decisions occurs at a stage too far from the 
positions where power is actually held and once more the appeal to community 
only results in the avoidance of the real issues, that in commenting on social 
issues a means is found whereby attention can be diverted from the social 
structures ( cited in Plant, 1974, p. 63). 
Summary 
This chapter outlined the conditions, values and benefits of public participation and 
public consultation practice to community and organisational well-being. The 
conditions and values are shown to connect with the Citizens' Jury public deliberation 
method and result in similar benefits that also coincide with the core values for public 
participation practice espoused by the International Association for Public 
Participation Practice (IAP2). 
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The thesis data prescribing the action plan (to trial a Citizens' Jury) revealed no 
evidence of public participation practice or its core values in the activities of New 
Zealand press and broadcasting despite their compilation of community impact 
policies, such as practice standards for widespread dissemination by their media. A 
case study examined distinguishing features of the Citizens' Jury model and traced its 
ability to disperse elite social power from the democratic citizen consultation practiced 
in Ancient Greece to the present day use of Citizens' Juries in several countries. 
In conclusion therefore, the value conditions and elements that prescribe the 
deliberative Citizens' Jury model, as explained by Fishkin ( 1991, 1995), the Jefferson 
Center, and the Independent Television Commission, and the conditions and criteria 
for public participation practice outlined by government legislation and the 
International Association of Public Participation, were adopted to assist the planning, 
operation, and evaluation of the Waikato Citizens' Jury project described in the 
chapters six, seven and eight respectively. 
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- 6 -
The Waikato Citizens' Jury Action Plan 
!find news coverage of personal tragedy offensive at times and an invasion of privacy. 
I find some interviews offensive in the questions they ask and the implications of some 
of their questions. 
(NZ female, teacher, aged 40-44 yrs.) 
No, nothing I see or hear on TV offends me. 
(NZ Maori female, home-caregiver, aged 35-39 yrs.) 
I don't like to see rape, offensive language and child abuse on TV 
(NZ male, dairy farmer, aged 40-44 yrs.) 
I realise that I have the option of the channel, mute and off buttons and that freedom 
of speech is a tenant of Western democracy but it saddens me that standards have 
declined from even years ago. 
(NZ male, student, aged 25-29 yrs.) 
Most offensive or controversial programmes are on late at night. However, I don 't like 
advertisements that feel the word 'bugger' is socially acceptable in NZ. 
(Dutch female, secretary, age 35-39 yrs.) 
Nothing offends me on TV 
(Chinese male, electronic design engineer, aged 30-34 yrs.) 
I avoid watching programmes with violence and simulated sexual intercourse. 
(European male, poet and forester (also ex teacher, aged 55-59 yrs.) 
(These comments are taken from the random sampling questionnaires returned by 
some of the 12 Waikato citizen jurors. See Appendix I for sample questionnaire.) 
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6.1: Data prescribing the Waikato Citizens' Jury project 
This chapter describes the planning steps for the Waikato Citizens' Jury project 
organised to create dialogue between television policymakers and a sample group of 
New Zealand citizens. The project was scheduled to take place from 2 to 4 July 1999 
at the University Lodge facilities on campus at the University of Waikato in Hamilton. 
The action plan to hold a Citizen's Jury was an intervention strategy to demonstrate a 
method for media policymakers to engage in policy dialogue with citizens. 
Exploratory reviews of the action field of media regulation had revealed a historic lack 
of public participation in media policies due to a pattern of elite social power. The 
Waikato Citizens' Jury was initiated as Citizens' Juries had been successfully used 
overseas to gather citizen knowledge to inform a wide variety of policies including 
media regulation. 
The data prescribing the action intervention revealed the group responsible for 
formulating the Codes of Broadcasting Practice in New Zealand was an elite insular 
decision-making circle. The policy dialogue circle included only those judged to have 
media govemmentality. This was shown to be a contrast to the coactive actions of the 
Independent Television Commission in Britain, which engages in direct dialogue with 
grassroots citizens to establish community values and attitudes for its policies through 
events like Citizens' Juries (and other two-way dialogic events). The lack of public 
participation in New Zealand television's community impact policies was shown to be 
socially out of step and to be ignoring the numerous benefits available to organisations 
which engage in public participation practices and consultative dialogue with citizens. 
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The lack of interaction between television broadcasters and grassroots citizens -
especially by the publicly owned Television New Zealand network - about policies 
with a widespread community impact can also be judged undemocratic. Any claim to 
citizen participation or community engagement by way of public opinion surveys was 
assessed as superficial and inaccurate due to their asymmetrical structure, elite agenda 
setting, and lack of opportunity for information sharing and deliberation. 
The topic for the Waikato Citizens' Jury was the "good taste and decency" Code of 
Broadcasting Practice for Free-To-Air television. This issue was chosen as the media 
reviews had disclosed setting this community standard to be a problematic decision for 
both press and broadcasting policymakers. Also, recent research commissions by the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority and the rise in complaints against the "good taste 
and decency" Code suggested there could be a mismatch between the present Code 
and community values. 
The project management of the Waikato Citizens' Jury was a complex endeavour. 
The main planning steps involved in organising the Waikato Citizens' Jury are 
detailed in this chapter while chapter seven provides a summary of the project's 
agenda and the content of each presentation. The evaluation of the Waikato Jury 
project with its connections to the thesis hypothesis is discussed separately in chapter 
eight. 
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6.2: Designing and planning the Waikato Citizens' Jury project 
The decision to organise a full Citizens' Jury programme to demonstrate a manageable 
citizen dialogue structure to New Zealand television policymakers involved a number 
of major planning steps as well as a multitude of small tasks. The planning steps 
ranged from designing a population sampling frame through inviting suitable expert 
speakers, and raising funds to cover the cost of the event to tasks like choosing 
catering menus, and hiring a video technician to tape the Jury sessions so that a record 
was available to accurately record and evaluate the event. 
The project management: The management of the three-day Citizens' Jury event 
was complex and the arrangements necessarily detailed. A systems based approach 
with four phases was adopted for the project's management. This is outlined in Figure 
5 below. 
I. CITIZENS" JURY PROJECT 
Assess all possibilities and identify facilities 
Set broad objectives and prioritise targets 
Design a budget and identify funding resources 
Compile a work plan and administrative chart 
Develop a time/activity flow chart 
Plan project monitoring and evaluation 
4. PROJECT MONITORING & EVALUATION 
Monitoring occurred during 
each step of the action plan to 
ensure all objectives and tasks 
2. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
This phase included initiating all the 
event management details outlined 
in the work plan and flow chart 
in step I were achieved and to enable 
accurate post project evaluation 
PROJECT OPERATION 
The Waikato Citizens' Jury: the action plan 
strategy to create dialogue between television 
policymakers and citizens held 2-4 July 1999 
Figure 5. Waikato Citizens' Jury Project Management Cycle 
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The four phases in Figure 5 were expanded into a detailed time/activity flow chart to 
ensure all components of the Citizens' Jury methodology and event management tasks 
were included, activated and achieved by target dates. Due to a lack of space, and the 
need to focus on the purpose of the action research project, this chapter will discuss 
the activities that connect to the method components for a Citizens' Jury, rather than 
the many tasks that relate to the operational management of the event. The method 
components in the planning for the Waikato Citizens' Jury linked to the criteria 
outlined in chapter five for a valid Citizens' Jury, as explained by Fishkin, (1991, 
1995) and the Jefferson Center. This chapter is designed to provide sufficient data to 
demonstrate how the Waikato project practice conformed to the theoretical design 
criteria for Citizens' Juries. 
However, it must be stated that the satisfactory operation of the Waikato Citizens' 
Jury project was largely a result of the attention paid to the many small details of its on 
site management. These included providing all the material comforts for the 
participants and creating a physical environment and communication atmosphere 
conducive to the progress of the event agenda. The knowledge of how to successfully 
manage these details and the continuous event facilitation and participant relationship 
networking came from practitioner experience. The physical arrangements as well as 
the research objectives were all continually monitored and adjusted as required in line 
with the three primary research objectives for the Waikato Citizens' Jury action 
project. These objectives were: 
157 
• To trial a Citizens' Jury to demonstrate its methodological suitability to act 
as a policy consultation structure between NZ television policymakers and 
grassroots citizens; 
• To assess the ability of the Citizen's Jury method to equalise social power 
between policymakers and citizens; and 
• To gather a sample of community attitudes about the problematic "good 
taste and decency" Code of Practice for Free-To-Air television (BSA, G2 
Code) to present to television policymakers. 
Secondary objectives included an interest in the attitudes of a sample citizen group 
about the general regulation of standards in television services - due to a lack of 
citizen agenda setting - and the group's attitudes to the Jury topic to later compare 
with the results of the Citizens' Juries carried out into this same topic by the 
Independent Television Commission in Britain. 
The action plan: The planning activities for the Citizens' Jury took place over a four 
month period from March 1999 through till the end of June 1999. The action plan 
involved a process of continual reflection and monitoring to achieve the most ethical 
approach and treatment for all involved parties in each action step. As an integrally 
involved action researcher my role included being the sole charge project organiser 
and acting as the on site manager and facilitator/moderator of the Waikato Citizens' 
Jury. The planning strategy for the Waikato Citizens' Jury had six major components. 
The six components did not happen sequentially, and at times their activity overlapped 
with other tasks, but they can be defined as: 
• Ensuring ethical participant treatment; 
• Selecting expert Jury presenters to ensure a balanced programme; 
• Designing an evaluation programme; 
• Carrying out sampling procedures and Jury member selection 
• Compiling the Citizens' Jury agenda and arranging all event logistics; and 
• Writing the Waikato Jury report and arranging its approval and distribution 
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6.3: Ethical considerations and the equitable treatment of participants 
Participant consent: At the heart of the Citizens' Jury method is the ethical treatment 
of all participants. Permission was gained from the University of Waikato Ethics 
Committee to involve human participants in the research programme (see Appendix 
A). A Jury participation and information release consent form was signed jointly by 
each of the 12 citizen jurors and the researcher at the introductory meeting prior to the 
Jury event. A copy of the consent form was given to each juror and the original copy 
retained by the researcher (see Appendix B, consent form sample). 
Citizen juror treatment: When the 12 jurors were initially selected and approached 
an invitation letter was designed to provide sufficient information about the research 
project so they could make an informed decision about their participation. They were 
each asked to return a short form stating their interest. These invitation letters 
contained brief details about the physical arrangements for the event, the expert 
presenters and the researcher's name and phone number were listed for any questions. 
The event was presented as an opportunity for the citizen jurors to learn about 
television regulation and to interact with television broadcasters and others responsible 
for formulating programme standards policies. They were told they would have the 
opportunity to compile their own rules about the "good taste and decency" G2 Code of 
Broadcasting Practice and their decisions would be conveyed to television 
policymakers. 
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The invited jurors were also told all accommodation and catering would be provided 
during the Jury event and there would be a NZ$200.00 fee payment at the close of the 
Jury for their attendance. The payment was intended to compensate them for any 
transportation costs or other minor expenses incurred during the event as their 
participation may have required leave from employment. It was also a gesture of 
appreciation for their time contribution and to ensure none of those selected would be 
financially unable to attend. 
Expert presenters: The presenters invited to attend the Jury event were provided with 
full details about their participation role. An outline of the Citizens' Jury method was 
provided, the project's purpose, the topic, and the length and position of their 
presentation within the Jury agenda. Jury presenters from out of town were offered 
accommodation and they were included in the catering arrangements. No special or 
different arrangements were made for the presenters and some lively discussions took 
place at meal times between the jurors and the available presenters. No payment was 
offered to the Jury presenters apart from airfares. A gift and card was handed to each 
expert presenter in appreciation for their participation before their departure and later a 
complimentary copy of the Waikato Citizens' Jury Report was posted to each person. 
6.4: Selecting the Jury presenters and ensuring a balanced programme 
None of the 12 expert presenters who attended the Waikato Citizens' Jury had any 
experience of such an event but appeared intrigued by the concept. Some presenters 
stayed longer than just their speaking time to observe the progress of the event. 
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Several stayed to observe other sessions two stayed overnight and one stayed to 
observe the entire Jury event. In order to provide the citizen jurors with authoritative 
information about television standards and their operation, it was necessary to involve 
a number of official television experts. Their involvement involved the researcher 
spending a considerable amount of time negotiating in person, and by telephone and 
email, as well as calling upon professional contacts from her work as a practitioner. 
Some invited presenters expressed fears that they could be "put on the spot" by the 
jurors. Two television standards representatives were hesitant about having their 
policies openly questioned face-to-face with a group of 12 citizens. Others liked the 
idea. In spite of assurances that there would not be any acrimonious arguments 
generated by the Jury structure, and my experienced facilitation skills, the TV3 and 
TV4 Ltd network representative who had accepted an invitation to speak at the Jury 
project withdrew shortly before the event citing this, and other factors, as reasons 
during a personal telephone call. She later sent a letter with details about their 
network's programme standard and public complaint procedures, which was read to 
the Jury (see Appendix C). In addition, this network representative arranged for the 
Television New Zealand network spokesperson, David Edmunds, to represent their 
viewpoint if required. 
6.5: Producing an impartial and balanced agenda 
Despite the work entailed, it was still a key action step, to carefully assess and select 
presenters to balance the programme topic and be informative, with diverse 
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viewpoints, for the jurors. The mix of presenters each related their material to the Jury 
topic of'·good taste and decency'' in television content and the setting of programme 
standards. In the course of the jury process, several presenters, often instigated by 
questions from the jurors, discussed a wider range of issues about television standards. 
The presented information included: broadcast television legislation and codes of 
practice; television network internal standards policies and their operation; the 
functions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority; various public complainant 
procedures and statistics; as well as local and international television research issues 
and personal opinions. The presenters each came well prepared for their presentations 
with a variety of video clips, overhead projector information and hand out materials. 
The presenters were positioned in the Jury agenda to progressively build the jurors's 
knowledge of the topic to achieve informed deliberation and consultation about the 
topic. 
The final list of 12 presenters included: the Television New Zealand network 
Programme Standards Manager, the Executive Director and the Research and 
Communications Manager of the New Zealand Broadcasting Standards Authority, a 
high school media studies teacher, three academic television researchers {specialising 
in children and television, televised violence and attitudes to women, and local 
research about televised sex content). The other presenters were a well-known media 
journalist, a television producer and director, a gentleman who had complained about 
a lack of "taste and decency'' in a television item with experience of the formal 
complaint and appeal procedures, and two teenagers to ensure that the viewpoints of 
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youth were included. Younger children were not invited to be present and be 
questioned by the jurors due to the particular legal and ethical difficulties of involving 
those under 16 years of age (see Appendix D for the list of presenters at the Waikato 
Citizens' Jury). 
6.6: Planning the Jury evaluation programme and its components 
Another early action step involved designing an evaluation programme for the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury project. Different objectives required different components to 
later evaluate the action research project's methodology and the Jury's deliberation 
about the topic. Different components were formulated: to track any attitude changes 
to television standards by the jurors: any increase in their topic knowledge from the 
jury information sharing process: and to document their opinions about the 
effectiveness of the Citizens' Jury method. The resulting evaluation programme had 
three phases. 
The first phase involved each juror completing a questionnaire prior to their participation 
in the Citizens' Jury and the second phase included two questionnaires at the close of 
the Jury event. The third evaluation phase continued throughout the Jury event and 
involved the video recording of each Jury session to ensure there was an accurate 
account of the Jury proceedings, especially the dialogue between the participants. 
This was an essential step because of my roles as project researcher, organiser and 
facilitator/moderator. It was easy to predict that I would sometimes have different 
competing claims on my attention during the event and would require the evaluation 
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elements to be in place prior to that happening. After the event, the videotapes proved 
particularly useful in enabling the extraction of exact dialogue comments to include in 
the Waikato Citizens' Jury report. 
The Evaluation questionnaires: The jurors each completed three evaluation 
questionnaires that were internally variable in question type and within a variable 
survey format. The format of the questionnaires followed the flow of subjects to 
encourage greater issue concentration rather than a set funnel survey method 
according to question type. The research coordinator administered all three 
questionnaires. An adequate amount of time was allowed for the juror respondents to 
complete them at their own pace. The first questionnaire was handed out when the 
jurors arrived at the introductory meeting on 19 June 1999. It needs to be emphasized 
that these were completed before the jurors were given detailed information about the 
Jury event or handed the information folder about the Jury topic. This first 
questionnaire began by asking for demographic information in five different 
categories to judge the sample group's diversity. These categories were carefully 
worded in a manner similar to Census data rules to Jessen any non-responses through 
possible concerns over privacy. Both open and closed questions were asked with the 
aim of assessing the jurors's foundation knowledge about the regulation of television 
content; the operation of the statutory Broadcasting Standards Authority; and their 
opinions of who should regulate television content. Other questions used a range of 
techniques including multi-choice, rating, ranking scale, and check list types (Wimmer 
& Dominick, 1997). 
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Some questions were replicated from the Citizens' Jury questionnaires of the British 
Independent Television Commission. These asked for opinions about different types 
of television content to gain an understanding of "taste and decency" attitudes between 
the British ITC juries and the New Zealand Jury for another research cycle. Other 
questions were intended to evaluate the operation of the Citizens' Jury (see Pre Jury 
questionnaire and results, Appendix E.). Permission was sought from the Independent 
Television Commission (ITC) to replicate questions from their 1997 Citizens' Juries 
on ·'good taste and decency" as, with the same topic being deliberated by New 
Zealand citizens, I planned to compile, as a further research cycle, an international 
comparison. This permission was granted by Jane Aldridge, a Senior ITC Research 
Officer. 
The second and third questionnaires were completed at the close of the Citizens' Jury, 
after the jurors had finished their topic deliberation time. The second questionnaire 
replicated questions from the first questionnaire to track any attitude changes to the 
topic and any knowledge increase about the regulation of television programme 
standards from their Jury participation. It again replicated some of the ITC questions. 
It also asked for their individual opinions about the regulation of television standards, 
for any comments, and whether they agreed with the Jury results (see Post Jury 
questionnaire and results, Appendix F). The third and final questionnaire was 
designed to evaluate the jurors' opinions of the Citizen's Jury methodology as a useful 
model for consultative dialogue between policymakers and grassroots citizens. This 
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questionnaire used similar types of questions to the first two and again replicated some 
ITC questions (see Jury Evaluation questionnaire, Appendix G). 
6.7: The random sampling process and selecting the Jury panel 
To be considered a valid Citizens' Jury a chosen population base has to be randomly 
sampled. Credibility arguments between quantitative and qualitative procedures 
relating to sample size were not an issue as the Jury method encourages a process of 
stratified sampling and offers precise arguments relating to political equality and non 
tyranny from the two way deliberative dialogue of Jury sample groups. A review of 
the benefits of sample size in relation to results and project constraints was made for 
interest and any effects on the sample outcome from increased size were found to be 
minimal (Deacon, Golding, & Murdock, 1999; Wimmer & Dominick, 1997). 
Privacy issues and other constraints: A complete stratified sampling process held 
potential limitations for this pilot Jury project as privacy legislation and rules are 
strictly adhered to/acknowledged in New Zealand with public awareness of privacy 
principles and their ethical connection on the increase in recent years. It was therefore 
considered necessary to work around such a potential complication and adjust the 
sampling method while still ensuring a credible random method was created. The 
three concerns of any sampling process - error, size and non-response - were 
considerations (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 41 ). Other legitimate factors for consideration 
were budget constraints, appropriate event facilities being available on campus at the 
University of Waikato, and the Citizens' Jury being a pilot research project (Wimmer 
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& Dominick, 1997). Due to the privacy constraint factor the random sampling 
questionnaire did not seek any personal demographic information in order to lessen 
the non-response rate. The jurors selected from the random sampling process could 
therefore not be considered representative of the sample population in any particular 
category, or the New Zealand population, as in a "stratified" Citizens' Jury group 
sampling process. 
Statistical representation: The chance of jurors being representative units of the 
entire population, however, was increased by their being selected from three local 
authority areas in the Waikato Region because the region is characterised by a 
demographic of rural, small town and city population residents. Population statistics 
from the 1996 Census were comprehensively examined and the selected sample 
population size was found to fairly reflect national Census statistical and lifestyle 
demographics. 
Census statistics were compared in three descending levels to the chosen sample 
population size. For example, according to the 1996 Census, New Zealand's total 
population in 1996 was 3,618,303 with a slightly higher number of women than men 
(i.e., 1,840,842 women and 1,777,464 men). The total Waikato Region population is 
listed as 350,125 with a slightly higher number of women than men (i.e., 176,442 
women and 173,685 men). The total combined population of the three Waikato 
Region areas - Waikato District, Waipa District and Hamilton City - comprising the 
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sample population size from which the citizen jurors were recruited is 186,420 with 
again slightly more women than men (95,364 women and 91,056 men). 
Five demographic categories of sex, ethnicity, age group, employment status and 
household composition were also explored in a similar manner and statistically 
compared to assess representation and the structuring of a sampling framework (see 
Appendix H 1-H4). Percentage assessments were made from these five categories 
against the population statistics. The results from this statistical layering process 
suggested that, in spite of the potential privacy complications and other constraints 
curtailing the initial stratified sampling procedure, the Waikato citizen jurors were a 
representative population group. 
6.8: Choosing the population base and inviting the Waikato jurors 
Defining the population size to sample was made after assessing the statistical benefits 
and effects, the available resources and the constraint factors. The decision was made 
to select 12jurors from the combined electoral rolls of three Waikato local authority 
populations: Waikato District, Waipa District and Hamilton City. These three areas 
have a combined population of 186,420 people, that is 5.152% of the total New 
Zealand population ( 1996 Census, Regional Summary). 
Sample questionnaires: Two hundred people in this population base were each sent a 
basic sampling questionnaire, which opened with a filter question (see Appendix I). 
Two hundred names were selected randomly from the electoral rolls for the Waikato 
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District, Waipa District and Hamilton City areas by a simple matrix system of dividing 
their total number of pages proportionately according to the percentage of names 
(based on each area's population) and then alternating choosing a name from the top 
and bottom of the relevant pages. By this simple system a total of 42 questionnaires 
were mailed to residents in the Waipa and Waikato Districts and 116 to Hamilton City 
residents. If postal details were incomplete for a selected individual further searches 
were made in other electoral lists to complete the addresses. Any employment details 
listed alongside names were noted in order to assist the sampling frame for juror 
selection and each questionnaire was numbered according to the number placed by 
each name to enable later address identification and invitation. 
Sampling response: The simply worded one page questionnaire had an introductory 
letter attached with a return deadline date and a stamped addressed envelope enclosed 
to lessen the non-response rate. The first questionnaires were received back within a 
few days of their posting and within two weeks 95 of the 200 questionnaires had been 
returned. One hundred and three sampling questionnaires were returned by the target 
close off date of 31 May 1999. This total included 19 envelopes addressed "return to 
sender". The overall response rate of 42% was not dissimilar to the 35% response 
norm listed by Looney (1991), (cited in Frey, Botan, Friedman, & Kreps, 1992). Of 
the 84 returned and completed questionnaires 25 people had ticked the question box 
that they would be available to attend the Waikato Citizens' Jury. This question was 
included, as Jury participation required a citizen juror to be available from noon on 
Friday 2 July through till approximately 3pm on Sunday 4 July 1999. 
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Juror invitations: An initial list of 12 people were sent Jury invitation letters on 3 
June 1999 but, due to the unavailability of four of these people, another list of 
invitations had to be compiled. By the end of the invitation process 24 of the 25 
people who had initially expressed interest had been approached. However, this list 
changed again shortly before the Jury date due to one member being rushed to hospital 
for an urgent operation and two others having to drop out for family reasons. Phone 
calls were made to ensure the other jurors were still available and last minute 
replacement invitations were made. The final Waikato Citizens' Jury had six women 
and six men. The 12 Waikato residents ultimately invited represented a diversity of 
age groups, ethnicity, employment, and household composition (see Appendix J, 
Waikato Jurors Profile List). 
6.9: Summary 
This chapter provides details about the planning components required to organise the 
three-day Waikato Citizens' Jury action project. It explained aspects of privacy and 
ethical considerations, evaluation procedures, presenter selection, programme balance, 
choosing the sample population, and the random sampling process used to select the 
12 citizen jurors. The planning components each related to the characteristics of the 
Citizens' Jury method defined in chapter five. The chapter references a number of 
appendixes to demonstrate the depth of planning carried out for the Waikato Citizens' 
Jury project and to provide a bank of verifiable data. 
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- 7 -
The Waikato Citizens' Jury 
2 - 4 July 1999 
This chapter presents a summary of the three-day Waikato Citizens' Jury project. It 
began when the 12 selected jurors were invited to an introductory meeting on 19 June 
1999. The Waikato Citizens' Jury agenda began at 2pm on Friday 2 July 1999 and 
concluded after the Jury panel had presented its findings at 3pm on Sunday 4 July 
1999. The project was organised as a residential retreat with the 12 jurors 
accommodated at the University Lodge next to the Jury seminar room, on campus at 
the University of Waikato. During the sessions presenters spoke directly to the jurors 
without any separately appointed session moderator intervening (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6. The seating arrangement decided by the jurors for the Waikato 
Citizens' Jury event. Rose Macbeth, the research coordinator, explains the 
agenda while a PrimeTV cameraman films the Jury opening for a news item. 
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As illustrated the 12 members of the Jury panel sat in a semi-circle enabling them to 
fully see each other and the presenters in front of them. The Jury members decided on 
this seating arrangement at the introductory briefing meeting on 19 June 1999. 
During the project my role as the project coordinator could be described as "laissez 
faire" (Hybels & Weaver, 1992, p. 236) as I deliberately arranged the event so that I 
would have very little involvement once the Jury event began. However, though 
preferring to adopt a "laissez faire" approach I was constantly monitoring the project's 
progress and being generally supportive to the participants. My in-the-background 
role encouraged the two Jury participant groups to interact directly with each other to 
share information and opinions. This in turn created a greater degree of independence 
as most public participation events and methods, whether focus groups or Citizens' 
Juries, include moderators or chairpersons. As the research coordinator, I introduced 
each presenter to the Jury group and facilitated the two evening sessions but otherwise 
continually played the "project minder" role. This included providing any general 
assistance the participants required and arranging details like the catering so the 
project timetable ran to schedule. The three-day agenda had morning, afternoon and 
evening sessions (see Appendix K, Waikato Citizens' Jury Agenda). 
Some questions and comments made by the jurors during the sessions are listed after 
each presentation summary as an "interpretative commentary" (Stainback & 
Stainback, 1988, pp. 81-82) of each session. They demonstrate, firstly, that the jurors 
understood the information being explained by each expert presenter and were able to 
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interact with the material. This is considered important because a Citizens' Jury takes 
it for granted that citizens with only some brief prior topic handout material will be 
able to digest complex information. This assessment of a citizen's ability differs from 
other public participation research methods where a speaker or topic issue will often 
first be tested as appropriate for a particular group and its demographic make up, 
perhaps in a focus group, and adjustments made. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the jurors's comments are listed in their original spoken unedited form so 
they "speak" for themselves unaffected by another's interpretation (Luthar, 1993, p. 
49). 
The diversity of comments listed after each session summary in this chapter also 
illustrate, for example, jurors took different stances towards the expert information, 
analysed it sufficiently to offer practical amendments to programme regulations, and 
were confident enough to criticise the information at times and even disagree with the 
experts. Some questions made by the jurors are also listed to demonstrate they 
successfully digested the professional complexity of the topic material. This is 
illustrated by their many questions seeking either a greater depth of information about 
an issue, and extending, or even linking an issue to other issues they believed 
connected. On some occasions jurors suggest an alternative method for the experts to 
handle an issue and are disapproving of the behaviour of television professionals who 
operate without any practice knowledge of programme regulations. Comments are 
included to illustrate these attitudes as well. 
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Finally, the lack of editing, and interpretation, of the jurors's comments is considered 
an ethical decision in line with the high regard taken towards the invited citizens 
participating in the research and the objectives of this particular project. Throughout 
this project's planning, and operation it was a deliberate decision to treat research 
participants and their material in a more equitable manner than are exhibited by the 
asymmetrical norms of public opinion polls and commercial commissioned research 
discussed at various stages in this thesis. The purpose of this project was primarily to 
trial the Citizens' Jury methodology and its ability to solve the lack of public dialogue 
informing media policies and not to analyse the reception of the topic material, though 
this could be an additional project at a later stage with the material now available. The 
jurors's comments were verified as correct by viewing the video record of each 
session. 
7.1: The introductory briefing meeting held before the Citizens' Jury 
This meeting explained the purpose of the Citizens' Jury and the design of the project 
event. It also gave the jurors an opportunity to meet the research coordinator and the 
other members of the Jury panel. Eight of the twelve jurors were able to attend this 
meeting. They each completed their first Jury evaluation questionnaire and were 
briefed about the Jury project arrangements and a tour was made of their 
accommodation and meeting facilities. 
Other items reviewed at this meeting included the agenda for the three-day project, the 
session presenters, the types of television clips they would be watching, the catering 
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arrangements, the video recording of the Jury sessions, and the possible visit of a 
documentary crew and other media representatives. In addition they were each given 
a folder of background material and invited to ask any questions. The information 
folder contained: a two page outline about the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
(BSA); a leaflet about making formal broadcasting complaints; a copy of the Codes of 
Broadcasting Practice for Free-To-Air television usually mailed by the BSA to 
complainants, a set of BSA complaint decisions relating to television items they would 
view; and a copy of the Citizens' Jury agenda. A map of the university campus, 
parking facilities and a copy of their meal menus were included. 
The jurors were interested to know how they had been selected and some required 
reassurance that they would cope with the official information that would be presented 
and discussed. Reassurance was provided and I explained how important their own 
experience and knowledge about the topic was to the project. Several jurors 
mentioned they had friends who were envious of their selection and wished they could 
also be involved and that the project was of great interest to their families. By the end 
of the introduction meeting the jurors were happily conversing together over 
refreshments and reluctant to leave the venue. Arrangements were made to meet the 
four absent jurors. They were each given the same folder of material, event 
explanations, and courtesy refreshments. They also each completed the first 
questionnaire. 
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7.2: Day one, afternoon session 
The first session introduced details about the regulation of standards in New 
Zealand broadcast television and what is considered acceptable, and not 
acceptable. Experts from the television industry and the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority explained their regulatory roles and procedures. 
Presenter no.1: Mr David Edmunds, the Programme Standards Manager for 
Television New Zealand Ltd (TV One and TV2 channels), was the first speaker. He 
was also present as the representative of the New Zealand Television Broadcasters' 
Council and spoke on behalf of the other free-to-air broadcasters. (TV3 and TV4 
Can West channels and the Prime TV regional stations.) 
Figure 7. David Edmunds, Programme Standards Manager for Television 
New Zealand Ltd, outlines programme regulations to the Jury panel. 
Edmunds began his presentation by explaining the different functions of his position 
and his responsibilities at TVNZ. He outlined how public complaints were received 
and dealt with in-house as well as his role of complaints manager and that of the 
Television New Zealand appraisers in setting programme standards. He then 
discussed various content regulation problem areas, outlined the obligations of the 
broadcaster in relation to the Broadcasting Standards Authority, and concluded with a 
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number of general observations about changes in television standards over the years. 
Edmunds was for many years a television news journalist and is the present chairman 
of the Journalist's Training Organisation. He described some of the special problems 
television news journalists face in their daily work routine. Questions and comments 
made by jurors included: 
• The whole system is not very customer-focused. The fact complaints must be made 
in writing to be formally considered is a limiting factor. 
• Can't the hundreds of complaint phone calls received per day by a broadcaster be 
collated and considered in some way? The 54 formal complaints that end up 
going to the BSA cannot reflect overall audience views. 
• How do you process a complaint about programme quality? 
• Are those who phone in invited and given information how to make a formal 
complaint? 
• How much influence, if any, do viewer complaints have on a producer or 
programme? 
• I made a phone complaint to TVNZ, was told someone would call me back but no 
one did. 
• How does TVNZ assess audience opinions about current programme standards? 
At the close of this first presentation I read a letter to the Jury from Di Winks written 
on behalf of the Standards Committee at TV3 Network Sevices Ltd and TV4 Ltd (see 
Appendix C). 
Presenter no. 2: Dr Michael Stace, Executive Director, of the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority, first outlined the role of the statutory government body, and its different 
functions. He then discussed some of the factors that have led to New Zealand having 
the most deregulated broadcasting environment of any country in the world. These 
factors included license tendering; the lack of restrictions for cross-media ownership 
and advertising minutage, and the lack of minimum local programme quotas. Dr Stace 
explained how the BSA was designed to be a voice for the consumer but was 
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essentially a broadcasting complaints-driven appeal authority. He also described how 
broadcasters were responsible for developing and reviewing the codes of broadcasting 
practice, and gave details about the membership of the BSA, its regulatory functions, 
and the assignment of penalties against broadcasters breaching the standards. 
Figure 8. Dr Michael Stace, Executive Director of the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) speaks to the Jury panel 
Questions asked by jurors included: 
• How much advertising is allowed per hour? 
• Who issues broadcast licenses in New Zealand? 
• What restrictions are there on ownership? 
• With such small penalties imposed there does not seem to be a lot of incentive for 
the public to complain or broadcasters to comply? 
Presenter no. 3: Dr Wiebe Zwaga, the Research and Communications Manager for 
the Broadcasting Standards Authority spoke about how the BSA was now regularly 
commissioning research of audience opinions about television standards. Dr Zwaga 
provided statistics about complaint categories and geographical information about 
complaints and complainants. He also reviewed for the Jury panel the results of a 
Good Taste and Decency research project carried out in April 1999. This research 
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assessed public attitudes about the acceptability, or not, of some so-called offensive 
language. Questions asked by jurors included: 
• Was the context of a so-called offensive word included in the taste and decency 
research? 
• Is there any research on the number of young children still watching TV after the 
8.30pm AO watershed? 
• Has there been any research to establish whether the 8.30pm magical watershed 
time is appropriate - especially with NZ television screening AO material earlier 
than other countries? 
• What does the BSA think about all the AO material on screen daily during 
weekday afternoons (soaps and talkshows) that can be viewed by young children? 
Figure 9. Jurors read about the 
Codes of Broadcasting Practice 
7.3: Day one, evening session 
Figure 10. A juror puts a point to 
Dr Zwaga about the Authority 
During this session the Jury viewed a series of television items that had attracted 
formal complaints to the Broadcasting Standards Authority. Each juror had copies of 
the BSA complaint decisions and copies of the Codes of Broadcasting Practice with 
the standard principles relating to the complaints. All the video complaint items 
linked to the "good taste and decency" Television General Programme Standard (G2) 
code, which is designed: 
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To take into consideration currently accepted norms of decency and taste 
in language and behaviour, bearing in mind the context in which any language 
or behaviour occurs (Broadcasting Standards Authority, 1996). 
Jurors were first asked to note their own decision on a form as to whether they thought 
the televised item should, or not, have been shown. They then discussed the item, its 
timeslot, standard policy code and other details they thought relevant. The six 
television complaint items viewed were: 
I. TVNZ Water Rats, programme promo, BSA decision no: 1999-011 
2. TV One Holmes, Jim Rose Circus, BSA decision no: 1998-088 
3. TV2 Dharma and Greg, BSA decision no: 1999-026 
4. TV2 Havoc, music video "Smack My Bitch Up", BSA decision no: 1998-165 
5. TVNZ Human Body, programme promo, BSA decision no: 1999-020 
6. TV3 News (6pm) arrest Headhunters gang members, BSA decision no: 1999-046 
(see Appendix L, for an outline of these formal public complaints and BSA decisions). 
This screening session encouraged the jurors to use the information they had heard 
from the expert speakers during the day to make their own regulatory decisions based 
on the Codes of Broadcasting Practice. The jurors had no problems relating the 
context of each screening to the Code and the formal complaint decisions. There was 
a full and frank discussion about each item with jurors's opinions ranging from "there 
is nothing wrong with that" to "the violent imagery in the language is more offensive 
than the nudity" to "that is pretty gross and not ever acceptable" and "but it was on 
late at night and in a programme where that kind of thing could be expected''. 
The discussions about the various items generally turned to more liberal viewpoints 
when jurors considered the need to regulate for a mass television audience, instead of 
themselves. However, the first notes on the jurors' forms revealed that, when initially 
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assessing the television complaint items, all jurors considered that some violated the 
"good taste and decency" Code and should not have been broadcast. 
7.4: Day two, morning session 
The second morning session had a variety of speakers presenting different 
opinions about the right to be offended, television structure, standards, and 
research issues. The focus for the day's programme was: Why regulate? What 
should we regulate? 
Presenter no. 4: Dr Geoff Lealand, Head of Department and Senior Lecturer in 
Screen and Media Studies at the University of Waikato opened the session. He spoke 
about how it is not possible to always please everyone as taste and decency is a case of 
opinion rather than facts. He suggested that taste and decency is not really an issue to 
New Zealanders, that it is an outmoded concept, and that issues like bias and right of 
reply in news are more important. Dr Lealand also suggested the jurors consider 
debating larger issues like the amount of advertising per hour and the blurring of 
infomercials and programmes on our television screens. He then invited the jurors to 
consider how representative so many of the trivial complaints to the BSA are as a 
body of public opinion and how it is important that new intellectual and sometimes 
controversial ideas entering the public forum are not restricted or silenced in any way. 
Comments by jurors included: 
• We are concerned here with the need for appropriate standards and those people 
who may need protecting, which is a helluva of a thing to say, with regard to 
violence and some sexual material. New ideas don't come into this scenario as far 
as I'm concerned. 
• I think some material ( like South Park) does have an effect on young children 
because just seeing that kind of behaviour on screen makes it that bit more 
acceptable. 
• My children have told me about the nightmares they suffered after they sneaked 
out and saw something that was rated not suitable for their age group. 
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Presenter no. 5: Ms Helen Martin, a Media Studies teacher at Westlake Boys' High 
School discussed two press reports, which offered no proof, blaming television images 
for bad behaviour in young people. She presented the results of a survey she had 
carried out with 62 of her students aged from 14 to 18 years. Martin said the results 
they wrote individually and privately in response to her questions were more 
conservative than what they said publicly in front of their peers. She pointed out that 
there was a great deal of bravado, especially amongst boys, and a great deal of 
pressure on them to support a particular stance. 
Figure 11. Jury presenters at front table from left to right: Dr Geoff Lealand, 
Mr Paul Smith, Mrs Helen Martin and Mr Chris Watson. 
The surveyed students stated they believed younger children needed protection from 
some television content. The students also wanted restrictions on television content 
showing sexism, sexual abuse, pornography, racism, alcohol and cigarette advertising, 
violence, showing dead bodies on news, swearing, using sex to sell things, showing a 
positive view of illegal activities, invading people's privacy, and nudity . Questions 
from jurors included: 
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• How can you be sure the students' answers are really theirs and not what they 
think they should say? 
• As adults our responses would vary quite a lot. Don't children tend to say what 
we would like them to say? 
• I can remember my own interest at their age in sexual details but your survey 
results seem to go against a boy's natural interest in sexual items? 
Presenter no. 6: Mr Chris Watson, a Senior Lecturer in English and Media Studies at 
Massey University began his presentation by reviewing for the Jury panel the 
philosophical world-view behind the belief that so-called vulnerable or impressionable 
people of society need protecting. Different methods of television research were 
summarised and he suggested any media effects remain unproven. Watson outlined 
two research projects he had carried out for the Broadcasting Standards Authority. 
The first analysed the portrayal of sexual acts and images on three television channels 
during a week in 1991. The second project undertaken in 1993 used focus groups to 
gather public attitudes about a documentary programme called Sophie's Sex. 
Presenter no. 7: Mr Paul Smith, a freelance journalist and media commentator told 
the Jury panel about the many legislative and ideological changes to the structure of 
television broadcasting, especially since the introduction of the 1989 Broadcasting 
Act. He discussed the impact of these changes on Free-To Air television and how 
these now affected television standards for viewers. Smith challenged the Jury to 
consider other standards in New Zealand television like issues of ownership, 
advertising, programme quotas and funding, and to think about whether broadcasting 
should be treated as just another market commodity. He concluded by stating he 
believed there would be no real competition for viewers in New Zealand's all-
commercial television environment until a non-commercial television channel was 
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established, and that problems with programme standards were essentially generated 
by the present broadcasting structure. Comments and questions from jurors included: 
• Regarding the affordability of having a public channel - we are always told it is 
too expensive or we are too small a population to support one. 
• Why aren't there more good current affairs interviewers like Kim Hill (from 
National Radio) on TV? 
• Is there a time Limit on overseas owners having New Zealand broadcasting rights? 
7 .5: Day two, afternoon session 
The afternoon session of day two provided the Jury panel with opinions about 
programme standards and public complaints from a television producer and 
different aged citizens. There were also two presentations about research 
attitudes to children and the screening of violence and women. 
Presenter no. 8: Ms Jill Graham, a freelance television producer and director was 
asked whether she considered content standards while making programmes. She told 
the Jury she was now more aware of issues regarding standards since a formal 
complaint appeal was upheld by the Broadcasting Standards Authority about the music 
video (Smack My Bitch Up) screened on Havoc, a show that she produced . 
Figure 12. Jill Graham speaks to the Jury panel. Presenters sitting from 
left to right: Dr Geoff Lealand, Canon Gerald Hadlow, Amanda Hayes 
and Inez Mccaughan 
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Graham stated she had known the video could be a problem so had portions 
deliberately but humourously censored. She said she thought that because the show 
was one that pushed boundaries anyway, screened to a music orientated teen audience 
and was scheduled at I 0.30pm, that there wouldn't be any problem with the content. 
Graham also discussed the background to another complaint upheld about a television 
current affairs programme. Questions asked by jurors included: 
• Did you make the decision to screen the video without talking to anyone about it? 
• Would you consult someone about standards issues in future? 
• From what I see of the TV industry you are all protecting each other and the 
industry sets and administers the standards. If a company you worked for knew a 
complaint penalty could be high enough to put them out of business would you still 
push the boundaries? 
• What do you think your company's attitude is to public complaints? 
• Do you always want to push the boundaries in a programme? 
• Did you think the censoring of some images on the video was funny? 
Presenter no. 9: Dr Geoff Lealand next spoke about research into children and 
television content. He told the Jury there were two questions to consider: do children, 
like adults, have the right to be offended and be protected from offence? He stated 
that it was strange children are rarely asked for their thoughts about television images 
and programmes when they are the ones thought to be most in need of protection. Dr 
Lealand suggested the jurors remember that childhood was often a construction by 
others for children. A video clip of a research project about children's attitudes to 
television carried out by the Australian Broadcasting Standards Authority was shown 
to the Jury. Dr Lealand explained the research findings showed that children were 
discerning and active viewers with specific items they didn't like to watch. 
Questions asked by Jurors included: 
• What do you think was useful about this research? 
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Could peer pressure have influenced the children's answers? 
Don't you think the barrage of media images forces children to grow up faster 
nowadays? 
It seems the results show that children don't want to be shocked. 
Presenter no. 10: Canon Gerald Hadlow appeared before the Jury as a citizen who 
had experienced the process of making a formal complaint to a broadcaster and then a 
complaint appeal to the Broadcasting Standards Authority. (The Jury had already 
viewed his complaint item about the Jim Rose Circus, screened on Holmes, TV One.) 
Canon Hadlow gave the background to his complaint and the reasons he persisted with 
the lengthy Broadcasting Standards Authority complaint appeal process. He said the 
decision of a majority of the BSA not to uphold his complaint was a demonstration of 
the social changes in our community as the item was very offensive. He also spoke 
about how there used to be a common view of standards but this had been displaced 
over the last ten years or so by a new code of ethics that seems to prohibit anyone 
from suggesting their code is better or worse than anyone else's. Canon Hadlow 
concluded by suggesting it was time for the BSA to be restructured as a large number 
of television programmes now include warnings about unwholesome content. 
Questions and comments by jurors included: 
• How many times did you have to write a letter? 
• We watched the item and felt it wasn't news as much as a publicity stunt. The 
motives behind it being screened should have been questioned and it was really 
about ratings. 
• Ratings is really the bottom line isn't it behind so much mass driven TV items like 
this? 
• I think having watched the item last night the general feeling was the programme 
was not entertainment. It could've had a detrimental influence on young children 
who could copy lifting heavy items with their penis. The verbal descriptions were 
more offensive than the images and repeated unnecessarily three times. 
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• It could've been a three-minute segment instead of being given the extended 
coverage it was. 
Presenters no. 11 and no. 12: Hamilton high school students Amanda Hayes and 
Inez Mccaughan did a joint presentation. Instigated by questions from the Jury panel 
they talked about the kinds of television programmes they, and other 16 and 17 year 
olds, like to watch, and their reactions to different types of television content. The two 
students explained various teenage attitudes to programmes presently on screen in 
New Zealand and debated vigorously with the Jury members the merits of music 
videos, and sitcom and talk shows. The students both stated in answer to jurors's 
questions that they would restrict the viewing of their own future children and said . 
they thought items that shocked and horrified them when younger were now available 
to an even younger age group nowadays. Questions asked by jurors included: 
• Do most of your friends also prefer not to watch items that are too emotional and 
intense? 
• Have you seen any programmes with sex in them that have offended you? 
• Do you think this downward trend (more graphic images available to those 
younger nowadays) leads to desensitisation in young people? 
• In your opinion are teenagers likely to copy things they see on IV? 
• What do you think the adult only time should be on IV? 
• As time goes by and standards change how would you handle IV viewing for your 
children? 
Additional afternoon presentation: Dr Kay Weaver a communication lecturer at 
Waikato University had carried out research for the British Broadcasting Standards 
Commission about the reception of violent screen images on women. She was unable 
to be present but provided a ten minute sound tape of her opinions for the jurors to 
hear. Dr Weaver explained academic theories about media effects and discussed the 
frequent confusion between regulating television standards and the freedom of speech 
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debate. The Jury panel also watched a video clip she had provided about research into 
the changed attitudes of young men to women after watching screen images of sex and 
violence, particularly images that victimised women. 
7.6: Day two, evening session 
For this last information session the Jury panel convened to watch a BBC television 
item about the ethics of screening news material filmed in violent and war situations. 
They also viewed a series of television programme segments that had been altered by 
TVNZ programme appraisers to comply with the current Codes of Broadcasting 
Practice standards. The jurors were able to view the unedited and edited versions of 
each segment. The objective behind this screening was to reveal some of the standard 
dilemmas about news coverage, allow the jurors to make their own regulatory 
assessments of television content, and again discuss broadcasters's standards in 
relation to the Codes of Broadcasting Practice. The segments were all taken from 
actual televised items. They included: Picket Fences, Dr Quinn Medicine Woman, 
Doctors to Be, She Woke Up, A Passion for Murder, Return of the Black Dragon and 
In the Line of Duty: Ambush at Waco. 
7.7: Day three 
On day three the Jury panel consulted about the many regulatory and content 
issues they had heard about from the expert speakers before producing a set of 
guidelines for regulating television standards and "taste and decency" issues. 
No facilitator was used during the final deliberation process but, as the project 
coordinator, I was available if assistance was required. 
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The jury members throughout the programme had been encouraged to speak their 
opinions, ask questions, and focus on debating the issues, rather than on any particular 
personality issues. The group demonstrated courtesy and consideration towards each 
other's views at all times while still fully, and at times heatedly, arguing various 
viewpoints. This equitable consultation atmosphere session had developed during the 
first session with basic guidance from my own past consultation experiences. 
For this last session the Jury panel was invited to structure how they would like to 
arrange their own deliberation time and it was suggested they could try small groups, 
stay together, or adopt any other option. The jurors unanimously chose to break into 
two small groups of six for a two-hour morning session in separate rooms and then 
reconvene as one group after lunch. Each small group had an equal number of men 
and women and a person in each group was delegated to write their deliberation points 
on large sheets of flip chart paper. 
During this session I sat listening to the consultation of the two groups alternately and 
recording some of their discussions but did not participate. The two deliberation 
groups had independently chosen different approaches. While one group chose to 
brainstorm all the issues from the various sessions the other group systematically 
prioritised different topics after discussing them thoroughly. 
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Figure 13. Group A brainstorm different opinions about the "good taste 
and decency" Code and other television issues 
Fie;ure 14. Group B prioritise and discuss their different opinions about 
television standards and other topics 
After lunch the two small Jury groups reconvened as one group to discuss their topic 
deliberation and the decisions they had each made with the aid of their note sheets. 
The noted issues were discussed fully to everyone's satisfaction and written down by a 
juror for final consultation and approval. This full jury group deliberation took nearly 
another two hours. The result was a number of unanimous decisions and specific 
recommendations about the present regulation of standards for Free-To-Air television 
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content and a set of principles and conclusions about the structural organisation of 
New Zealand television services. The members of the Waikato Citizens' Jury all felt 
strongly that the present structure of television organisation, and having only 
commercial channels in New Zealand, were implicated in determining current 
television programme content and "taste and decency" standards. 
7.8: The Waikato Citizens' Jury Report, approval and distribution 
The final action step of the Waikato Citizens' Jury was completed by myself on behalf 
of the citizen jurors. A draft report of 48 pages was compiled and a copy posted to 
each of the 12 jurors for any corrections and comments a month after the event. The 
report was to be presented to key television policymakers. It contained a two-page 
summary of the unanimous conclusions and recommendations of the Jury members 
about the operation of the "good taste and decency" Code of Broadcasting Practice 
and a number of issues relating to television standards (see Appendix M). The report 
also included a summary of the Citizens' Jury design, event arrangements, agenda 
sessions and a brief evaluation commentary. The results of the first and second Jury 
evaluation questionnaires completed by the jurors were attached. No report 
corrections or additions were requested. Fifty copies of the report were published with 
a presentation cover (see Macbeth, 1999). A copy was sent to each of the 12 citizen 
jurors and a photo of the Jury group was enclosed as a memory of their participation in 
the project (see Figure 15 next page). 
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Figure 15. The group photo sent to each citizen juror with a copy of the 
Final Waikato Citizens' Jury report by the research coordinator. In this 
photo the 12 jurors stand with the research coordinator (Rose Macbeth centre 
front) at the close of the action project on Sunday 4 July 1999. 
The report of the Waikato Citizens' Jury was then presented on behalf of the Jury 
panel to The New Zealand Television Broadcaster's Council, The Broadcasting 
Standards' Authority, programme standards managers at Television New Zealand Ltd, 
TV3 Network Services and TV 4 Ltd, Prime TV and a representative of the Screen 
Producers and Directors Association. Two copies of the report were also sent to the 
Minister of Broadcasting, Hon. Marion L. Hobbs. 
On IO November 1999, during a trip to London, I delivered courtesy copies of the 
project report to the Independent Television Commission (ITC) in London. These 
were given to Ms Pam Hanley, the Senior ITC Research Officer, who supervised the 
organisation of the two ITC Citizens' Juries on "taste and decency" in commercial 
television programmes in late 1997. Our ensuing discussion covered many aspects 
about the organisation and suitability of Citizens' Juries and their variants (e.g., 
Citizens' Forums) for gathering community opinion to inform media regulation 
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policies. The discussion revealed that the two sets of Citizens' Juries carried out on a 
similar policy topic in commercial broadcast television with grassroots citizens in two 
different hemispheres had been equally ethical in their approaches and had been well-
prepared and executed examples of the Citizens' Jury methodology. 
7.9: Summary 
This chapter reviewed the Waikato Citizens' Jury research project, which took place 
from 2 to 4 July 1999. It includes a summary of the expert presentations and the 
participation of the citizen jurors as well as the approval and distribution of the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury report. A number of appendixes directly relating to the 
operation of the three-day project are provided to add depth to the in-chapter 
information. The next chapter provides an evaluation of the Waikato Citizens' Jury 
action research project measured against the thesis hypothesis and the action research 
project's main objectives. 
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- 8 -
Gatecrashing an Elite Policy Dialogue Circle 
Despite demonstrating its usefulness as a model, despite the recognition of its value by 
all the jurors, despite the unsolicited tributes by some experts who presented and 
observed, despite the participation of representatives of the media elite, despite the 
unprecedented demand for the University of Waikato working paper (Macbeth, 2000)3 
reporting the results and process, despite substantial media interest and coverage, the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury failed to initiate a change of consultation practice by the Free 
to Air television policymakers responsible for setting community standards on screen. 
Indeed, the dismissive reactions of most television policy gatekeepers when presented 
with a copy of the Waikato Citizens' Jury Report indicated that I and the citizen jurors 
had dared to gatecrash someone else's operational environment - and we had. These 
reactions parallel Olsen and Marger's (l 993) observation that, "Major social 
transformations are always strongly resisted by elites" (p. 80) by suggesting how that 
elite social power similarly resists effective public participation, with transformational 
potential, in media policies. Fortunately given the immensity of changing such time 
honoured practices, there are other criteria for evaluating the achievement of the 
3 This Working Paper about the Waikato Citizens' Jury project, titled Creating Public Dialogue and 
Rejuvenating Citi=enship, has been requested by a variety of individuals and institutions. Altogether 
twenty three copies have been sent out in response to New Zealand requests and one to Australia. 
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project - especially the ability of the Waikato Citizens' Jury to resolve the thesis 
hypothesis. 
8.1: Evaluating the Waikato Citizens' Jury action research project 
The trial Citizens' Jury held 2 to 4 July 1999 demonstrated the method is ff"public 
participation practice fully capable of resolving the research hypothesis. During the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury, television policymakers and a group of grassroots citizens 
discussed the regulation of community standards in broadcast television programmes. 
The citizens's opinions and decisions were later distributed to the policymakers (i.e., 
Macbeth, 1999). The jurors's opinions were however secondary to the primary motive 
for the project. The thesis hypothesis that there is lack of public participation in the 
development of media policies due to elite social power motivated the organisation of 
the Waikato Citizens' Jury. The Waikato Citizens' Jury project is therefore evaluated 
in this chapter for the ability of the Citizen's Jury method to resolve this hypothesis 
and the three objectives for the action project listed in chapter six. 
The chapter begins by examining how the Waikato Citizens' Jury fulfilled the first two 
objectives, that of trialling a Citizens' Jury to assess its suitability to enable 
consultation between media policymakers and citizens, and to equalise social power, 
as these connect to the resolution of the thesis hypothesis. The operation of the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury is validated by showing that the characteristics distinguishing 
the Citizens' Jury method and the core values for public participation practice, listed 
in chapter five, featured in the project. Factors equalising the status of the diverse 
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participants during the project are also reviewed as these worked to lessen elite social 
power and led to the compilation of the EPPT code. The EPPT code stands for 
"Equal-Participation-Preparation-Time". It evolved from reflections about the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury and is designed to act as a best practice formula for public 
consultation events. Finally, the chapter reviews the project's success in achieving the 
third objective: to gather a sample of citizen opinions about the "good taste and 
decency" standard in television content to distribute to television policymakers. 
8.2: Creating dialogue between television policymakers and citizens 
Objective One: To trial a Citizens' Jury to demonstrate its method suitability 
to act as a policy consultation structure between New Zealand 
media policymakers and grassroots citizens 
This first objective was fulfilled by bringing a group of media policymakers together 
with a sample group of citizens at the three day Waikato Citizens' Jury. The event 
bridged the distance between television policymakers and citizens and created face to 
face dialogue about a media policy with a widespread community impact. In its 
practice and structure the Citizens' Jury demonstrated how to engage with and resolve, 
in an uncomplicated manner, the unsatisfactorily undemocratic processes identified in 
the research hypothesis. Its ability to achieve those aims also stemmed from giving 
both participant groups roles to assist their unique face to face meeting and, from the 
choice of the policy topic, about a on-screen community standard, which gave a 
precise focus, of mutual interest, for their dialogue interaction. 
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All the elite experts that the Broadcasting Standards' Authority lists as being part of 
their policy consultation circle participated in the Waikato Citizens' Jury (see BSA 
Annual Report, 1999, pp. 4-5). Other Waikato Jury presenters (e.g., a well-known 
media journalist and author, a television producer, university researchers, and different 
aged citizens) expanded the jurors's knowledge of the topic by providing alternative 
views about television standards, as well as a diversity of opinions about television 
regulation in New Zealand. 
The Waikato jurors conversed directly with the presenters during agenda sessions, and 
break-times, asking questions and exchanging opinions. The variety of expert material 
presented during the first two days of the Jury produced a balanced agenda ensuring 
the Jury panel had different perspectives about the topic so their deliberations on the 
third day were informed. Being "informed", through a process of information sharing, 
is a distinguishing feature of Citizens' Juries (Fishkin, 1991; Jefferson Center, 2000). 
All 12 jurors stated in their evaluation questionnaires they found the Jury agenda to be 
balanced in its approach to the topic with sufficient information to inform their 
deliberations (see Appendix G). 
The mixed agenda ensured a second characteristic of Citizens' Juries, that an agenda 
be "impartial" (Fishkin, 1991; the Jefferson Center, 2000), was fulfilled. It also 
fulfilled the public participation core value that participants be provided "with the 
information they need to participate in a meaningful way" (International Association 
of Public Participation, 1999). The expert presenters like the citizen jurors were 
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briefed about the project by the research coordinator so they were also informed 
participants able to take part meaningfully. 
The attendance of presenters from within the elite policy dialogue circle (e.g., 
television broadcasters and the Broadcasting Standards Authority) was crucial. It 
ensured the agenda included the expert information the jurors required for their 
decision-making deliberations. It was also hoped their attendance would increase 
official interest in using the Citizens' Jury method, and the results of the jurors's 
deliberations, but this did not eventuate. Their acceptance however, did help attract 
the participation of some other presenters who had been initially hesitant to accept 
speaking invitations. The resulting list of expert acceptances indicated it was an event 
worth attending, even if out of self-interest. Olsen and Marger ( 1993) confirm that 
elites will become involved in activities that coincide with their areas of operation for 
this reason. The presence of elite status participants at the Waikato Citizens' Jury also 
helped attract the attention of another elite group, the media. 
8.3: Media response to the action project enlarged the dialogue circle 
The attendance of the elite level television policymakers leveraged the New Zealand 
trial nature of the Waikato Citizens' Jury into a higher status community project, 
sufficient to attract local and national media interest. The resulting press and 
broadcast news items generated additional levels of dialogue about the Citizens' Jury 
project to different publics. For example, a television documentary team requested 
permission to film some of the Jury programme, news items about the Waikato 
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Citizens' Jury appeared on television and in radio news bulletins and articles were 
published in national, regional and local newspapers. 
Broadcast journalists asked how a Citizens' Jury differed to other public opinion 
models and press headlines ranged from "Waikato jury to put TV on trial" to 
"Citizens' jury offers strong view on broadcasting" (Moxon, NZ Herald, l 999 July 3, 
p. Al3; Smith, The National Business Review, 1999, September 17, p. 39 
respectively). One article mentioned the hypothetical research scenarios normally 
used by the Broadcasting Standards Authority to assess community standards and the 
other quoted an Authority spokesperson saying, ''it was impossible to know what 
would come out of the [Waikato Citizens' Jury] recommendations and whether they 
would be considered, as it was only a tiny sample of people" (Moxon, 1999, p. Al3). 
On the evidence of the media coverage and the participation of elite members of the 
television policymakers's circle, a group of "ordinary" citizens deliberating about a 
screen policy issue did appear to be of official and public interest. However, the 
Citizens' Jury method and the Jury panel's recommendation's were judged unworthy 
of attention by the television policymakers. One reason given was because of the 
small sample size and, another was because the policy recommendations came from 
outside the established policy dialogue circle. 
8.4: Two factors limiting the impact of the action plan and its effects 
These two reasons were found to be limiting the elite's adoption of both the Citizens' 
Jury method, and the jurors' s opinions about television standards. The first factor -
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that poll size matters - was stated to the research coordinator, and the press, by 
members of the policy circle responsible for setting community standards in television 
content. This occurred during the Jury event and later in project debriefing face to 
face interviews, phone conversations and email correspondence. 
The other factor found to be limiting the adoption of Citizens' Juries was their lack of 
institutional status, or governmentality. This lack of official recognition meant the 
jurors's well-informed opinions, about the "good taste and decency" standard for 
television content, were dismissed by television institutions, through their elite 
representatives. The jurors's opinions were considered unacceptable to inform 
community standards policies as they came from outside the designated policy 
dialogue circle and did not result from a recognised process, such as in-house 
commissioned research. Consequently, the jurors's findings had no recommending 
force. These two factors - poll size and lack of governmentality - worked to limit 
official interest in the method. This is despite the method proving to be as suitable in 
New Zealand, as it had been in Britain, as a public participation method for informing 
community related television policies. 
8.5: To gain elite attention in New Zealand survey size matters 
The concentration by a range of television officials on the small sample size may be 
connected to the fact that the majority of pubic opinion research in New Zealand, 
including that carried out by the television industry and the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Standards' Authority, still utlises quantitative representational methods. This 
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continues despite substantial research criticism of such methods (Zaller, 1992; 
Neuman, 1986; Wheeler, 1976; Converse, 1970). In terms of public participation such 
methods of surveying public opinion are strongly criticised by Fishkin (I 991, 1995) 
for being unrepresentational, inaccurate, and neglecting political equality due to a lack 
of information sharing and deliberation. 
This type of public opinion survey is usually carried out by virtual means (via 
telephones and computer screens) of at least 1,000 respondents by market research 
companies. The public exposure of such survey results through widespread media 
attention, and their use by elites to assess issues of national importance, appears to 
outweigh any general inaccuracy in their results. Their inadequacy in representing 
informed citizen opinion form no barrier to their official recognition and status in 
relation to other methods. The tendency to treat citizens's opinions as just another 
marketable commodity has turned them from a knowledge resource into a saleable 
volume. Galtung ( 1999) says this use of public opinion is not a form of 
communication and explains: 
The citizens and customers are not invited to participate in a dialogue as 
subjects, but are explored, mined for possible inclinations that can be 
exploited. A dialogue may occasionally happen, but only with selected, closed 
groups. It is a caricature of democracy (Gal tung, 1999, p.12) 
This commodification of public opinion is exhibited by the television industry and the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority. The elite market research companies used by 
television broadcasters to establish the popularity of their programmes for advertisers 
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are also employed by the Authority to carry out research projects into community 
attitudes to establish standards for television content. 
For example, AC Nielsen.McNair operate electronic People Meter surveys with a 
panel of 440 households of approximately 1,000 people aged five years and over. 
This system has the selected television viewers log on in their homes with a punch of a 
button each time they watch a scheduled programme. The survey results are 
purchased by advertisers, media buyers and television programme schedulers to 
maximise their resources and income. In this commercial environment, citizens' 
opinions are reduced to dubious ratings statistics (Lealand, 1998; Zwaga, 1992). 
Since its formation the Broadcasting Standards' Authority has regularly commissioned 
the same market research companies, ACNielsen.McNair, and Colmar Brunton, to 
gather citizens' opinions (e.g., BSA, 1993, July; BSA, 1997, October). Together 
these two research companies are responsible for most of the high profile public 
opinion survey polls, especially of political parties and politicians, carried out in New 
Zealand. But while their methods for the Authority have consistently included large 
surveys of 1,000 respondents they have also used small sample methods like focus 
groups consisting of" 10 or 11 people" (i.e., BSA, 1997, October, p. 9). The use of 
such groups calls into question the rationale underpinning the sample size objection to 
the validity of Citizens' Juries. 
202 
I contend the more likely reason for rejecting Citizens' Juries is the method's lack of 
governmentality or institutional status. This is compounded by their coactive ability to 
equalise elite social status and eliminate professional public opinion survey mediators 
as even the focus group method is "a carefully planned discussion" usually "conducted 
by a skilled interviewer" (Krueger, cited in Cook, 1998, p. 4 7). The strictly controlled 
moderation of focus group discussions and their carefully managed group composition 
are a contrast to the consultation flexibility and composition diversity of Citizens' 
Juries. The tight agenda setting structure of focus groups can be a safe interaction for 
those considering community dialogue and interactions to be unruly and in need of 
professional control. The interpretation of their "conclusions", in marked contrast to 
the relatively unmediated form of the Waikato Citizen's Jury, also permits a high level 
of official or expert control. Unfortunately, this tight agenda control and the method's 
lack of participant diversity criteria can limit consultation creativity and skew results. 
The demonstrated lack of interest by television policymakers in what could be, rather 
than what is, shows a preference to maintain status quo arrangements. This situation 
and their lack of interest in the benefits resulting from a more ethical and accurate 
public survey practice like Citizens' Juries also displays the continuity of the 
bureaucratic procedures and attitudes previously discussed in chapters one and two. 
8.6: Information sharing works to limit the influence of elite social power 
Objective Two: To assess the ability of the Citizen's Jury method to 
equalise social power between policymakers and citizens 
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This second objective was also achieved. During the Waikato Citizens' Jury two 
components were designed to equalise knowledge of the Jury topic. The two 
observable components in the equalising process were information sharing and 
deliberation. The expert information sharing carried out during the first two days of 
the Waikato Citizens' Jury worked to eliminate the asymmetrical topic knowledge 
between the elite and citizen groups and to lessen the influence of elite social power. 
The effectiveness of this process was illustrated as the sessions progressed. The jurors 
were initially timid about asking questions but this changed. The change 
corresponded with thejurors's increased knowledge about the topic issue. The jurors 
stated they felt empowered by this information sharing process and one stated it 
succinctly as "knowledge is power" (see Appendix F, question 13). 
In the first agenda session the experts appeared able to push their views more strongly 
withoutjurors responding, though thejurors's faces often reflected a difference of 
opinion and differences were discussed in the agenda break-time. The experts also 
had a noticeable tendency to dismiss any alternative opinions offered by the citizen 
jurors who appeared unsure at times whether to be more assertive. As a result, on the 
first day, the experts were a confident knowledgeable in-group while the jurors were a 
knowledge seeking out-group. However, as the jurors's topic knowledge increased so 
did their confidence and during the second day they were responding not just 
defensively but confidently, often reconfirming their statements and challenging a 
presenter's viewpoint. Some jurors even expressed frustration and anger saying they 
felt they had been kept in deliberate ignorance about major changes made to television 
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organisation and regulation. Their reactions appeared consistent with the documented 
lack of public debate in the country, especially during the late 1980s when television 
services were significantly restructured. 
It was also noticeable that some presenters were better able to deal with the 
information sharing process and jurors's questions and challenges about their material 
than others. One presenter, called A for this example, ignored the presentation 
timeslot guideline and came armed with enough data to fill a one to two hour session. 
During the presentation A interacted less with the jurors and passed around lengthy 
documents that the jurors did not have time to absorb. Afterwards during the break 
some jurors said they felt this particular presenter had treated them as "ignorants". 
The attitude of A was a contrast to other presenters who, though strongly promoting 
their own opinions, engaged directly with the Jury panel and were responsive to 
questions. The manner displayed by presenter A towards the jurors's views, which 
they judged dismissive, produced an interesting side effect. In chapters two and four 
the domineering behaviour of Robert Muldoon was shown to have a coercive affect on 
the behaviour of others and it was argued this coercion was only successful because 
Muldoon was of higher status and noncompliance could produce negative effects on 
the other party. During the Waikato Jury elite coercion was not an issue although elite 
knowledge and discursive tactics, such as A's colonisation of time and heavy use of 
documented information, was used on occasions to try and influence the jurors's 
opinions about television standards. However, as Wartenburg (l 997) confirms, such 
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tactics, unlike coercion, cannot make anyone behave differently to how they wish. It 
did not succeed with the jurors. They just noticed and expressed resentment. Any 
attempt to use expert knowledge undemocratically to gain influence tended to generate 
a negative reaction against the user instead of any appreciable impact on the jurors's 
views. 
The structure of the Citizens' Jury allowed different opinions and attitudes to be 
expressed even though an agenda and timetable framed the entire event. This internal 
flexibility meant the citizen jurors could discuss any topic they desired. For example, 
the Waikato jurors emerged from their lengthy deliberations on the third day with 
several well-informed decisions about the current organisation and regulation of 
television services in New Zealand, as well as their recommendations about the topic 
of "good taste and decency" on television (see Appendix M). Their internal agenda-
setting ability, combined with the expert information sharing and later deliberation, 
enabled the Jury group to define their own participation during the event and engage 
confidently with asymmetric elite arguments, attitudes, and tactics. 
8.7: Knowledge sharing, a key to rebalance an asymmetrical relationship 
Together these twin processes, of knowledge sharing and internal agenda setting, 
during the Waikato Citizens' Jury could be observed to lessen any influence from elite 
social power and to equalise the status and communication between the two 
participant groups. Wrong ( 1993) explains that asymmetrical power relations occur as 
one "power holder exercises greater control" than the other (p. 13). This situation was 
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observed at the beginning of the Citizens' Jury however, as the jurors's topic 
knowledge and confidence increased the power relationship between the Jury 
participants achieved greater symmetry. This more equalised situation could be said 
to display "intercursive power" (Wrong, I 993). Wrong explains that: 
Intercursive power exists where the power of each party in a relationship is 
countervailed by that of the other, with procedures for bargaining or joint 
decision-making governing their relations when matter affecting the goals and 
interests of both are involved (1993, pp. I 3- I 4 ). 
lntercursive power, through Citizens' Juries, demonstrates one way citizens can resist 
or combat the influence of elites in community issue policymaking; it requires that a 
method, acceptable to both parties be adopted and that both have a willingness to 
participate. In this study, a search was carried out to locate a precise structural method 
of bringing together the two distant parties, as one party obviously held greater 
decision-making power. As the thesis has earlier argued, this elite power 
identification was substantiated by a long-term historical assessment of broadcasting 
activities and policies. 
Observations during the Citizens' Jury indicated that the single factor allowing 
television policymakers to retain a hierarchical, and closed, tradition in setting 
community policies is information or knowledge. One Waikato juror summed it up as 
"an empowerment through information" (see Appendix G, question I 9). Without the 
elite information sharing process of the Citizens' Jury, the citizen jurors would not 
have had the ability or confidence to deliberate about the topic or formulate their 
decisions. Accordingly the potential of an intercursive power relationship would not 
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be able to be realised. The consultative process reflects, without necessarily having 
the final judgment of their legal counterparts, the court justice process where citizen 
jurors are provided with comprehensive information to enable them to negotiate and 
make an informed group decision. Information sharing is the key that lessens the 
influence of elite power and the factor that elite media institutions and representatives 
protect. Information sharing turns a public participation/consultation event into an 
event of jointly exercised, or what Foll et terms "coactive" ( cited in Gilbert et al., 
I 9992, p. 45) power. The Waikato Citizens' Jury demonstrated how, for such an 
event to succeed, intercursive and coactive power relations must develop between the 
consultation parties. 
8.8: EPPT limits elite activity and enhances public consultation practice 
The EPPT code connects observations from the Waikato Citizens' Jury into a practice 
formula that works to limit elite influence and ensure ethical public participation 
consultations. The code is intended to assist the planning and management of public 
consultation events by media organisations but it would be equally applicable to any 
other consultation activity. The code combines four value conditions (Equal-
Participation-Preparation-Time), which were each part of the planning and operation 
of the Waikato Citizens' Jury. 
• Equal - an ethical consultation event ensures each participant is treated equally 
and that every endeavour is made to equalise topic knowledge differences so 
all participants can contribute to discussions and decisions 
• Participation - each participant must have the necessary information to 
participate fully at all stages of the consultation process. Participation should 
be diverse. To assist creative consultation there should be composition 
diversity among participants 
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• Preparation - equal participation preparation should be provided for all 
participants. Differences of topic knowledge should be acknowledged and 
deliberate efforts made to ensure these differences are equalised so 
consultation results are informed and appropriate 
• Time - equal participation preparation time is necessary. Participants require 
sufficient preparation time to gain topic knowledge in order to be full 
consultation participant partners. 
The EPPT code functions as an integrated system of interdependent and interacting 
criteria to lessen the impact of any elite social power and encourage a coactive 
consultation atmosphere. The code indicates there should be no superiors or 
subordinates in a public participation consultation event, in contrast to the pattern of 
authority retention in most public opinion survey events. 
The EPPT code is deliberately laid out as a set of systematic interlinked criteria as 
such lists have a prescribing nature. For instance Eden and Huxham's (1996) list of 
action research characteristics in chapter three is designed to operate in this manner 
and this approach is also reflected in Seidman's (1994) summary of bureaucracy's 
rule-like prescribing criteria in chapter one. This prescriptive ability of criteria lists 
was argued by Sefton-Green and Buckingham ( 1998) to be a constraining factor but in 
this instance constraint for a precise outcome is intended. 
In the Broadcasting Act ( 1989), the single criterion given is inadequate to prescribe 
ethical consultation activity and the inadequacy bears a major responsibility for the 
continuing lack of public participation in formulating the Codes of Broadcasting 
Practice. The Act states that it is a function of the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
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to "encourage broadcasters to consult with persons having an interest in the subject-
matter of those codes" (Section 21, 2). 
With regard to the codes citizens could definitely be considered the largest group of 
persons having an interest in any consultation about their formulation. As Cleland and 
King ( 1972) rightly point out consultation as an organised activity should usually 
involve all stakeholders with a common interest in a subject matter. However, in this 
section of the Broadcasting Act (1989), the wording only indicates a relationship 
between the Broadcasting Standards Authority and broadcasters. This situation allows 
broadcasting elites to interpret and set community standards in a self-regulatory 
manner similar to press editors. It also, in this case, implicates the government and 
broadcasters in a policy alignment that excludes citizen participation in policies that 
have a widespread community impact. This alignment is similar to the historic 
government/media alliances related in chapters one and two. At the close of the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury a juror precisely defined this situation in his questionnaire as: 
"They look after each other (BSA and broadcasters). Don't hurt broadcasters etc" (see 
Appendix F, question 7). 
The multidimensional design of the EPPT code encourages full and equal participation 
to achieve a balance of knowledge by all participants as a method to limit elite social 
power in public consultations and achieve accurate decision-making. The application 
of the code's four criteria during the Waikato Citizens' Jury empowered the diverse 
participants in the jury panel and ensured their decision-making independence. 
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Jurors's comments confirm this assessment (see Appendix F and G). The jurors's 
engagement throughout the Citizens' Jury and their focused topic recommendations 
also confirm that when the EPPT code criteria are applied they work synergistically to 
produce an ethical and successful public participation event capable ofrejuvenating 
involved citizenship. 
8.9: Gathering citizens' opinions about television standards 
Objective Three: To gather a sample of community attitudes about the 
regulation of television content, especially the problematic "good taste and 
decency" Code of Practice for Free-To-Air television (BSA, G2 Code) to 
present to television policymakers. 
This third action project objective was also successfully achieved. The 12 jurors gave 
their individual opinions about television content including the G2 ''good taste and 
decency" Code of Broadcasting Practice in two questionnaires (see Appendix E and 
F). Their joint opinions from four hours of deliberation also produced a final list of 
unanimous recommendations and conclusions (see Appendix M). A report containing 
this information was especially compiled by the research coordinator and presented to 
all New Zealand television policymakers on behalf of the Jury panel (i.e., Macbeth, 
1999). 
The Jury panel's list of recommendations and conclusions reveals that, in their small 
group and joint group deliberation sessions, many different television regulation issues 
were discussed. As well as "good taste and decency" in television programmes, other 
Codes of Broadcasting Practice were debated. These included the role of television 
broadcasters and the Broadcasting Standards' Authority as developers and supervisors 
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of community standards, the on-screen censor guides for television content, public 
complaint procedures, the government's structuring of television services, the impact 
of advertisers and the all-commercial nature of New Zealand television, and the lack 
of public representation in the formulation of community impact policies. 
The 12 jurors wrote many comments in their evaluation questionnaires to the effect 
that they thought members of the community should be directly consulted about the 
compilation of television standards and that community members had a right to have a 
say in the regulation of community standards in broadcast television. The jurors 
suggested "broadcasters need to be more proactive in researching viewer opinions" 
and "should be in regular consultation with the public" through an "interactive" 
process like Citizens' Juries (Appendix M). The trial Citizens' Jury panel concluded 
that it was an effective public participation method enabling citizens "to have a say". 
The Waikato Citizens' Jury also revealed a majority of citizen jurors held views about 
the G2 code different to those gathered by the market research company Colmar 
Brunton during a quantitative survey of 1,000 respondents just prior to the Jury project 
(BSA, 1999). Dr Zwaga, the research and communications officer for the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority, explained some results from this survey (i.e., 
Changing Mediascapes) to the Jury panel. For example, the results indicated that the 
majority of New Zealanders are unaffected by so-called bad or offensive language 
being broadcast (NZPA, 7 June 1999, p.3). 
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However, in their pre jury evaluation questionnaire a majority of the Jury sample 
ranked swearing and bad language at the higher end of the "least acceptable" scale 
(Appendix E, question 4). In their post jury evaluation questionnaire their views 
ranked slightly more widely across the scale from least to most acceptable but a 
majority still ranked swearing and bad language within the mid to high range of being 
unacceptable in television content (Appendix F, question 2). These pre and post Jury 
questionnaires reveal little individual change, even though the jurors viewed this issue 
in a number of different screen contexts and it was extensively discussed. 
This example indicates the Waikato Citizens' Jury sample group held a different 
opinion on this issue to the Colmar Brunton survey. While this difference can be 
blamed on the small sample of the Waikato Citizens' Jury the hypothetical survey 
scenarios devised for the use of bad or offensive language on screen, and the 
established general inaccuracy of quantitative representational polling (Smith, 1999; 
Fishkin, 1991, 1995) could be equally to blame. This survey comparison also suggests 
that the attitudes of New Zealanders may be less liberal than is indicated in the 
professionally devised and mediated surveys carried out by the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority and that the Codes of Broadcasting Practice could be inaccurate 
for the community they serve. 
8.10: The results of a survey assessing prior topic influence 
After the Citizens' Jury a survey was carried out to benchmark the results of the pre 
jury questionnaire that was designed to establish jurors's attitudes prior to their 
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Citizens' Jury participation. This additional survey was undertaken to gauge any prior 
topic influence the 12 jurors may have gained from media items about either the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority or the issue of community standards because there 
was a period of two months from the time the jurors received their random 
questionnaire until they were invited to take part in the research project. 
All 12 selected jurors resided in the Waikato area, in and around Hamilton City. The 
major daily newspaper published for this area is the Waikato Times. This newspaper 
has a wide range of news and feature items and replicates many items of national 
importance appearing in larger circulation papers, such as the NZ Herald and The 
Dominion. The residents of the three areas from which the jurors were selected could 
be generally regarded as loyal subscribers or regular readers of this regional 
newspaper over others, and, as a large regional paper, the Waikato Times also reflects 
information conveyed daily by other media. 
Issues of the Waikato Times for three months prior to the Jury weekend were 
examined for television related items, especially any associated with standards or 
regulatory matters. A total of 14 7 television related items were published in April, 
May and June 1999. The items were summarised for convenience into five categories: 
economics, overseas news, local news, entertainment and standards (see Figure 8). 
The variety of material about television published during this three-month period was 
extremely limited. For example, most items in the "economics" category were a 
continuing update about the potential sale ofTVNZ's share stake in SKY Pay-TV. 
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Only one item in this category related to viewers and regulation - the government's 
proposal to scrap the broadcasting license fee levy. 
Month Economics 0/New NZ/News Entertainment Standards 
April 1999 I 4 7 28 2 = 42 
May 1999 3 3 8 34 2 = 50 
June 1999 6 2 14 31 2 = 52 
Figure 16. Results of the prior influence media survey about the Waikato Citizens' Jury topic 
Continuing stories also dominated the entertainment category. These included 
updated reports about the jailing of an American screen actor, daily television 
programme schedules, and a weekly television review. It was judged that in the 
months prior to the jurors's participation in the Waikato Citizens' Jury they would not 
have been influenced or received any associated topic information from their local 
newspaper, or other media. 
8.11: An assessment of the Waikato Citizens' Jury and its impact 
The Waikato Citizens' Jury action project successfully gained the attention, and 
participation of elite television policymakers. The public participation method also 
gained an elite supporter within the policy circle but elite gatekeepers dismissed these 
representations. The manner of these discussions was related to the research 
coordinator but, due to them being "off the record", they cannot be explicitly 
discussed in this chapter. However, these known informal effects have provided 
added confirmation of the research hypothesis that elite social power works to exclude 
public participation and citizen dialogue in television policymaking in New Zealand. 
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This situation confirms the assessment already stated in the prescribing data that those 
who are in elite decision-making positions can regulate who gets to deliberate about 
New Zealand television policies, and can marginalize, or dismiss, intercursive 
relationship attempts, and their findings. The Waikato Citizens' Jury also confirmed 
both the contemporary existence of policymaking in-groups and out-groups and the 
continuing ability of those with elite status to set policy participation practice and 
exclude citizen dialogue about television policies with a widespread community 
impact. This situation can be construed as reflecting the belief that those with 
govemmentality are better able to make decisions and public dialogue can be irrational 
(Leftwich, 1983). 
Eleven of the twelve Waikato jurors stated in their Jury evaluation questionnaire they 
were hopeful their informed opinions would be considered by those in positions of 
authority but elite social power worked to dismiss those hopes (see Appendix G, 
question 20). The remaining juror stated he would like to be hopeful but he believed 
the Jury findings would have no effect. This juror was an employee of a large local 
government body and he was skeptical that the Jury results would have any effect on 
policymakers, though he strongly approved of public participation processes and 
citizens' opinions being gathered to inform community policies. 
The comments of the 12 Jury members in their questionnaires also revealed they 
gained confidence and knowledge from their participation in the Waikato Citizens' 
Jury and that they thought the method should be utilised in the future. All 12 jurors 
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stated they would participate in other Citizens' Juries if invited. But their increased 
levels of confidence and understanding about television regulation and their 
enjoyment of their Jury experience did not displace their feelings of being 
disenfranchised from a decision-making process that they felt affects them and their 
families. During sessions and agenda breaks a number of jurors expressed 
astonishment, and outrage, at the politically initiated rearrangements of broadcasting 
systems in recent years that had been undertaken without their knowledge as well as 
their inability to contribute to policy dialogues. 
The action project's operational success was no indicator to the attitudes of 
policymakers to the jurors's recommendations or their interest in the method as a 
viable public participation practice. Past attitudes and actions revealed through the 
descriptive phenomena in chapter one and the general reluctance of organisations in 
New Zealand to adopt public participation practices, despite being enshrined in 
legislation, were major indicators. The research data prescribing the action 
intervention also accurately foretold the responses of the two television organisations 
responsible for formulating the Codes of Broadcasting Practice - the New Zealand 
Television Broadcasters' Council and the Broadcasting Standards Authority. Their 
negative responses to the Citizens' Jury method reveals that the elite social power that 
had prescribed the problem-solving intervention project also ended up prescribing and 
restricting "the likely range of validity and applicability of the results" (Eden & 
Huxham, 1996, p. 537). 
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In contrast to Britain, and other countries, ethical unmediated citizen policy dialogue 
still appears not to be a consideration. This attitude persists even when sound 
management practice points to the community as a key stake-holder in community 
impact policies like the Codes of Broadcasting Practice and when public participation 
is shown to be a positive process for informing and benchmarking organisational 
decision-making. Also, though citizen inclusion is central to the idea of democracy 
and media, and the press industry acknowledges this as guiding principle, citizen 
representation at organisational and political levels in New Zealand is mainly taken to 
mean representation negotiated by a minority elite or professional experts, as in 
professionally controlled focus groups and community attitude surveys. 
This system of representative democracy ingrained in New Zealand's television 
policymakers means the appointed elite believe they should be able to make decisions 
without either any "backseat driving" or face to face dialogue from the community 
(Catt, 1997). In one discussion, during the presentation of a copy of the Waikato 
Citizens' Jury report to an elite television policy gatekeeper, he expressed outrage that 
citizens should be able to complain: "They have no right to complain about a 
programme that may have cost a producer a million dollars to make" (Anonymous, 
September 1999). This attitude confirms that elites continue to limit public 
participation in media policies as systematically today as they have in the past. 
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8.12: Summary 
The Waikato Citizens' Jury demonstrated that public participation and intercursive 
power relations in television policymaking (and other media) in New Zealand is both 
possible and practical. As an action research project it showed how the deliberative 
Citizens' Jury method used overseas by the Independent Television Commission could 
also be a suitable and manageable structure for New Zealand policymakers to gather 
community knowledge to inform policies with a widespread community impact. The 
Waikato Citizens' Jury successfully demonstrated the characteristics of a valid 
Citizens' Jury as detailed by Fishkin (1991) and the Jefferson Centre, as well as the 
seven core values the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) 
advocates for public participation practice. Theories arising from the descriptive 
material in the media reviews (i. e., elite social power, bureaucracy and 
governmentality) prescribing the research hypothesis were revealed to be strongly 
influencing the attitudes of media officials towards the use of Citizens' Juries. 
I therefore conclude that the use of elite social power amongst television policymakers 
continues to limit elite acceptance of citizen dialogue and public participation methods 
like Citizens' Juries. This is due to a preference by those in elite positions to favour 
other elites like large research companies using traditional, and less accurate, survey 
methods to inform community policies. For Citizens' Juries to become a media policy 
public participation practice a change of attitude by media institutions would be 
required, as the method's information sharing process works to equalise social power 
and this challenges the social status of those in policymaking elite positions. 
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Media, Citizens, Dialogue, and NIMBYism 
In the course of the previous eight chapters, this thesis has sought to forge a new 
direction for the relationship between New Zealand media and its community. The 
directional hypothesis of a lack of public participation in the policies of New Zealand 
press and broadcasting was the inspiration for the problem-solving intervention 
project, the Waikato Citizens' Jury. The twin processes of accumulating hypothesis 
prescribing data and the action project utilising practitioner skills made the action 
research inquiry method uniquely suitable to encompass the complexity of the planned 
research strategies. 
This vindication of action research inquiry as a suitable method for media research is 
an original contribution in that no documentation was located to show it had been 
previously used for research into media activity in New Zealand. In addition, other 
thesis contributions to the action research inquiry method include: 
• showing how an action project on the Citizens' Jury method can resolve, at the 
same time as having widespread community impact, the lack of public 
dialogue, both historic and contemporary, informing media policies; 
• demonstrating the Citizens' Jury method as a viable and ethical public 
participation practice suitable for New Zealand policymakers and organisations 
to gather community representative dialogue. This has particular value in a 
national context since the first Citizens' Jury held in New Zealand (i. e., 
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Wellington City Council, 1996) attracted negative criticisms, which brought 
discredit to the method as well as to that specific project; 
• formulating the EPPT code as a practice guide for the ethical management of 
public consultation events by media and other organisations wishing to initiate 
citizen interaction and gather community knowledge (and so making events 
like the Wellington one less likely); 
• suggesting how New Zealand community relations could be rejuvenated - a 
lack of public debate and distance between citizens and decision-makers in 
New Zealand was documented in the course of this thesis - into a greater sense 
of involved citizenship through Citizens' Juries; 
• gathering, in an ethical manner, a sample of community opinions about 
television standards and especially the problematic "good taste and decency" 
Code of Broadcasting Practice and distributing them to television 
policymakers; and 
• verifying that the 15 characteristics compiled by Eden and Huxham ( 1996) are 
a useful guide for an action research programme, which involves practitioner 
skills and is concerned with a change of organisational practice. 
This final chapter presents a concluding assessment and discussion about the research 
hypothesis and its prescribing data, as well as comments about the listed research 
contributions. It connects observations about the social phenomena of elite power 
used by New Zealand media authorities to an ingrained pattern of organisational 
thinking, or an internal culture, that works to limit public participation in media 
policies. Olsen and Marger's ( 1993) descriptions of elite social power are accurately 
reflected in the historic and contemporary behaviour of government, media authorities 
and their officials examined in this thesis. Weber's concepts of bureaucracy and its 
operational effects were also found to be not just significant factors prescribing the 
research hypothesis, but also to be factors limiting the success of this research 
programme. 
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Together the two theories of elite social power and bureaucracy embedded in the 
research programme's descriptive data and its results combine to form the conclusion 
that media authorities in New Zealand exhibit an elite bureaucratic protectionist 
syndrome that can be best described as "institutional NIMBYism" (Not In My Back 
Yard). This style of organisational culture or behaviour appears as an unbroken fault-
line in the relationship of New Zealand media authorities to citizens stretching from 
the earliest days of media's establishment in the mid 1800s to its present day 
operations. 
This chapter explains what is meant by ''institutional NIMBYism" in relation to New 
Zealand's press and broadcasting institutions, and the Citizens' Jury action project. It 
also examines the potential for media authorities to change their policy consultation 
procedures to a more inclusive practice - in accordance with the example set by their 
British counterparts - and predicts some future effects from the continuing adherence 
to "institutional NIMBYism'' in New Zealand. 
9.1: Tracing the protectionist pathway of media's institutional NIMBYism 
The term "institutional NIMBYism" was deliberately coined to describe the elite 
behaviour of New Zealand's media policymakers (press, radio and especially 
television), in persistently excluding citizen participation in policies with a community 
impact. This assessment of their elite behaviour is strongly supported by historical 
and contemporary literature material, policymaking practices, comparisons with 
similar overseas organisations, and the reactions of television officials to the use of 
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Citizens' Juries. In summary this brand of organisational behaviour by New Zealand 
media authorities can be characterised as follows: 
• it dismisses most public participation and public consultation practices; 
• it is socially out of step with the multiple calls and requirements from official 
sources and members of the public for the inclusion of public participation 
practices; 
• it ignores the potential benefits to organisations and the wider community from 
such external interaction practices; 
• it exhibits out of date management practices compared to similar overseas 
media institutions; 
• it involves a continuing reliance on restricted professional expertise to gather 
community attitudes and a reliance on representational survey methods which 
can produce inaccurate community information; and 
• it strongly suggests media authorities and their officials do not believe that 
citizens are authoritative sources for their own knowledge. 
In combination these defining characteristics point to a NIMBY mindset or culture 
whereby international practice that values citizen participation is not welcome in the 
New Zealand media policy backyard. 
The syndrome of NIMBYism or "Not In My Backyard" activity is a euphemism 
normally used to describe the local opposition and attitudes of a community or group 
of citizens towards a decision by others to position an unwanted facility in their 
neighbourhood (Mazmanian & Morrell, 1994; Rosenbaum, 1991 ). Such opposition 
normally relates to environmental or public utility development decisions and NIMBY 
situations are regularly reported in the press. For example in recent months, in the 
same area from which the Waikato jurors were selected, citizens were opposing the 
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siting of a waste dump, a prison, and a casino in their community areas ( Waikato 
Times, 2000 December 15, p.3; Waikato Times, 2000 December 20, p. I). These 
citizens because of their opposition to these three activities in their environment will 
be labeled "NIMBYs" by those in authority wanting to develop the dump, prison and 
casino facilities. 
The appearance of such citizen initiated "Not In My Back Yard" activity always spurs 
a corresponding reaction from the implementing organisations who will usually begin 
a range of reactionary activities to gain greater public support for their projects. These 
counter-activities to citizen activism can take the form of a carefully targeted public 
relations campaign that incorporates a series of asymmetrical activities such as direct 
mail-outs to community leaders and homeowners in the project area; project meetings 
with media representatives and community officials to refute objectives, paid 
advertisements and articles favourable to the projects being placed in the local press, 
and public meetings arranged in the NIMBY localities. From this list of activities it 
can be seen it is not a contest between equals in terms of either social power or 
resources and any response is a carefully managed activity by developers to suppress 
and eliminate the NIMBY opposition. The cartoon (Figure 9) on the next page 
illustrates types of items and attitude that can initiate NIMBYism; the writing in the 
speech bubble indicates the activities which institutional NIMBYism typically 




public dialogue in 
media policies 
Figure 17. The appearance and form of NIMBY activity: adapted from a cartoon 
by Hawkey published in the Waikato Times, 27 January, 200 I, p. 6 
Institutional NIMBYism (or a Not In My Backyard mindset by organisations towards 
public participation practices) can spring from the elite's desire to proceed 
independently with public impact activities; a dismissive attitude towards those 
stakeholders in an organisation's external environment, or even an uninformed 
assumption about an activity. The practice of institutional NIMBYism is a by-product 
of closed organisations as these eschew citizen dialogue, even in relevant operational 
areas. Such organisations also exhibit hierarchical bureaucratic procedures and ignore 
the established benefits that can result from public participation practices and citizen 
consultation. For instance in chapters one and two, New Zealand media organisations 
were shown to cling to established conventions, dismiss the involvement of non 
professional outsiders in their decision-making, and work to maintain a system of elite 
social power and partnerships within their operational internal and external 
environments. In regard to media regulation it was also shown that past policy 
decisions can be a constraining influence on present decisions, and that "there is a 
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natural instinct to favour what is familiar and avoid risk" (Economic Monitoring 
Group, 1985, p. 5). 
Together these exhibited organisational behaviours and the use of inherited policy 
decisions can form a pattern of organisation protection or institutional NIMBYism 
because they function similarly to citizen initiated NIMBYism. Again, it is not a 
contest between equals. The media organisations have the power, resources and 
backing of government or self-regulation policies, to operate as they wish over 
complete national community environments. The practice of institutional NIMBYism 
towards public participation and the inclusion of citizen dialogue by New Zealand 
media authorities, particularly television, can be interpreted from the weight of 
research evidence informing the conclusion. The reasons for the practice appear to 
range from an anticipated dissipation of authority power by executives, a fear of 
unknown effects from citizen involvement, and even as outlined in chapter five, the 
assumption that decision-making could be lengthened by any process of public 
consultation, public interactions can be chaotic and public dialogue irrational. 
9.2: Organising the research strategy to counter media's NIMBYism 
To counter institutional NIMBYism by media authorities, this researcher organised the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury as a targeted response project. However, unlike the struggle of 
citizen NIMBYs my campaign was more equal as I possessed a range of practitioner 
skills to assist a counter campaign and had access to international best practice 
methods. 
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The first step was to find a model that had already been successfully used, hopefully 
by other media authorities, as this increased the likelihood of it being adopted and 
institutionalised for public participation in New Zealand. Closed elite organisations, 
like New Zealand media authorities, tend to dismiss new practices but, as they are 
bureaucracies, they display some openness to manageable new structures that 
complement existing procedures and draw from traditionally valued practices 
elsewhere. The Citizens' Jury consultation and public opinion gathering method was 
therefore selected as appropriate because it had been used successfully by a large 
British media regulatory institution, the Independent Television Commission, as a 
public participation method to inform and benchmark their community impact 
policies. 
The planning for the problem-solving Waikato based Citizens' Jury action project was 
complex especially the negotiations to bring elite media policymakers together with a 
group of grassroots citizens to consult about a community related policy. The topic 
for the joint consultation was Free To Air television programme standards and in 
particular the "good taste and decency" Code of Broadcasting Practice, as this issue 
was attracting an increasing number of public complaints. It was also disclosed to be 
a problematic area for both press and broadcasting policymakers to establish and it 
was thought the topic issue may increase their interest in the Citizens' Jury method 
and the project's results. 
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In this thesis the data originally prescribing the action intervention with its 
documented theme of "institutional NIMBYism" proved to be an accurate indication 
for a lack of practice change by television authorities. The social phenomena 
examined in different chapters and the attitudes of those in media decision-making 
positions revealed how their organisational conventions and dominantly positioned 
individuals work to hinder any changes to policymaking consultation procedures. 
Consequently, this thesis contends that past media practices (which work to dismiss 
public participation in decision-making) will continue to influence the future rather 
any rational assessment of organisational benefits from a practice change favouring 
greater citizen inclusion. This contention means that media authorities, especially 
broadcast television, will miss the benefits that derive from including citizen dialogue 
as a resource in their consultation procedures about community standards and other 
community impact related policies. 
Further negative effects include: the continuing preference for elite professionals to 
gather community opinion, which is usually a more expensive option and a greater 
drain on the financial resources of organisations; and the delays that can be caused 
through the deployment of community opinion surveys, undertaken by in house and 
external professionals, being lengthy processes sometimes. For example, the review 
of the Codes of Broadcasting initiated by the New Zealand Television Broadcasters' 
Council in early 2000 is still not completed a year later. In contrast Citizens' Juries 
can produce results, inexpensively and fast. 
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9.3: The role, contribution, and limitations of practitioner experience 
Practitioner skills were entwined in every step, especially the Waikato Citizens' Jury, 
of the research process and were another reason that the action research inquiry 
method and the characteristics compiled by Eden and Huxham (l 996) provided the 
best theoretical warrant. The success of Citizens' Juries could be limited by a lack of 
such practitioner skills. For example, an examination of the criticisms of the Citizens' 
Jury organised by the Wellington City Council in 1996 in both the report to Council 
and a sample of press articles (i.e. Cutler, 1996; Moran, 1996; Boswell, 1996, Trotter, 
1996) reveal that the negativity could have been eliminated with a more intimate 
knowledge and ethical application of the Jury methodology and the involvement of 
communication management skills. 
The organisation of the Waikato Citizens' Jury action project was informed by many 
years of both event and communication management experience and a well-researched 
knowledge of the key components and functioning of the Citizens' Jury methodology. 
Interviews with other Citizens' Jury organisers and a review of the method's 
international application were integral planning steps. Consequently, unless a similar 
knowledge base and skills inform other Citizens' Juries, their operation will vary from 
the Waikato Citizens' Jury and their success may be compromised. 
The researcher's practice background enabled the sole-charge organisation of the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury and it eliminated the involvement of others with potentially 
less experience. It also ensured that the action project to counter elite NIMBY 
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behaviour was a more equal campaign. For example, the media response to the 
Waikato Citizens' Jury was deliberately initiated by press releases written by the 
research practitioner as an additional means to circulate knowledge of the Citizens' 
Jury method, to increase the project's profile, and to gain the attention of media and 
other policymaking elites. 
The researcher's decision to play the "laissez faire" role of project minder assisted the 
independent participation of both the citizen jurors and the presenters and encouraged 
greater independent symmetrical dialogue. Both contributed to a successful result. If 
a Citizens' Jury has an active involved moderator, chairperson, or any other additional 
intervention then there is a risk that the results could be very different. The action 
project required a problem-solving and collaborative attitude, and an understanding of 
coactive power to operate smoothly and beneficially for all participants and to attain 
the research objectives. This operational knowledge was again the result of 
practitioner values and experiences with a wide diversity of people and problem-
solving projects. 
9.4: Changing assumptions and long-term media practice 
In conclusion this thesis challenged the assumption by elite media policymakers that 
grassroots citizens could not absorb the complexity of media regulation and produce 
policy information that could be a valuable decision-making resource to inform 
community impact policies. It also challenged the elite assumption that professional 
expertise is required to moderate and negotiate public participation practices 
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(including symmetrical dialogue events) and their results. Though professional skills 
were an integral part of the research programme they were only used to organise and 
manage the physical aspects of the project. The citizen participants demonstrated they 
were able to independently utilise the Jury process to produce appropriately 
formulated policies on behalf of the national community. Together the operation of 
the Waikato Citizens' Jury and the jurors's focused policy conclusions and 
recommendations upsets the assumption that public consultation can be chaotic, 
irrational and lengthy, and changes the longstanding and ongoing continuing elite 
exclusion ofNew Zealand citizens. 
Though this study's conclusions, like any other, can be explained as only one answer 
for the lack of public participation in media policymaking the depth and expanse of 
the research investigations suggests otherwise. An authoritarian past is influencing 
present day policy decision-making in New Zealand to a greater extent than other 
countries like Britain and America. The historical media review data discloses that 
those in elite media policymaking positions in New Zealand consistently operate their 
traditional institutionalised practices even though they are out of step with 
contemporary attitudes and out of date in relation to developments in comparable 
international media organisations, and out of touch with the desires of citizens they are 
required to consult. 
This thesis unfortunately has to conclude as it began. The historical data prescribing 
the research hypothesis is reflected in the actions of contemporary media policy 
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makers. This reflection of the past in the present predicts the future. The thesis can 
therefore comfortably predict that recent policy statements by the Minister of 
Broadcasting (i. e., Hobbs, 6 July 2000) encouraging participatory democracy in 
broadcasting are equally unlikely - unless a practice like Citizens' Juries is adopted 
and institutionalised - to change the strongly entrenched elite protectionist culture of 
media authorities towards citizen involvement in decision-making. 
Note: 
A concluding contribution of this thesis, introduced in the preface, is that the progress 
of this action research programme has confirmed that the action research inquiry 
method conforms to the basic tenets of sound scientific research practice. This 
conclusion is demonstrated by a comparative survey between the characteristics of 
action research illustrated in this thesis and a list of five scientific characteristics 
provided by Wimmer and Dominick ( 1997). They argue that a research approach that 
does not follow their listed characteristics cannot be considered a scientific approach 
(pp. 9-11 ). Their list was chosen in preference to others as they compiled it in relation 
to mass media research, which is the issue, explored in this thesis. 
1. Scientific research is public: Wimmer and Dominick ( 1997) state a scientific 
approach includes a series of steps, that a researcher builds on past knowledge and 
researchers must publish and share their results. This action research programme 
has proceeded in a series of steps starting with the comprehensive literature 
reviews of historical material referenced for other researchers to examine. The 
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information gathered from interviews was checked against literature sources, so 
these information sources can also be sought and replicated. Finally, the research 
results were published and distributed in a public manner through a project report, 
a working paper (i.e., Macbeth, 1999; Macbeth, 2000), and a published article 
(Macbeth & McKie, 2000) already widely distributed in the Asia Pacific area. 
2. Science is objective: The research can be considered objective, even though 
action research inquiry encourages a greater degree of reflexive involvement by a 
research practitioner, and any long-term assessment of an historical issue can be 
redefined by another for another purpose. Facts have been dealt with objectively 
and the research subject matter has prescribed each phase of the research process. 
Any reflections, encouraged by the action research approach, or what Wimmer 
and Dominick ( 1997) may describe to be "eccentricities of judgement" have been 
kept separate in the preface and postscript sections (p. I 0). 
3. Science is empirical: The research programme has consistently examined material 
that is knowable by others and abstract notions have been defined by operational 
definitions. For example, the author's definition of media policies, and how they 
operate on an external environment, in chapter four is linked to established 
descriptions of the public policy process. 
4. Science is systematic and cumulative: This research programme began by 
examining historical material and already established concepts which helped 
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identify a problem in New Zealand's media regulation. The research programme 
used the "ideal form" of progressing from a single event, in this case the lack of 
public participation in media policies (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997, p. 11). The 
patterns of the phenomena within the prescribing research data were found to be 
linked to various concepts which then formed a "systematic" direction and 
formulated "propositions" (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997, p. 11 ). Proposition 
examples include Citizens' Juries can resolve the research hypotheses and the 
finding that New Zealand media authorities, especially television, practice 
institutional NIMBYism towards public participation. A proposition theory is the 
EPPT code formula which proposes there are certain value conditions that can. 
enhance public consultation between diverse participants, such as television 
policymakers and citizens. 
5. Science is predictive: The historical information informing the research 
intervention was shown to predict the research results. The theory that elite social 
power circumscribes public participation in media policies is connected to the 
reactions of media officials to the use of Citizens' Juries. The prescribing research 
data predicted this result and predicts there will be a lack of citizen consultation by 
television policymakers in future to inform and benchmark their community 
impact policies, unless a practice like Citizens' Juries is institutionally adopted. 
Together these five "scientific" research characteristics compiled by Wimmer and 
Dominick ( 1997) coincide with the 15 characteristics - for an action research 
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programme aimed at organisational change - provided by Eden and Huxham ( 1996) 
which guide this thesis. Establishing this connection, between action research inquiry 
and the norms of scientific research practice, was done to respond to criticisms that 
action research is a not a proper scientific approach and research programmes using 
the context exhibit poor methodology, when compared to other inquiry approaches. 
As already mentioned, there can be certain variations within action research inquiry 
that this thesis includes but these also link to the procedures of scientific research 
practice. For example, Wimmer and Dominick ( 1997) describe eight steps in a 
scientific research practice. Each of these steps, sometimes called cycles in action 
research, ranging from the solution of a problem, through the review of existing 
research and theory, to the development of a hypothesis and determining an 
appropriate research design, are all present in this action research programme. 
These steps also conform to Eden and Huxham's ( 1996) list of action research 
characteristics used as both a guide and validation for this thesis. Examples are how 
this research has initiated additional research steps or cycles ( e. g., the hosting of a 
second Citizens' Jury event related in the postscript) and has revealed "implications 
beyond the domain of the project" (Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 537). Similarly, the 
implications of popular public opinion polling methods and the public communication 
practices of policymakers have inspired separate publications to present research 
results. This study is therefore able to conclude that this thesis and the characteristics 
of action research provided by Eden and Huxham ( 1996), replicate the distinguishing 
characteristics of scientific research, as compiled by Wimmer and Dominick ( 1997). 
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Postscript 
Recent Developments and New Directions 
In the final months of writing this thesis there have been a number of relevant 
developments. New policies for broadcasting have been proposed by the government 
and broadcast television policymakers have initiated several activities that could be 
considered informally as paralleling, or relating to, results arising from this research 
programme. In this postscript I therefore take the opportunity to discuss the following 
specific items: the government's new policy proposals for broadcasting; its mention of 
participatory democracy; the current review and rewrite of the Codes of Broadcasting 
Practice for Free-To-Air Television; and the organisation of a second Waikato 
Citizens' Jury event. In addition, like the conclusion of the preface, this last postscript 
section includes research reflections that have generated additional insights about the 
research programme and form part of the action research inquiry tradition. 
1. Recent developments for broadcasting 
The Labour Alliance government, under the direction of the Minister of Broadcasting 
and her policy advisors, has drafted, and presented to parliament, a new broadcasting 
development programme and a charter to guide the programming of the publicly 
owned, state-operated, Television New Zealand (TVNZ) network. Unfortunately, in 
relation to this thesis and its documentation, these developments merely serve to 
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confirm yet again the long tradition of government restructuring of broadcasting and 
the accompanying pattern of government interference in television programming that 
normally occurs with a change of government and political philosophy. One press 
item commenting on these political changes was accurately headlined "Intervention 
increases" and stated ·'government officials are working on a programme to increase 
state intervention in television and radio" ( Waikato Times, 2000, May 15, p. 3). 
However this research programme did produce an additional and unforeseen result. 
Copies of the two policy statements were sent by the Minister of Broadcasting to this 
thesis researcher with requests for comments (Hobbs, 2000, July 6; Hobbs, 2000, 
September 19). In other words I was now judged to have governmentality or 
professional expertise, as the organiser of the Waikato Citizens' Jury, and several 
letters were received requesting my comments about the new broadcasting proposals 
(Minister of Broadcasting Hon Marian L. Hobbs, personal communications, 2000, 
April 26; 2000, June 13; 2000, July 4; 2000, August 8; 2000, August IO; 2000, 
September 20). 
My challenge to the policymakers - to engage in dialogue with citizens to inform 
community policies - and my perceived knowledge of broadcasting matters had 
brought requests from those within the professional policy dialogue circle. It made me 
reflect back on the elite reactions to radio's broadcaster Scrimgeour's activism many 
decades earlier. Perhaps his repeated challenges to bureaucratic officialdom had 
initiated the government's appointment of him as a Radio Controller, in the hope his 
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actions would cease. A more recent example is journalist Paul Smith who was 
recently appointed to the Board of TVNZ. Till his appointment he was well known 
for his weekly articles in The National Business Review railing against the 
organisation of television services, and other media, and the actions of media officials. 
Recent broadcasting developments are however, a side issue to the main intent of this 
thesis, which was to increase public participation in media policymaking. The 
Minister commented in a letter that the recommendations about the Broadcasting Act 
listed in the Waikato Citizens' Jury Report had been placed "before my officials for 
consideration as they develop policy for me" (M. L. Hobbs, personal communication, 
2000, April 26). In this same letter, the Minister stated that the TVNZ charter "will be 
developed following a process of public consultation". However, the draft charter was 
compiled internally by broadcasting policymakers without any public consultation. 
Citizens were invited to submit comments - after its compilation. A public meeting in 
Christchurch to discuss the draft document attracted only seven people (Waikato 
Times, 2000, October 25, p. 9). 
This approach reflects the same misunderstanding of public participation and public 
consultation practice as the approach taken by the Wellington City Council 1996 Jury 
inititative. As stated already in chapter five the approach to consult citizens occurs 
too late in the decision-making process to be genuine. As a result it can appear to 
citizens to be worthless or an elite attempt to divert attention from already made 
decisions. After decades of this type of political behaviour citizens are wise to 
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actions that simultaneously give the impression there will be change while actually 
window dressing a maintenance of the status quo. 
2. The promotion of participatory democracy in broadcasting 
Another tactic giving an impression of change without substance may be discerned in 
the government's mention of "participatory democracy" in the new regulatory 
proposals for broadcasting (i.e., Broadcasting Policy: Objectives and Delivery 
Mechanisms, Hobbs, 2000, July 6). This policy objective states a goal to achieve: "the 
promotion of participatory democracy, including encouragement of a diversity of 
sources of information" (no. 5). Like the word community the word democracy 
denotes certain values and "is widely regarded as a good thing" but it is equally hard 
to define (Plant, 1974, p. 11 ). For example, the press industry states it assists the 
democratic process through disseminating information and a country is defined as 
undemocratic if it restricts the activities of employees of the press industry (Balding, 
2000). 
The Labour Alliance government's use of the term "participatory democracy" and a 
new preference by the Minister of Broadcasting to use the word "citizen" instead of 
audience or consumers, when referring to broadcasting users in recent media 
interviews, is a new direction reflected in the work of this thesis. Karim ( 1999) claims 
'·audience" and "public" are words that create a distance or disconnection so the 
adopting of the term "citizen'' for the purpose of this research is appropriate but for the 
Minister to use it, along with the new policy objective, suggests some kind of future 
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citizen inclusion in broadcasting policies. This recent development also provides the 
final link in my assessment that New Zealand has historically followed a pathway of 
institutional pluralism in broadcasting policymaking, as participatory democracy infers 
neo-pluralism (see chapter four). 
The new goal of citizen inclusion is however, contradicted by another objective in this 
same government policy statement. The document lists a goal of an: 
Enforcement of standards content which conform with and support "perceived" 
community values. This goal is met in New Zealand through the mechanism 
of the Broadcasting Standards Authority .... There is currently no proposal to 
alter or amend this regime (Hobbs, 2000, July 6). 
In 1999, radio broadcasters rewrote their Code of Practice document without any 
public consultation and television broadcasters initiated a very narrow and 
unrepresentative community consultation process for their present Code review. The 
Broadcasting Standards Authority approved both these review processes even though 
both Code documents are radically different from their previous formats. It is unlikely 
any participatory democracy process will be activated as the current legislative regime 
(i. e., the Broadcasting Act, 1989) allows public participation/consultation about the 
Codes to be decided by broadcasters and the Broadcasting Standards Authority, and no 
legislative alterations are intended. Consequently, the principle of participatory 
democracy, in the new broadcasting policy document is yet another carefully worded 
participatory illusion along the lines of the principle of consultation for the Codes of 
Broadcasting Practice outlined in the Broadcasting Act ( 1989). These recent events 
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confirm yet again how the regulation and structuring of public participation is "a 
political act" (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 13). 
On a more positive note some media commentators (e. g., Schulze, 1996, p. 55) 
explain that new technical innovations like interactive television and the proliferation 
of media choice could make it an economic necessity to treat media viewers and users 
as people possessing practical reason. However, such active citizen participation will 
challenge the present status of broadcasting executives and their present bureaucratic 
practices. Consequently, a lack of encouragement for this new broadcasting objective 
will tell us more about the character of those who strive to maintain in-group elite 
control and their out-group attitudes towards citizen stakeholders. This is because 
perceptions about the behaviour of the in-group can be formed from observations over 
a long period ohime, as in this thesis, while their perceptions about the behaviour or 
functioning of the citizen out-group are merely assumptions, due to the lack of 
interaction and evidence. 
In Britain, the New Labour government's promotion of participatory democracy is 
becoming a functioning reality through the increasing use of Citizens' Juries. The 
increased usage is actively encouraged as a means to gather community ideas about 
public interest items like health, broadcasting, and new media to assist decision-
making. In December 2000, the British government announced that it intends to form 
a single new super regulatory body for broadcasting and that the interests of citizens 
will be paramount. This proposal first appeared in a government Green Paper 
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(Department of Trade and Industry, 1998) and was a topic discussed during the 
interviews in Britain, which informed this thesis (Steel, 1998; Ketteringham, 1998). 
The British government's new proposal includes a "powerful consumers panel to be 
placed at the centre" of the new giant regulatory body and they state that Citizens' 
Juries will be used as part of this process (see Wintour in The Media Guardian Online, 
December 12). This decision is an interesting trend as social policy has not 
traditionally been associated with the community, or consumer society (Edwards, 
2000). However, in Britain there is a long-standing tradition of public service towards 
citizen interests in broadcasting. Also, unlike the New Zealand government, the 
British appear to recognise that if citizen participation is to take place, then 
mechanisms, such as Citizens' Juries, must be included in legislation to achieve the 
objective. 
This approach perhaps also relates to another British initiative that is different to New 
Zealand - their development of long-term objectives and strategies for public policy. 
In 1993, the Institute of Public Policy Research based in London formed a 
Commission for Social Justice to discuss this issue. The Commission proposed four 
wide objectives for consideration across all public policies: "democracy, opportunity, 
fairness and security'' (Murroni, 1997, p. 6). These British actions contrast sharply 
with both the lack of citizen inclusion in media policymaking in New Zealand and the 
historic lack of long term planning strategies for broadcasting. The emerging two-
tiered approach to media regulation in Britain appears to belie Plant's statement that 
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·'participatory democracy is an illusion: people always have been and always will be 
governed, controlled and manipulated by elites" (1974, p.65). The institutionalisation 
of Citizens' Juries by the British government fits the pluralist dimension of social 
power and democracy, whereby citizens can participate in secondary groups to inform 
and influence decision-making (Olsen & Marger, 1993). The British actions conform 
to what can be increasingly seen as a worldwide trend emerging from the 1990s, and 
still being ignored in New Zealand, for greater citizen inclusion in the governing 
processes of pub I ic interest uti I ities. 
3. The review of the Codes of Broadcasting Practice 
Clearly the trend towards thoughtful citizen inclusion did not form any major part of 
the review of the Free-To-Air television Code of Broadcasting Practice, which has 
been ongoing since February 2000. As the Television Broadcasters' Council 
representative appointed to carry out the review, and rewrite the Code, expressed it in 
a communication to this researcher: 
The legislation requires that in undertaking this task I must consult the 
community .... I would value your guidance on how you think I might go 
about getting a view representative of the community as a whole without 
having to go to full public submissions .... Can you suggest a method that I 
can use in undertaking this consultative process with it being a sort of "hit and 
miss'' and rather random affair? (Edmunds, personal communication February 
8, 2000). 
The content acknowledges the need for the consultation process encouraged in the 
Broadcasting Act ( 1989 Section 21, no. 2) and the request shows that the Waikato 
Citizens' Jury, or at least the participation of elites in it, had made some impact. 
However, it also reconfirms that how citizens can participate in policymaking is 
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decided by elites, whose disposition to dismiss more participative methods is obvious 
in the adjectival choice of "hit and miss" and "rather random". My reply stated that 
the most manageable, representative and ethical public consultation process for such a 
public interest and community impact issue would be to organise Citizens' Forums, in 
the North and South Islands. Citizens' Forums can have up to 200 randomly chosen 
citizens and they replicate the procedures of Citizens' Juries. Forums are again a 
public consultation process that has been used successfully overseas to inform media 
policies (e.g., Independent Television Commission January, 2000). Edmunds 
presented my public consultation proposals to both the Television Broadcasters' 
Council and the Broadcasting Standards Authority. Unsurprisingly, the proposals 
were rejected. I was told anonymously by two different inner circle people that the 
chief executive of the Television Broadcaster's Council strongly objected to any such 
citizen involvement and that the members of the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
would never agree to such a process (Anonymous, 2000; Anonymous, 2000). 
The consultation process both organisations decided to use could not in any way be 
considered genuine, or representative. The process included "a list of something over 
a hundred people", mostly academics, with half receiving a copy of the draft Code 
document, and the other half being sent letters inviting them to request a copy 
(Edmunds, personal communication, 2000, June 23). This consultation decision was 
thoroughly discussed with the Broadcasting Standards Authority. Edmunds explained: 
It [the Authority] takes the view that the basic issues were canvassed with the 
public in its wide-ranging consultation process in connection with the Pay 
review. It believes the information gathered then was applicable to free to air 
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television as to Pay, and that as it was very recent it could safely be considered 
current (2000, June 23). 
This poorly formed public consultation process setting programmes standards for 
nationwide broadcast television channels for another five years or more is doubly 
disappointing. Aside from its lack of grassroots community representation, it was also 
informed by research gained from a substantially different television context. As just 
one indicator illustrating the inadequacies of the process, the Waikato citizen jurors in 
July 1999 consistently stated subscription television has and could have more liberal 
standards than Free-To-Air viewing. In addition, there continues to be a rise in 
complaints to the Broadcasting Standards Authority in the category of "good taste and 
decency" (BSA, 200 I January). The Authority also says in this recent statement that 
"complaints about offensive language continue to account for a significant number of 
the Authority's decisions". This announcement contradicts the Authority's 1999 
research findings outlined to the Waikato jurors which claims that for the most part 
New Zealanders are unaffected by swearing and bad language in television content 
and confirms the Jury's findings to the contrary. 
The lack of grassroots community representation informing this long term community 
impact policy document made me decide to arrange a second Citizens' Jury gathering. 
I contacted the 12 Waikato jurors and invited them to a daylong event to discuss the 
draft of the rewritten Codes of Broadcasting Practice compiled by the Television 
Broadcasters' Council. 
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4. The second Waikato Citizens' Jury 
This second Waikato Citizens' Jury gathering took place on Saturday 8 July 2000. 
Though an additional research cycle, similar arrangements were made to the first Jury. 
Full details about the event and background information were posted to the jurors so 
they would be prepared to discuss the draft document and lunch was provided at the 
event. When they arrived each juror again signed a consent form. Eight of the 
original 12 Waikato jurors attended the event. One did not arrive after initially 
accepting and three had to cancel at the last minute due to different unavoidable work 
and family commitments. 
The extensive discussions about programme regulations and the content of the Code of 
Broadcasting Practice during their first gathering in July 1999 provided the Jury group 
with a comprehensive knowledge base to assist their assessment of the draft document. 
The jurors began by comparing the various standards of the present Code with the 
principles and guidelines of the newly rewritten Code. Later, general conclusions and 
interacting topics were discussed. The day-long consultation produced a number of 
group statements as well as some individual responses (see Appendix N). The jurors 
unanimously considered the proposed new Code compiled by broadcasters to be 
extremely simplistic in its format and so open in its principles that it would be an 
ineffective and inappropriate operational document. One juror wrote down a summary 
of the group's decisions, which each juror signed. The summary states: 
The revised Code is much harder to follow with the principles being less 
defined thereby giving broadcasters more flexibility and "outs'' when dealing 
with marginal issues. The Code is generally geared towards the rights of the 
broadcaster rather than the rights of the public. We still have a consensus of 
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opinion about the standards of broadcasting as decided last year as members of 
the Waikato Citizens' Jury. For example: 
• Regular consultation with the public about regulation 
• Public should be empowered to have an input 
• Television broadcasting should be regulated by public not owners 
• Public should have easier access to complaints procedures 
• Those in authority should recognise citizens have wisdom and know the 
difference between right and wrong 
The Jack of communication between the viewing public and the broadcasters is 
still there. Broadcasters are deciding what "we want" to view, and they also 
dictate the terms of any public input into the review process in a very narrow 
manner. 
The series of group statements and the individually written statements were all 
approved by the jurors and sent by the research coordinator on their behalf to the 
Television Broadcasters' Council and the Broadcasting Standards Authority on 28 
July 2000. The atmosphere amongst the jurors at the end of their consultations was 
one of frustrated resignation at the attitudes of the broadcasters. The Jury group asked 
for a copy of their recommendations and conclusions from the July 1999 Waikato 
Citizens' Jury (see Appendix M) to be attached, as they still considered these to be 
relevant. 
Shortly before this Jury, in May 2000 during an interview with Dr Michael Stace, the 
executive director of the Broadcasting Standards Authority, he had said that a 
watchdog body like the Authority was essentially a good idea but queried "who was 
there to watch the watchdog?". I believe the Waikato citizen jurors have proved that 
grassroots citizens are very capable ''watchers of the watchdog" and that the role of 
citizenship in relation to media is greatly underrated because of their marginalisation 
or exclusion by media's elites. In Britain, citizens are going to be legislatively 
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empowered as watchers of their new media watchdog through Citizens' Juries. The 
British decision recognises that an intercursive power system is important to combat 
the often remote and potentially inappropriate elite control of policies with a 
widespread community impact. 
In December 200 I I received a further redraft of the proposed new Code from the 
Television Broadcasters' Council (Wallace, personal communication, 2000, December 
8). Submission comments about this final draft were invited by 19 January 200 I. The 
process of rewriting the Codes of Broadcasting Practice for Free-To-Air Television 
begun in February 2000 has still not been completed a year later. 
The two latest appointments to the membership of the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority, replacing two members due to step down, are also of interest. The two new 
members announced by the Minister of Broadcasting are a Professor of Media Studies 
and a former television broadcaster and producer (Hobbs, 2000, September 22). These 
appointments take yet another step away from the grassroots community 
representation intended for the Authority's membership when it was first established, 
and another step towards the desire of broadcasters for more members with experience 
of their industry (Personal communications Fish, 2000; Wallace, 2000; Hardie, 1999). 
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5. Closing research reflections and new directions 
Question: What is the purpose of this closing transcript? Why have one? 
Action research inquiry, as stated in the preface, encourages reflective dialogue about 
a research process and specifies that it must be documented in some way (Eden & 
Huxham, 1996). To me the various research steps contain my reflections but there are 
insights that crop up only at the close of a project, often outside the main research 
theme. I can now more fully comprehend what Winter ( 1998) means when he talks 
about action research being a process of theoretical discovery. Action research inquiry 
produces a different type of theoretical journey but I am now finding an emphasis on 
reflection in writings that relate to this research study. For example, I recently located 
a discussion of Kant's philosophy in Dyson and Homolka ( 1996). They claim media 
studies topics usually relate to cause and effect issues whereas reflective judgement as 
an intellectual activity can inspire actions about how we ought to live. This thesis 
evolved from such reflections - so I will be examining this area more in future. 
Question: Okay. Let's move on. You mentioned research insights especially ones 
that happen after the close of a research project. 
I have discussed some already in the earlier sections of this postscript and in chapter 
nine I mentioned several different assumptions were challenged during the course of 
this research programme. The most obvious may be to have contextually framed a 
PhD thesis about media as an action research inquiry when the inquiry methodology is 
relatively new in media studies (particularly in New Zealand), still subject to critical 
dialogues in different areas, and attuned to making real world changes rather than 
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remaining restricted to theoretical analyses. Accordingly the whole approach of this 
thesis context may have challenged the more abstract norm of approaches for a thesis, 
and media research. One alternative, after looking at the expanse of research data and 
the long-term impacts of media executives, would have been to frame the topic 
through managerial ism theory as the hypothesis is a result of elite decision-making. 
However, such an approach would have placed me more firmly on one side rather than 
walking between both, that is media and citizens. 
Question: What do you mean? 
Well, throughout the action project, I was understanding and supportive to both these 
groups. On the one hand, I was attempting to bring about a change of management 
practice by media authorities and on the other hand, I was siding with citizens, as I 
wanted to initiate greater public participation. Despite hindsight reflections about the 
suitability of other contexts like managerial ism, I reverted to my choice of action 
research as the best match for the expanse and tensions of this research programme. 
Also, the second action research characteristic on Eden and Huxham's (1996) list 
states there must be a generation of knowledge beyond the domain of an action 
project. I have hinted at the limitations of current media management practices, in 
contrast to overseas media institutions, so this opened up an area for further 
investigation. The potential of further research in that area was confirmed through the 
request for public consultation ideas for the current Codes of Broadcasting Practice 
review. The request shows how this project's knowledge reached television officials, 
and that there was an openness to new ideas by some officials. 
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Question: Can you name an example of an insight outside the research theme? 
One would be about how there are certain assumptions about language for a thesis and 
theoretical traditions for particular disciplines. For instance being involved in lengthy 
full-time community and professionally based research without any on-campus 
involvement created a distance from academic life. This distance was perhaps useful 
in that I was immersed in the issues but it influenced my writing style, which on 
reflection could be compared perhaps to the difference between a residential student 
and a correspondence student. Similarly my rather unusual choice of theoretical 
traditions (e.g., virtually ignoring the media predilection for Marxism and neo-
Marxism in favour of updating ideas from Weber and Follet) involved the project in 
an intersection of action research and early organizational theory that suggested 
exclusions in the typical approaches of media studies. 
Question: What are these effects and why are they relevant? 
The decision to focus on an action plan to transform a social situation sent me in a 
direction where I interacted with people in a variety of occupations in New Zealand 
and overseas. The majority were external to an academic environment for a 
considerable period of time. As I explained in the preface dialogue, the external 
community focus and academic result orientation did not always prove an easy 
combination. In addition, another effect of this long community based research period 
was a noticeable loss of language sophistication in terms of what could be called the 
academic norm. Carr-Chellman (2000) notes this factor in distance education 
students. Ansley and Gaventa ( 1997) also talk about this as a factor in community-
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based research but go on to claim that academics need to be educated to the reality that 
publications and research products carried out in communities, and for communities, 
are likely to look quite different from the academic norm. With regard to the 
theoretical traditions the applicability of my findings to policymakers and their need to 
acknowledge them was aided (although this was not the reason for the orientation) by 
using theorists who were less dismissive of their lifeworlds. 
Question: Has this proved limiting? 
Not in relation to the applicability of the findings. Nor, do I feel with regard to the 
writing, but I am aware I have hit a somewhat dichotomous situation. On the one 
hand, I am seeking institutional academic acceptance through writing this thesis while 
on the other hand I very much want to convey the results of this research programme 
to a much wider audience beyond academia which requires a more accessible 
language style. I hope I have succeeded in walking this tightrope. I think I may have 
as publications resulting from this period of research, in this language style, have 
brought unsolicited praise even from overseas academics searching for methodology 
material to inform their consultancy interests (e.g., Valvasori, personal 
communication, 2000, November 4). The academic distance, and my practice 
experience, has perhaps enabled me to communicate with greater clarity to a diverse 
array of people about my research results, especially to community organisations 
which were after all my focus. Information requests from local body authorities, 
councillors and city libraries have been numerous enough to confirm the research, and 
its application, was interesting to a variety of people and organisations. 
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Question: What do you mean about communication clarity? 
Well, during this action research programme before any academic ideas could be 
discussed they had to be translated or reinterpreted for those in the community due to 
the level of language abstraction. The abstraction of academic language is suited to 
academic life but can be like a foreign language or communication barrier when 
relating to others in different social situations. It can also, in my experience, 
complicate the transmission of ideas, which was not something suitable for this 
research project that aimed at community transformation. If I had not been aware of 
this factor, I doubt the Citizens' Jury project would have succeeded so well or the later 
exchanges eventuated about the project with broadcasters, policymakers, local 
community representatives and other interested citizens. I think the simpler language 
style I deliberately chose for writing the report of the Waikato Citizens' Jury on behalf 
of the jurors also made the research results accessible to a wider range of people. 
Also, in this thesis I have deliberately included unedited comments by the citizen 
jurors and chose not to reinterpret them as I believe, like Ward ( 1996), that the 
application of academic language can obscure real-life content. 
Question: How can you measure the infl.uence of the Waikato Citizens' Jury? 
Well, I don't think I will ever really know the level of influence but there have been 
signs it may be a seed for change. From an expansive perspective it is worth 
remembering that the Minister of Broadcasting and her policy advisors had my report 
about the Waikato Citizen's Jury many months before the release of the new policy 
developments for broadcasting. Perhaps my ideas coincided with ideas they had. I 
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don't think I will ever know whether any of my research results were a clear catalyst 
but they are reflected in several of the recent developments mentioned in this 
postscript. 
Question: Have there been any other changes that reflect aspects of your research? 
Yes, in particular there have been two recent changes made by television broadcasters. 
A new series of community announcements are now appearing regularly on each 
broadcast television channel. These state that if anyone wishes to make a formal 
complaint about a programme they can write direct to the broadcaster and full contact 
details are provided on screen. This is a major change of practice. The former on-
screen announcements were criticised by the Waikato jurors, as they did not clearly 
state the procedure for public complaints. The former announcements said 
programme complaints should be submitted to the Broadcasting Standards Authority, 
when the Authority is only a second stage appeal agency. The other change is the 
provision of greater detail about adult content in the classification messages prior to 
programmes being screened. The jurors also specifically addressed this issue and 
recommended more classification details be provided prior to programmes (see 
Appendix M). Also, the Minister of Broadcasting has just announced a review of the 
power and penalties of the Broadcasting Standards Authority. She suggested the 
penalties were so low they are little more than "'a slap with a wet bus ticket'' and some 
broadcasters were "giving the fingers" to the Authority (Hobbs, 2000, July 18). The 
Minister's comments closely parallel the conclusions and recommendations listed by 
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the Waikato jurors about the attitudes of broadcasters, and the low penalties imposed 
by the Authority. 
Of course, the media interest at the time of the Waikato Citizens' Jury was also of 
assistance. News items, both published and broadcast, disseminated the action plan's 
intention throughout the country. The core people involved in television 
policymaking are now aware citizen participation can be achieved through Citizens' 
Juries, and the Jury report has been requested and read by many different individuals 
so this could all be construed as influence. The request for public consultation ideas 
by a television policymaker and the correspondence with the Minister of Broadcasting 
were both a direct result of the Waikato Citizens' Jury. In addition, I received a 
number of letters and phone calls after the project from people requesting further 
information. These requests came from city councillors in both the North and South 
Islands, as well as academics at other universities. I have twice noticed in local papers 
the suggestion that a Citizens' Jury be used to resolve issues. I do think that if an idea 
is put out into the community arena it may not immediately cause any noticeable 
ripples of change but it can have an effect in time through association. Ideas 
themselves are like change-agents. I have noticed this from practitioner projects. 
Question: What do you mean? 
I believe that a single individual can be a force for change, as a good, and timely idea, 
can be a catalyst. Gregory ( 1996) says that an "individual is as much an agent in 
changing and maintaining society as are the institutions which operate at the macro 
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level within society" (p. 489). This is a belief of mine and was probably instrumental 
to my deciding on a community-based response project after identifying the 
hypothesis problem. She also states that ''anticipating a future form for society" 
(Gregory, 1996, p. 488) can drive the anticipated goal forward. To me the mere fact 
the Waikato Citizens' Jury took place, and that it involved so many elites, means my 
promotion for genuine public participation in media policies is on the first rung to 
success, as the knowledge of how it can be achieved has been demonstrated and is 
now embedded in the minds of those elites. There are many authors from Giddens 
( 1991) to Habermas ( 1986) who talk about such effects arising from individual actions 
and Foucault ( 1970) discusses how new knowledge enters systems through being 
embedded in discourses. Through this research programme I have intentionally 
sought to embed a number of new ideas in different discourses. 
Question: You mentioned that your values are implicated in the research process and 
how action research usualZv arises from a researcher's values. Were any relevant? 
After this research experience, I think the values of a researcher are always part of a 
research process and are very relevant, especially when deciding a research direction 
but until this project, I didn't see how fully they could be entwined. I can now 
confirm a researcher's values are part of action research as Whitehead ( 1993) claims 
as this project definitely displays how I live my values more fully in my practice. 
Not only do I have doubts about any research ever being absolutely objective, but I 
think it is feasible for all action research to be tracked back to a values based decision 
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by a researcher. Tetlock (I 988) notes a greater degree of what he calls integrative 
complexity in people he categorises as liberal or moderate, as opposed to conservative. 
He concludes that this complexity also occurs more in pluralism discourses, as there is 
an inevitable tension. I found this intriguing as action research and its associated 
inquiry methods are all fields of complexity and tend to fall into categories that fit the 
pluralism model. They also usually involve topics that are inherently complex, as they 
delve into areas of conflicting values, and their researchers are often placed in an 
opposition role in real world social settings. This was certainly a theme of this study. 
This research, its choice of domain issue, and style of reasoning will therefore 
probably reveal a lot about my personality and values. Examining the place of values 
in an action researcher's choice of topic and direction could be another future 
investigation. 
Question: So your own values were integral to this research programme? 
Yes. Some were naturally incorporated due to many years of practitioner problem 
diagnosing and systematically designing solutions. I also think I have a predisposition 
towards what may be called collaborative practices and encouraging widespread 
consultation to resolve difficulties, as I believe the answers to most problems are not 
usually found inside offices. Consequently, the hypothesis that emerged from the 
media reviews possibly appeared stranger to me than someone else as I had a wide 
knowledge and experience of just how valuable consultation as a management activity 
can be to decision-making. It has proved beneficial, as well as ethical, for participants 
and associates in my consultancy contracts. All these values and skills connect in 
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various ways to action research and the research hypotheses. Because of my 
experience and skills I was aware what could be achieved as soon as I saw the 
emergent hypothesis, and the first step taken was like achieving the last step. 
Question: Is there anything else you would like to mention? 
At the close of this research I have been reflecting about the theme of elite social 
power and became interested to diagnose my own form of social power during the 
research. I have already mentioned that I gained govemmentality in the minds of 
some media elites. Foucault's theory that govemmentality is a normalising process 
was certainly proven through this research. I am sure I had elite power in the minds of 
the citizen jurors as I appeared in charge, associated with elites and was attached to an 
elite institution - a university. However, in spite of all this "elite appearance" I was 
accepted by the Jury group more than the elites. 
Question: So, what did you find out about your own social power? 
The diagnosis search led me to feminist theory literature. I knew I had a pattern of 
taking on challenging and transformational style projects so, I wondered if this could 
link to issues of power and even perhaps being a woman? Jean Miller ( 1982) believes 
power is used differently by a woman than a man. She claims women traditionally 
engage in practices that are designed to empower others rather than dominate them 
and I tend to agree with her looking back at my own experience, but I do know men 
who consistently engage in work and projects to empower others so the fit was still not 
quite right. After wading through theories about how women tend to use more ··power 
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to'' tactics and then reading counter arguments about women also using top down 
··power over" tactics, as mothers towards children, I went back to Miller's ( 1982) 
claim that women use power more to bring about change, as it fitted my research 
intention and how I saw my role. In a thesis that has often examined the negative 
impacts of power, I think I used any power I possessed to initiate change and to 
enhance the lives of others as she argues women tend to do. I tried and failed to 
change the attitudes of most television policymakers towards public participation but 
the jurors reported a renewed interest in public issues and stated they felt empowered 
by the Jury process. 
Question: So, what was the result of this personal power investigation? 
The closest match was the concept of transformational power as discussed by Luce 
lrigaray ( cited by Kuykendallas in Treblicot, 1983). Transformative power has a very 
different form to the normal mechanisms of social power as it disappears when a task 
has ended. lrigaray's description of how transformative power disperses fitted with 
my role in this research, as I only really had power during the project and from the 
project. It has gone now. I think this is a very positive use of power amidst the 
patterns of negative power use documented in this thesis. So, you see my values, 
practice style, including my use of social power, were not silent actors. 
Question: Do you think, like your citizen jurors, at the end of this research that 
ordinary citizens should have a say in media policies and corporates like TVNZ? 
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Yes. Especially, as we are living in age of educated citizenry with numerous 
participation options to act as dialogue bridges. It is unfortunate that public sector 
services and business have become so intermingled from government restructurings. 
Their combined adoption of corporate management practices and branding exercises 
appears to have blurred public interest functions to the point of nonexistence in the 
minds of those in management positions, and this further distances citizens. I think 
the government's charter proposal for TVNZ, and its new programming guidelines, 
veering away from a merely commercial approach, will it make it impossible for the 
network to continue to be a full member of the Television Broadcasters' Council. If it 
does continue, the network will be put in a position of siding with views that 
contradict the government's intentions for the publicly owned network. From insider 
information I think this has already been happening. 
As a final comment, I do think that without a more collaborative style of community 
through methods like Citizens' Juries the present buzzwords of "knowledge 
economy", intellectual capital" and "bridging community gaps" branding this era will 
remain merely words. Unfortunately, they are also words that reinforce the perception 
of a community being composed of in and out-groups. At present, there is a lack of 
appreciation for the diverse and valuable resource that is community knowledge, and 
the wisdom of citizen experience. This action research has been my small 
contribution to changing this in media policymaking. 
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P.S.S. I've just thought of another action research cycle to commemorate the 
importance of citizen participation in building strong communities and to rejuvenate a 
sense of citizenship. 
Question: I thought you had finished? 
Action research programmes don't finish. They just spin off into new research cycles. 
Wouldn't it be a great project to get a special day or week in New Zealand officially 
declared in honour of citizen participation in governing processes? The Governor of 
the State of Nevada did it. He proclaimed 17 September 1998 to be a day to 
appreciate and encourage citizen participation. Also, media do intentionally position 
themselves as promoters of democracy on behalf of citizens so it could be interesting 
having them account each year for their public participation practices in their annual 
reports, like local authorities are supposed to. I can't? I don't see why not ... 
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A: Ethics Research Committee Approval 
B: Waikato Citizens' Jury Participation Consent Form 
C: TV3/TV4 Network letter to Waikato Jury 
D: List of the Waikato Citizens' Jury presenters 
E: Pre Jury Questionnaire 
F: Post Jury Questionnaire 
G: Jury Evaluation Questionnaire 
H: Population sampling charts 
I: Random Sample Questionnaire 
J: Waikato Citizen Jurors' Profile List 
K: Waikato Citizens' Jury Agenda 
L: List of public complaint video clips 
M: Summary Waikato Jury recommendations/conclusions 
N: Conclusions of second Waikato Citizens' Jury 
0: List of New Zealand and overseas interviewees 
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The University of Waikato Department of English 
Te Whare Wa nanga o Waikato 
Private Bag 3105, Hamilton. New Zealand 
Fax+ 64-7-838 4722 Telephone+ 64-7-856-2889 
26 November 1996 
Dear Ms Macbeth 
Thank you for your letter of the 8th inst. and the copy of your research proposal. 
Having read the proposal in the light of the University ethics policy guidelines I 
can give you my approval for the project. given vour assurance that you will 
observe the General Principles for Research involving human participants. A 
copy of these General Principles is attached. 
Yours sincerely, 




Citizens' Jury Research Project 
Regulating Standards in New Zealand Television 
2 - 4 July 1999 
Jury participation/ research release form: 
As a member of the research project this is written assurance that your privacy will be 
respected. If at any time during the research project you have any concerns please 
contact the research coordinator, Rose Macbeth, as your willing participation and 
contribution to the event are highly valued. 
You will not be identified in any publication/ dissemination of the research findings 
unless prior consent is obtained personally by the researcher in advance. 
If direct quotations by individual jurors are used in any publication false names will be 
used to differentiate between participants. 
When questionnaire results or data are being viewed by anyone other than the research 
coordinator, Rose Macbeth, any personal details that could identify you will be deleted 
or masked. 
As part of this process of trust and consent between the researcher and jury 
participants a draft report of the results and data from the project will be sent to each 
participant for comments. 
Video Recording: 
The video recording being made of the research event is mainly to enable the 
researcher to have an accurate record of the proceedings for analysis. In addition the 
video recording may be used: 
1. To provide material for a short edited video of the research project and its subject 
2. To provide material for an edited video demonstrating the potential of Citizens' 
Juries as a viable new method for gathering public opinion 
There is no intention for the video material to be broadcast to the general public. If 
this situation changes individual jury members will be approached for their consent. 
Name: Signature: 
Date: 
Rose S. Macbeth Signature: 
Citizens· Jury Research Coordinator Date: 
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30 June 1999 
Rose S Macbeth 
70 Memorial Drive 
Hamilton 
Dear Rose, 
TV3 NETWORK SERVICES Ltd 
TVA NETWORK Ltd 
'- A t" V, ~ S. r 3 I C ~ t. . ~ V !i T ;· ,V. 
This is to confirm our telephone conversation where it was agreed that David Edmunds 
from Television New Zealand would represent the 'free-to-air' broadcasters during his 
presentation on the formal complaint system to your Qtizens' Jury Project on Friday, 2 
July. 
As previously discussed, within the confines of our responsibilities under the 
BroadcaSting Act there is effectively minimal difference in lVNZ's and lV3/TV4's 
processes for handling of formal complaints lodged with regard to the Act and the 
Codes of Television Broadc:aSting Practice. We certainly appreciated the opportunity 
offered to lV3/TV4 to take part in the Project - but we do believe your Jury members 
would have been "bored" by the sameness of our systems! 
Obviously common to all free-to-air broadcasters is the criteria upon which complaints 
must be based in order to be accepted by broadcasters as "formal" complaints, and the 
time limits for lodgement, response, and referral (as outlined in the endosed brochure 
prepared by the Authority). 
Under the BroadcaSting Act broadcasters must establish procedures tor investigating 
formal complaints. In this regard 1V3/TV4 has a Standards Committee made up of staff 
members from various departments within the networi<s, including Administration, 
Programming, Communications, News, Current Affairs and Appraisers. 
Formal complaints received by the networks are forwarded to a central point, logged 
and an initial letter of acknowledgement sent to the complainant outlining the 
Standards under which the complaint will be considered or, if the grounds of the 
complaint are unclear, seeking further information from the complainant. 
Copies of the complaint are sent to the network department responsible for the 
programme concerned (i.e. "20/20" related complaints are copied to Current Affairs 
staff, "3 News" and "Nightline" to News, international programmes to Programming, 
local (non-News) programmes to Local Programme Production, and promos to 
Programming/Communications, etc). These departments then provide a tape of the 
relevant programme along with background on the programme and their comments on 
the complaint. 
Finance and Administration 
3 flcwt!r 51Teet, Eden ie•ro;::e, r'fr,101e Bog 92-624, Symonds Street. Au(ii:!Md, New ZedonC 
Pho"e 6.4-9-377 973C Foll 64-9-302 23' 1 
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Members of the Standards Committee then review this material and the programme 
tape and determine whether or not they believe a breach of Standards has occurred. 
Should a breach of Standards be upheld the Committee then determines what, if any, 
action is required by the networks to address this and to avoid potential future breaches 
of this nature. A formal response is forwarded to the complainant on that basis. 
Should the complainant be dissatisfied with the Committee's response, or by any action 
taken following a breach being upheld, they then have 20 working days from receipt of 
the Standards Committee's response In which to refer the matter to the Broadc.asting 
Standards Authority for a review of the Committee's decision/actions. 
The Authority then gives both the broadc.aster and the complainant an opportunity to 
submit any further comments/information they believe the Authority should consider in 
its review. Following its review the Authority advises the broadcaster and complainant 
by way of their Decision, which is then released to the media and other interested 
parties. 
The broadcaster and the complainant then have the option of appealing the Authority's 
decision and any penalty that may be imposed. 
Rose, TV3/TV4 takes its responsibilities as a broadcaster, and the meeting of its 
requirements under the Codes and the Broaclcasting Act, very seriouSly and it is 
obviously not to the networks' benefit to alienate viewerS through the broadcast of 
material that viewerS in general would find offensive or distasteful. We believe that, 
overall, the current complaints process adequately serves the viewing public and our 
networks. 
Attached is the information you requested regarding formal complaints determined by 
TV3/TV4 1999 year-to-date. 
Should you require anything further please let me know. 
Yours sincerely, 
Di Winks 
for STANDARDS COMMITTEE 
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Waikato Citizens' Jury Presenters 
David Edmunds, Auckland 
TVNZ Programme Standards Manager 
NZ Television Broadcasters Council representative 
Dr Michael Stace, Executive Director 
Dr Wiebe Zwaga, Research & Communications Manager, 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority, Wellington 
Dr Geoff Lealand, Hamilton 
Head of Department, Screen & Media Studies 
University of Waikato 
Helen Martin, Auckland 
Secondary School teacher & author 
Chris Watson, Palmerston North 
Senior Lecturer, English & Media Studies, 
Massey University 
Paul Smith, Auckland 
Journalist & media commentator 
Dr C. Kay Weaver, Hamilton 
Lecturer, Management Communication 
University of Waikato 
Jill Graham, Auckland 
TV Producer & Director 
Canon Gerald Hadlow, Rotorua 
Citizen interested in media standards 
Amanda Hayes & Inez Mccaughan 




PRE JURY QUESTIONNAIRE: RESULTS 
The pre jury questionnaire asked the 12 jurors about their knowledge of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority, regulation of standards and their opinions about 
the portrayal of some material on television. Some questions were replicatedfrom the 
ITC Citizens' Juries to gain an international viewer comparison of ' taste and 
decency ' attitudes. 
1. Have you heard of the Broadcasting Standards Authority? 
I I ticked Yes 
I ticked No 
2. Please explain what you know about the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority 
Nothing 3 
TV advertisement I 
Guardian of standards on TV I 
Regulates TV programmes I 
Handles complaints 5 
Standards Authority for viewers & classifies programmes I 
3. People who make adverts should be able to use images they want, even if 
there is a risk they may cause offence to some people 
Strongly agree 
Agree 2 
Neither agree nor disagree 5 
Disagree 4 
Strongly disagree 
The most important thing that regulators should do is to protect children 
Strongly agree 4 
Agree 4 
Neither agree nor disagree 3 
Disagree 2 
Strongly disagree 
Things that are likely to upset or offend even a minority of people should 
not be shown on television 
Strongly agree 
Agree 








APPENDIX E. continued 
Parents should take more responsibility for what their children see on TV 
Strongly agree 8 
Ag~ 2 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly agree 
Some people enjoy watching material that other people find offensive. 
Those people should be able to see what they want to. 
Strongly agree 
Ag~ 5 
Neither agree nor disagree 5 
Disagree I 
Strongly disagree I 
If people want to pay extra to watch particularly sexually explicit 










There should be stricter regulation for people who make programmes 
than for people who make adverts 
Strongly agree I 
Agree 5 
Neither agree nor disagree (] noted it should be the same) 4 
Disagree 2 
Strongly disagree 
Some people find the following unacceptable on television. What do you 
think? Please rank the items. (l=least acceptable, 7=most acceptable) 
(One juror stated all seven listed items acceptable within a context) 
Swearing or bad language 















I= Least acceptable 
1 ! 
6 




APPENDIX E. continued 
Language which may be offensive to certain groups of people (i.e. people 
from particular regions, people with disabilities, women) 
I= Least acceptable 4 




7= Most acceptable 
Nudity 
I= Least acceptable 
1 ! 
6 
7= Most acceptable 
Violence 
I= Least acceptable 
2 
! 3 4 5 
6 









APPENDIX E. continued 
Sex between a man and a woman 
I= Least acceptable 2 




7= Most acceptable 
Sex between a man and a man, or a woman and a woman 
I= Least acceptable 4 




7= Most acceptable 
5. What do you know about the regulation of standards in television? 
~ 4 
Not a lot, very little 6 
There is an Authority and programmes are class(fied I 
There should be a censor I 
6. What do you think about the amount of regulation of the content of 
television at the moment? 
-There needs to be more 
-Not much. There should be more. 
-Not sufficient for some content. 
-Extremely poor in terms of overall balance- i.e.number of hours of different 
types of content. Huge amounts of violence, very little intellectual stimulation. 
-Too liberal particularly where children are exposed to programmes that use 
violence, sex as a substitute for quality. 
-Not too bad 
-I don't know 
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7. Who should be the most important in regulating what is shown on TV? 
(Jurors could tick one option or a combination) 
The government Nil 
The broadcasters or advertisers Nil 
An independent body, groups of ordinary citizens, viewers as they watch 4 
Groups of ordinary citizens, viewers as they watch 3 
Combination of all of all 5 I 
An independent body, groups of ordinary citizens 3 
Viewers as they watch I 
8. What guidelines would you suggest are necessary or desirable for deciding 
whether something is acceptable or not on TV? 
-I think that the standards should be decided by a consensus of public opinion 
with set and non negotiable guidelines 
-The title and what the programme is all about 
-Protection of children, timing of adult and education programmes 
-I don't know 
-Protecting the natural, wholesome development of children, having some 
programmes on very late (after 11pm) 
-Can't answer as too content spec(fic 
-Morals, good sense of moralistic values 
-Morality, Public Channel/Pay TV, hour of day, viewing audience 
(children/adults), general society's views 
-Panel percentage 
-A range between pure violence, sex and bad language and comedy 
9. Which of the following were important to you when you decided to take part 
in this Citizens' Jury? 
(Jurors could tick one or more statements) 
I am interested in the idea of public involvement 9 
I am interested in taking part in a new piece if research 
I was attracted by the money 
I am curious 







POST JURY QUESTIONNAIRE: RESULTS 
The post jwy questionnaire asked the 12 jurors about their knowledge of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority, regulation of standards and their opinions again 
about the portrayal of some material on television. Questions from the ITC Juries 
were also replicated for an international comparison of viewers' "taste and decency" 
attitudes. 
1. People who make adverts should be able to use images they want, even if 
there is a risk they may cause offence to some people 
Strongly agree 
Agree I 
Neither agree nor disagree 3 
Disagree 5 
Strongly disagree 3 
Jurors comments: 
It depends on context and time aired 
Depends upon who, how many & why they are offended 
The most important thing that regulators should do is to protect children 
Strongly agree 5 
Ag~ 5 




-It is important, but not the most important 
-There are other important issues such as quality and ownership 
Things that are likely to upset or offend even a minority of people should 
not be shown on television 
Strongly agree I 
Ag~ 2 
Neither agree nor disagree I 
Disagree 6 
Strongly disagree 2 
Juror's comment: 
-You can't please all the people all of the time 
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Parents should take more responsibility for what their children see on TV 
Strongly agree 8 
A~ 4 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly agree 
Some people enjoy watching material that other people find offensive. 
Those people should be able to see what they want to. 
Strongly agree 2 
Ag~ 4 
Neither agree nor disagree 3 
Disagree 2 
Strongly disagree I 
Juror's comment: 
-{f they want to pay.for it 
If people want to pay extra to watch particularly sexually explicit 
programmes not available on other TV channels they should be able to do 
this. 
Strongly agree 2 
A~ 6 
Neither agree nor disagree 2 
Disagree 2 
Strongly disagree 
There should be stricter regulation for people who make programmes 
than for people who make adverts 
Strongly agree 
A~ 4 




APPENDIX F. continued 
2. Some people find the following unacceptable on television. What do you 
think? Please rank the items. (l=least acceptable, 7=most acceptable) 
One juror did not rank the items and commented: 
{fall these are explicit or gratuitous then they shouldn't be shown. If they are 
needed.for the story-line then they should be shown (context and time aired have 
to be taken into account). 
Swearing or bad language 










I= Least acceptable 
i 1 
6 









Language which may be offensive to certain groups of people (i.e. people 
from particular regions, people with disabilities, women) 
I= Least acceptable 3 




7= Most acceptable 
Nudity 
I= Least acceptable 
1 1 
6 







APPENDIX F. continued 
Violence 
I= Least acceptable 
; 1 
6 







Sex between a man and a woman 
I= Least acceptable 2 




7= Most acceptable 2 
Sex between a man and a man or a woman and a woman 
I= Least acceptable 4 




7= Most acceptable 
3. What do you know about the regulation of standards in television? 
Jurors' comments: 
-Current standards are administered by broadcasters and BSA 
-The codes of broadcasting practice, how they apply to complaints, who 
administers them and that broadcasters developed them 
-Details of on screen programme classifications and scheduling 
-The BSA, that all TV programmes are classified (G,PGR, AO) for different ages 
-There are detailed rules that have to be followed when broadcasting things on TV 
-That it all works okay but needs some changes now 
-There are acceptable times for certain programmes on TV, if a complaint is made 
it can be processed under BSA guidelines and ultimately dismissed or upheld 
according to the code that was breached 
-Phone and formal complaints are directed to the broadcaster, 8.30pm watershed. 
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3. What do you know about the regulation of standards in television? 
(Jurors' comments continued-) 
-Formal complaints go to the BSA which meets and makes a majority decision on 
the complaint. BSA can only rule on codes not quality or value of programme. 
-Regulations quite lax. Decay of morals in society if unchecked. TV should be 
publicly owned and operated. Get rid of deregulation. 
-Codes of broadcasting practice-used as guidelines for producers, broadcasters as 
to what is, or is not appropriate. 
-Almost everything! 
-BSA adjudicates formal complaints in accordance with Broadcasting Codes of 
Practice-there are few other regulations 
4. What do you think about the amount of regulation of the content of television 
at the moment? 
Jurors' comments: 
-There is not sufficient regulation 
-The codes of broadcasting practice are fair but should be changed to allow more 
definite classification and chance for stricter regulation 
-Not enough regulation, not so much for standards but as far as content and type 
of 
programmes. Also the programming times need further regulation. 
-Adequate with regard to standards but inadequate with regard to quality and 
quotas of programme types for example news, documentaries, drama etc. 
-About right in terms of content of individual items. Should be more permissive 
aier a certain time. Very poor in terms of overall balance in programming. 
-Not much. I think the codes of broadcasting practice need to be more 
rigidly/strictly enforced. A lot to do with the quality of the material. 
-Needs to be more stringent? Structure of broadcasting regulations, government 
input and funding issues need to be taken into consideration 
-I am more concerned about the structure and purpose of the regulatory set up 
-Good. 
-Okay but time slots need changing for viewing 
-It's okay. Watershed needs to change slightly. TV broadcasting structure has to 
change dramatically. 
-Not enough. Need to make more regulations like another watershed at 10.30pm 
and before this time no AO programmes on air. 
-Regulation of standards needs to be reviewed. 
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5. Who should be the most important in regulating what is shown on television? 
(Jurors could tick one option or a combination of listed optiom) 
The government 
The broadcasters or advertisers, an independent body, groups 
of ordinary citizens (but all in one group or body) 
An independent body, groups of ordinary citizens, 2 
Groups of ordinary citizens, viewers as they watch I 
Combination of all 5 options I 
An independent body, groups of ordinary citizens 5 
Groups of ordinary citizens I 
6. What guidelines would you suggest are necessary or desirable for deciding 
whether something is acceptable or unacceptable on television? 
Jurors' comments: 
- Protection of our children 
-Human wisdom/instinct plus a set of standards as guidelines. The effect on 
children must be considered 
-Watersheds (8.30pm and 10.30pmfor AO content, when it screens, a programme 
rating system, a quota guideline 
-Taste and decency. Brutality towards people, animals, debasing humanity. 
Things which breach universal ethics or morality would help ensure a higher 
percentage of programmes which raise awareness and knowledge. 
- Guidelines set by the censor to code footage and then set into the appropriate 
watershed timeframe with the censor's notes and code clearly broadcast first 
-Items need more classification. For example Rl8, R16 and classified as to 
content (S, V.L,C,X). The higher the classification the later the item should be 
screened. For example X rated.films only after midnight. 
-Okay. But time slots need changing for viewing. 
-Nudity and violence should be regulated 
- Greater public input is required e.g. Citizens· Jury panels. 
-The current guidelines cover this fairly well. Should also be general instinct. 
- Use of our own wisdom, codes of honour, morals. is it suitable for the audience it 
is available for i.e. before or after watershed. 
7. What is your opinion of the role of the Broadcasting Standards Authority? 
Jurors' comments: 
-They are a reactionary group who react once a complaint has been made. 
-It is fairly much controlled by the broadcasting industry and does not seem to be 
proactive 
-Needs better guidelines about what the public wants. 
-Should not be complaints driven. 
-The broadcasting standards are fine in my opinion. 
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7. What is your opinion of the role of the Broadcasting Standards Authority? 
Jurors' comments continued: 
-Toothless and probably quite apathetic 
-They look after each other (BSA and broadcasters). Don't hurt the broadcasters 
etc. 
-It needs to enforce standards more and have higher/stronger penalties 
-It is compliant-driven. It should become more proactive, user-friendly, and be an 
independent watchdog. 
-Far too limited a range of authority and is a toothless creature in comparison to 
overseas standards bodies. 
-I believe it is a reactive body that does not have enough authority to enforce 
sufficient penalties to deter broadcasters/ram breaching taste and decency 
standards. 
-The BSA is complaints driven and should be more proactive in obtaining public 
opinion with regard to both programme content and the standards themselves. 
8. What is your opinion of the role of television broadcasters in regulating 
standards? 
Jurors' comments: 
-Should be more restrictive than the current one. They should take more 
responsibility for complaints. 
-The broadcaster must enforce standards without 'pushing the limit' constantly 
and relying on the complaints system, and must be proactive in accessing public 
opinion 
-They are ambivalent to the public, are greedy commercially orientated and do not 
have the public interest at heart. 
-When the structures for standards are empowered they would obliged to look 
carefully at their standards. At present this doesn't happen. 
-Broadcasters are not particularly interested in regulating standards. They 
are supposed to abide by them but are often interested in pushing the boundaries. 
-Their role needs to be expanded. They need to be proactive and be much more 
aware of the standards. 
-They need to have more input. 
-They broadly adhere to required standards 
-They have unprecedented boundaries. They need guidelines from public 
comment. These should not be dictated by polls or ratings. 
-I think it is good they have an input into standards but they should use some of the 
feedback they have regarding their programming in a more constructive way 
-They seem to set the standards and then push the limits at times. 
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9. What do you think is the most important thing that regulators should think 
about when they are making decisions about taste and decency on television? 
Jurors' comments: 
-Quality and suitability 
-Time of screening, likely audience, currently accepted norms 
-The protection of wholesome and good morals to make society a better place 
-What the people want and the times they are shown plus children 
-The time that programmes are scheduled 
-They need to see if the thing that is causing offence is gratuitous or not and the 
more potentially offensive something is the later it should be screened. 
-Viewing time 
-Was the viewer informed correctly about the programme? Was the programme in 
its correct watershed time frame? Was the offensive segment within context? 
-Allowing children in early childhood, the most powerful learning stage in our 
lives, to receive constructive things rather than destructive. Until we have a.fully 
educated population they must take on the role of responsible parenting for the 
minority of households where this does not occur yet. 
-Children, programming time at which material is screened and fear of breaching 
standards (they have no fear). 
-Protection of children and being sensitive to the development and education of 
youth. 
-Protection of children from viewing violence and sex 
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10. What do you think about the following ways of regulating what is shown on 
television? 
A very good way A fairly good way Not a good way A very bad way 
Legal 
restrictions: on 5 5 2 
certain material 
Scheduling: the 
8.30pm watershed 8 4 
or others 
Scheduling certain 
material on certain 6 5 I 
channels 
Warning before 7 4 I 
the programme 
Constant on 4 6 I I 
screen warning 
Classification: 









Using smart cards 4 4 3 I 
or pin numbers 
Codes: with the 
penalty of warnings 6 5 I 
or fines 
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11. Do you agree with the main conclusions of the Jury? 
All 12 Jurors wrote YES. 
Some added the words: totally, absolutely and unequivocally. 
12. Do you think your views have changed after taking part in the Jury? 
8 jurors ticked Yes 
3 jurors ticked No 
I juror ticked Yes and No 
If you answered Yes, please explain in what way your views have changed 
Jurors' comments: 
-I now have a bigger resource of knowledge on the subject 
-I now have more knowledge on which to base my opinions and know things I 
didn't know before and have become more aware of TV and broadcasting issues. 
-I have become tolerant of other people's desire to watch programmes that I 
consider o~jectionable or trash. I do not consider it necessary to protect other 
adults from being shocked. 
-Tolerance levels, considering all sides of an argument. considering material in 
context, standing up for my right, knowledge of the issue. 
-Am less emotive, more opinions based on discussion. research and information 
-About what gets shown on TV, who watches and I learnt more about TV than I 
have ever known. 
-I would prefer not to have the blood and guts of the news on TV at all but concede 
that to some it may be important, slotting it into a later time slot may be 
appropriate. 
-I realised the BSA is very important, all TV programmes need regulation. It is 
not necessary to question children when making regulation. 
-Have a broader understanding of broadcasting, the need to voice complaints and 
now have knowledge about procedures required to be effective in making good 
changes in community. 
-That diversity of standards should be allowed. Scenes that I do not think should 
be seen on TV may not necessarily disturb other viewers. 
13. Please make any further comments you wish: 
-Thank you for inviting me to participate. Excellent informative medium in order 
to formulate opinions. 
-Build up a more easier complaint system for TV programmes rather than 
'formal". Set up another watershed at 10.30pm to sh(fi all AO programmes to 
after this time and make a system to improve the TV quality. 
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13. Please make any further comments you wish continued-
-/ hope our comments and findings will be taken into consideration by the 
government and broadcasters (and be put into practice). I also hope that this 
Citizens' Jury method of discovering what the people think about issues 
concerning them will be used by other researchers and the government - so we 
have a voice again. 
-Enjoyable process. Will need time to consider it in relation to other participation 
processes before being able to evaluate its usefulness/practicality for widespread 
community decision-making. 
-Looking for change soon. 
-This has been a very informative process with some very strong conclusions. I 
would only hope that these could in some way change the way NZ television 
broadcasting operates and improve programme content. 
-Knowledge is power. The appalling state of NZ TV and the lack of standards 
have caused a desensitization and intellectual dulling of NZ citizens to the point 
where no one feel empowered enough and too apathetic to voice an opinion. If 
your population is uneducated and illiterate they are easier to control. The drop 
in TV standards has contributed to the general decline in NZ society. (Enough 
rant). Thank you for allowing me to be part of this process. I'm glad I 
participated. Thanks for your hard work. 
-I still feel that a lot of what is on TV and seen as acceptable by broadcasters is 
trivialising the viewer and not taking into account that people probably need 
something to actually think about in deeper terms. It is unfortunate to me that 
some of the speakers actually seem to believe that it is okay to keep going down 
the track that broadcasting is going- they seem to want afreeing up more of what 
is acceptable. They seemed to me to be quite desensitized and that being 
desensitized is okay or that watching TV does not sensitize people. Those young 
people (High School student speakers) found not much wrong with what they 
watch - but what quality stuff have they got to base their opinions on? 
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WAIKATO CITIZENS' JURY EVALUATION: RESULTS 
This questionnaire completed at the close of the Jury event asked the 12 jurors for 
their opinions about: the presentation of the topic information, the Jury agenda, being 
recorded on video, viewing television clips, participating in the Jury and whether they 
would consider participating again, (f asked. The questions were designed to not just 
assess this Jury event but assist the planning of any future Citizens' Jury event. The 
listed jurors · comments are unedited. 
1. What do feel about the information presented to you during the Citizens' 
Jury? 
All of it went over my head 
Some of it went over my head 
I understood most of it 










3. Did you feel the written information that you received was: 
Too much 
12 
About right 12 
Not enough 
Comments: 
- No chance to read some of the books and folders which were passed around 
- Didn't have enough time to read during presentations 






I felt there was too much wasted time-would rather it had been more intensive 
(shorter breaks) with a Saturday night off 
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5. What did you feel about watching the clips from television with other 
people? 
I didn't mind watching them with other people 
I felt uncomfortable 
I have preferred to watch with smaller groups 
I would have preferred to watch them on my own 
12 
6. What did you think about the video clips? 
There were too many 1 * 
There weren't enough 1 
We didn't have enough time to watch them 
We had enough time to watch them 10 
Comment: 
* Especially Saturday night - most did not add to our understanding gained 
from the first 2 or 3 
7. What did you feel about the information you received about the clips? 
8. 
It was about the right amount 
It wasn't enough 
It was too much 
Comment: 
Perhaps we should have watched the clips before receiving the info 
(complaints) to formulate own ideas first 
What did you think about the Jury group discussions? 
(Jurors could tick one or more statements) 
There was enough time for different opinions 
There was not enough time for different opinions 
Everyone got a chance to speak 
Everyone didn't get a chance to speak 
Other: A lot of talk occurred in down time so it was all good 






9. What did you think about the way the Jury days had been put together? 
(Jurors could tick one or more statements) 
The agenda over the three days was fair to all the different sides 11 




APPENDIX G. continued 
10. Which aspects of the Jury did you find most useful in helping you to 
decide about the issues? (Jurors could tick one or more statements) 
Hearing from the speakers 
The question and answer sessions 
The full Jury discussions 
The smaller group discussions 
Watching the video clips from television complaints 
Informal chats at break times 
Just thinking at break times 










11. Is there anything that you think would have helped you to decide upon the 
issues which you think we should have included? 
5 stated No 
- Not really 
- I think the programme fitted really well 
- Information on overseas methods 
12. Were you able to get your views across in the Jury discussions? 
12 ticked Yes 
Comments: 
- Yes- Sometimes felt inadequate in voicing opinions, saying wrong thing? 
inarticulate 
- I thought more than is said, but felt happy with my contributions on Sunday 
- During meal breaks or small sessions 
- Yes, I felt everyone listened to others 
13. Please tell us how you felt being filmed during the Jury: 
It made no difference to me 
I felt a bit self-conscious at first, but then I didn't mind 
I felt inhibited 





APPENDIX G. continued 
14. How do you feel about the Citizens' Jury you have just participated in? 
(Jurors could tick one or more statements) 
I found the jury interesting 11 
I found the jury informative 11 
1 found the jury enjoyable 1 O 
I found the jury put me in a position of influence 5* 
I found the jury boring 
I found the jury confusing 
I found the jury a depressing experience 
Comments:* Don't know yet; Who knows? 
15. If asked would you take part in another Citizens' Jury? 
12 ticked Yes 
16. Would you recommend taking part in a Citizens' Jury to other people? 
12 ticked Yes 
17. What do you think is the best thing about a Citizens' Jury? 
- It could be a move towards educated or true democracy 
- The ability to discuss the case. Social interaction-meeting new people 
- Meeting other people; respecting others views and having a say 
- Great people, positive findings and fast group discussions for a group 
- A cheap rapid effective means of gauging public opinion 
- Know about B.S.A. 
-Obtaining information in depth on a subject that enabled you to understand 
the subject and be able to recommend changes and alterations to existing 
format 
- Being able to put forth your opinion 
- Meeting new people and bringing ideas together 
- It informs prior to asking for opinions 
- Opportunity to concentrate on an issue without distractions 
- It is the people and the x section of people formulating informed decisions 
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18. What do you think is the worst thing about a Citizens' Jury? 
May not truly represent, poorly selected 
What happens/ram here? 
Having to sleep!! 
Time (low pay. Joke!) 
Not enough time 
The hard bed! 
Nil 
Perhaps some people influence others to their view 
Not very interactive as these sorts of process go 
I enjoyed it all 
19. What, if anything do you feel you have gained from taking part in a 
Citizens' Jury? 
-Knowledge, increased understanding 
-The need to make change for the better -Being effective advocate 
-A broadening of my horizons and tolerance levels, an understanding of the 
issue 
-Knowledge, confidence with group discussions and confidence in questioning 
"experts" without necessarily agreeing with them 
-A greater awareness of the media through the information that was submitted. 
The knowledge that many New Zealanders/ram different backgrounds can 
come to a consensus. 
-Information and being given a voice 
-Knowledge and understanding of what is happening around 
-An empowerment through information 
-Got a lot off my chest about poor quality of NZ TV, enjoyed learning about 
Citizen's Jury process and enjoyed the experience of being involved 
-A realisation of self worth-my opinion was listened to and at times debated 
20. Do you think the jury's recommendations will have an effect? 
11 wrote Yes 
wrote No 
Comments: I hope so 
-I hope so, we now have the knowledge it's up to us to use it further 
-I definitely hope so 
-I think they should and hope they do, I suspect there would be strong 
commercial opposition 
-I'd like to thinks so, but no not really 
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21. Should ordinary people be involved in making decisions about taste and 
decency on television? 
12 ticked Yes 
22. Do you feel a Citizens' Jury is a good way of involving ordinary people in 
making decisions? 
12 ticked Yes 
23. Please make any further comments you wish about the Citizens' Jury: 
-A great way to get the public point of view across because they have been 
informed on the subject for discussion. 
-I hope this method is used in the future by government and researchers 
-I hope it is used for other issues and that the powers that be take it seriously 
as being "the peoples' view". 
-Many thanks for the opportunity to be involved. Would like to further explore 
the potential of using the process with you, especially in local govt. context. 
Cheers! 
-I enjoyed the company and the food. It was very well organised. It was great 
getting to know completely different people and working together for a 
common cause 
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New Zealand Population 
by Gender, Age, Ethnicity and Employment 




Age Group by Sex for Usually Resident Population 1996 
Under 5 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 
Male 144.111 147.723 135.663 133.575 134.835 132.453 142.452 139.293 125,439 
Female 135.489 140,571 128.523 129.405 136,926 140,850 151,032 145.923 129,600 
45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+ 
Male 120.249 93,351 78,783 67.419 65,184 51,762 33.561 20.412 11,196 
Female 120.942 93.366 79,818 67.845 67.788 61.902 48.726 34.869 27,264 
Ethnicity by Sex for Usually Resident Population 1996 
European NZ Maori Pacific Island Asian Other Not specified Total 
Male 1.270.041 258.000 85,113 77.112 7.836 79.362 1,777,461 
Female 1.324.650 265.374 88.065 83.568 6.831 72,351 1,840.839 
Status in Employment for Usually Resident Population 1996, 15 Years and over 
Paid Employee Employer Self-Employed and Unpaid Family Worker 
Without Employees 
Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
939.165 273.963 108.162 14.148 142,473 42.891 23.793 30.219 
Not Specified 
Full-Time Part-Time Total 
39.180 16.830 1.630,821 
Source: New Zealand Statistics Census 1996 
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Waikato, Region Area 
by Gender, Age, Ethnicity and Employment 






Waikato Region Age Group by Sex for Usually Resident Population 1996 
Under 5 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 
Male 15,075 15,270 14,520 13,707 13,284 12,390 13,086 13,227 11,859 
Female 13,962 14,829 13,530 13,059 12,993 13,146 13,869 13869 12,123 
45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+ 
Male 11,202 8.859 7,503 6,636 6,363 4,764 3,003 1,944 990 
Female 11,160 8,865 7,581 6,576 6,264 5.400 4,188 2,901 2,124 
Ethnicity by Sex for Usually Resident Population 1996 
European NZ Maori Pacific Island Asian Other Not specified Total 
Male 123,834 35.334 3.432 3.891 450 6,744 173,685 
Female 126.117 36.345 3,297 4,179 423 6,084 176,442 
Status in Employment for Usually Resident Population 1996, 15 Years and over 
Paid Employee Employer Self-Employed and Unpaid Family Worker 
Without Employees 
Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
82,230 25,536 12,387 1.905 16,659 4,554 2,964 3,891 
Not Specified 
Full-Time Part-Time Total 
3,696 1.641 155.463 
Source: New Zealand Statistics Census 1996. Regional Summaries 
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New Zealand Population 
Family Type and Number of Children 
For Families in Private Dwellings, 1996 
New Zealand Totals of Family Type and Number of Children 1996 
One Parent Family Two Parent Family 
One Child Two Three or Total One Child Two Three or Total 
Children more children more 
91.434 48.789 28,029 168.258 147.438 164,571 114,558 426,567 
Couples Not Classifiable Total 
354,588 87 949,497 
Waikato Region Totals of Family Type and Number of Children 1996 
One Parent Family I Two Parent Family 
One Child Two Three or Total One Child Two Three or Total 
Children more children more 
8,751 4,941 3,087 16.782 13,725 15.237 12,234 41.196 
Couples Not Classifiable Total 
34.233 6 92.214 
Waikato District, Waipa District and Hamilton City Combined 
Totals of Family Type and Number of Children 1996 
One Parent Family Two Parent Family 
One Child Two Three or Total One Child Two Three or Total 
Children more children more 
4,899 2.685 1,713 9.297 7.239 8,169 6.120 21,528 
Couples Not Classifiable Total 
17.307 3 48.144 
Source: New Zealand Statistics. Census 1996 
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Waikato District, Waipa District and Hamilton City Combined 












Age Group by Sex for Usually Resident Population 1996 
5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 
7.800 7.491 7,911 8,229 6.828 6,909 6,849 
7,542 6,933 8,085 8,409 7.443 7.335 7.389 
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 
4.584 3,603 3,126 2.865 2,208 1,500 1.008 
4,572 3,684 3.313 3,063 2,766 2,253 1,704 
Ethnicity by Sex for Usually Resident Population 1996 
European NZ Maori Pacific Island Asian Other Not specified 
Male 65,616 17.019 1,479 3,153 357 3.429 










Status in Employment for Usually Resident Population 1996, 15 Years and over 
Paid Employee Employer Self-Employed and Unpaid Family Worker 
Without Employees 
Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
47.991 14,664 5,799 795 7.437 2,133 1,182 1.761 
Not Specified 
Full-Time Part-Time Total 
1.890 840 84.495 




I. Do you watch television regularly? Please tick one box. 
2. 
Yes D No D If you answer is "No" please explain why below-
I am interested in the idea of public involvement 
I am interested in taking part in a new piece of research 
I am attracted by the money 
I am curious 
I am attracted by the idea of publicity 





















4. Do you personally see or hear things on television that you find offensive? 
If yes, what and why? 
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Waikato Citizen Jurors' Profile List 
Gender Age Group Ethnicity Occupation Household Composition 
I. Female+ (30-34yrs) NZ Maori Public Health Nurse Couple & I child 
2. Male (35-39yrs) European Environmentalist Couple w/o children 
3. Male (30-34yrs) Asian Electr. Design Engineer Couple & I child 
4. Female+ (20-24yrs) European Export Administrator Couple w/o children 
5. Female+ (20-24yrs) European University Student Couple & 3 children 
6. Male*+ (40-44yrs) European Dairy Farmer Couple & 2 children 
7. Male*+ (25-29yrs) European University Student Single, flatting 
8. Female+ (40-44yrs) NZ Primary Teacher Couple &3 children, 
9. Female (35-39yrs) Dutch Secretary Couple & 2 children 
10. Male+ (55-59yrs) European Retired Teacher Single 
11. Female+ (35-39yrs) NZ Maori Caregiver to mother I parent & 3 children 
12. Male (55-59yrs) European Self-employed Couple w/o children 
* Jurors with SKY Pay Television in their homes 
+ Jury members who ticked Yes, to the question in their pre jury questionnaire asking: 
Are you a member of any particular religious faith? 
O.f the eight affirmative: 2 were regular Christian church attendees, I Rosacrucian, 
2 designated Christian, 3 of affiliated spiritual belief This iriformation was gathered 
informally during the Jury event 
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Waikato Citizens' Jury Agenda 2 - 4 July 1999 
Friday 2 July Regulating television standards: Broadcaster and BSA systems, what 
is & what is not considered acceptable in NZ 
Sat. 3 July 
12 noon - 1.30pm Lunch 
1.30pm Jury convenes 
2pm David Edmunds, TVNZ Programme Standards 







The Broadcasting Standards Authority, 
Dr Michael Stace & Dr Wiebe Zwaga 
Dinner 
Jury convenes to view television complaint items 
Why regulate? What should we regulate? 




Dr C. Kay Weaver 
12 noon - 1.30pm Lunch 
1.45pm Jury convenes 





Dr Geoff Lealand 
Canon Gerald Hadlow 
Amanda Hayes & 
Inez Mccaughan 
Break 
Dr C. Kay Weaver & Jury discussion time 
Dinner 
Jury convenes to view television items 
Sunday 4 July Jury convenes to debate regulation of standards for television 
IO - 12 noon Jury considers regulatory questions & principles 
Lunch 
1 pm - 2.30pm Jury presents findings 
Jury evaluation 
Citizens' Jwy ends 
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Television items viewed by the Jurors that were the subject of formal 
complaints to The Broadcasting Standards Authority. 
1. TV2 Water Rats, trailer broadcast 17/11/98 at about 8.03pm 
Complaint that a trailer for the AO classified programme showing a naked 
couple in bed was broadcast during the PGR classified programme Party of 
Five. 
Decision: The Authority declined to uphold the complaint. 
2. TV One Holmes, Jim Rose Circus item broadcast 23/4/98 between 7-30pm 
Complaint that the item breached the good taste standard and it was 
inappropriate and vulgar in the extreme considering it was screened when 
children would be watching. 
Decision: A majority of the Authority declined to uphold the complaint. A 
minority considered the item was inappropriately broadcast during family 
viewing time, especially given that the show itself, as well as the excerpts 
, ·'ected for broadcast, were intended for an adult audience. 
3. TV2 Dharma and Greg broadcast on TV2 4/11/98 at 7.30pm 
Complaint that explicit programme content was unsuitable for broadcast before 
8.30pm. 
Decision: A majority of the Authority upheld the complaint that standards G8 
and G 12 were breached. A minority decided the programme was correctly 
classified as being suitable for children under the guidance of parents and 
noted there was no explicit sexual activity shown. 
4. TV2 Havoc, music video 'Smack My Bitch Up' broadcast 10.30pm 7/6/98 
Complaint that that the video breached several broadcasting standards (G2, 
G 13, V 4, V 11) because of its portrayal of sexual violence, its exploitation of 
women and its promotion of contemptuous treatment of women. 
Decision: A majority of the BSA upheld the complaint that the item breached 
standards G2 and VI 1. A minority found no breach of the standard. 
5. TV One Making of the Human Body, trailer broadcast 9,10,11/11/89 6-8pm 
Complaint the display of naked women in G or PGR time breached the 
standard requiring the observance of good taste and decency. 
Decision: The Authority declined to uphold the complaint. 
6. TV3 News (6pm) Headhunters' Gang members arrest broadcast 11/12/98 
Complaint that the footage of gang members giving the camera, and therefore 
the viewer, 'the fingers' did not maintain standards of good taste and decency. 
Decision: The Authority declined to uphold the complaint. 
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WAIKATO CITIZENS' JURY: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
PART ONE: Regulating standards and the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
I. The Jury agreed the present written Broadcasting Standards Authority codes of 
practice for television broadcasters are basically satisfactory. 
2. They recommended there should be two watersheds: the present one at 8.30pm 
and a second one to be introduced at I 0.30pm. Adult only content to be 
screened after I 0.30pm and any potentially X rated material to be screened 
only after midnight, if at all. (A diversity of programmes re a quota system 
would ensure there is not too much AO, X rated material broadcast.) 
3. The censor's film classification system should be introduced to rate 
programmes on television. This already publicly understood system would 
assist television broadcasters to more appropriately schedule TV material and 
provide more accurate programme previews and on screen guidelines for 
viewer judgement. One system would be better for the public. (For example M, 
R 16, R 18.) Any censor's comments could also be broadcast for additional 
clarity. 
4. Taking into consideration the need to have an effective news service portraying 
the reality of events taking place in New Zealand and overseas the Jury 
concluded 6pm news items broadcast on any publicly owned channel should be 
suitable for all viewers including children. The PGR rating should be the news 
standard for 6pm broadcasts with items edited if necessary. News broadcasts 
scheduled between IO to I I pm could show full uncut items. 
5. Broadcasters need to be proactive in researching viewer opinions 
6. Complaint procedures need reviewing and made easier. The present system is 
too cumbersome. The process needs to be made accessible for those who may 
be illiterate or uncomfortable responding by writing. 
7. There needs to be harsher penalties for broadcasters breaking standards codes. 
The BSA should have more power to enforce higher penalties. The Jury 
believed broadcasters push boundaries more in our competitive all commercial 
environment and are also dismissive of any penalty because they are so small. 
8. The Jury expressed concern about preschool children viewing the adult shows 
broadcast between 12 noon to 3pm. (Talk shows and soaps.) They also 
commented on shows with distinctly adult themes and sexual innuendo 
( Veronica ·s Closet, Friends, Dharma and Gregg) being scheduled before the 
8.30pm watershed. 
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PART TWO: Broadcasting Structure and Regulation 
I. The Jury blamed the 1989 Broadcasting Act and broadcasting deregulation for 
creating such a competitive commercial climate between broadcasters that the 
diverse needs of viewers are neglected in New Zealand. 
2. The Jury concluded there should be one New Zealand publicly owned 
advertisement-free channel to provide a balance of information, education and 
entertainment programmes. The channel should be service-orientated to the 
public without any profit requirement or the need to pay a dividend to 
government. A quota system should be introduced to ensure a diversity of 
local content, documentaries, news and drama. (Jurors suggested funding for a 
national noncommercial channel could be provided by gathering a fee from 
commercial broadcasters via their licenses.) 
3. There should be a non-syphoning law for items of national importance such as 
rugby, other sports and concerts. 
4. There should be stricter criteria for broadcast television ownership. Private 
owners should be fit and proper. Broadcasting licenses should not be sold to 
the highest bidder. 
5. Television broadcasters should be subject to standards defined in their licenses. 
For example a yearly monitoring appraisal could be carried out based on 
licensees' quality, diversity of programming and complaints. 
6. Cross media ownership should not be permitted. Minority shareholding could 
be acceptable. 
7. Broadcasting companies need to be customer focused. 
The Jury also recommended: 
• there should be regular consultation with the public about regulation 
• the public should be empowered to have an input 
• the Citizens' Jury system is a cost effective and rapid form of consultation 
• the method of consultation should be interactive like the Jury process 
The Jury also provided the following principles: 
• the public have the right to have a say in broadcasting regulation 
• television broadcasting should be regulated by the public not owners 
• the public should have easier access to complaints procedures 
• those in authority should recognise citizens have wisdom and know the 
difference between right and wrong 
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The Second Waikato Citizens' Jury held 8 July 2000 
Recommendations and conclusions about the proposed new 
Code of Broadcasting Practice for Free-To-Air Television 
Statement One: 
The group of Waikato citizens assessed the Code revision broadly as, firstly giving 
greater overall freedom to television broadcasters to push the standard boundaries of 
acceptable content, due to less carefully defined and specific topic standards, and 
secondly noted a number of ambiguities in different guidelines, a number of 
exclusions, and a more open approach to some standards in other guidelines, than in 
the present Code. 
Statement Two: 
The group generally thought it was harder to follow the intent of different standards in 
the format of the new proposed Code. They suggested this could give members of the 
public problems as they are required to give a specific standard or guideline as a basis 
for any formal complaint to a broadcaster, or any appeal to the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority. This lack of specificity and topic definition could also create difficulties 
for the BSA when assessing whether a breach of any standard in the Code had in fact 
occurred. 
Statement Three: 
The overall group reaction to the television broadcasters' draft was one of 
disappointment. This reaction was based, firstly on the fact that they had observed no 
improvement in the types of programmes being scheduled for broadcast since last year 
(more low budget reality shows masquerading as local content, repeats, lack of in 
depth news coverage etc.), and secondly the revised Code being simplified with some 
present Code areas being deleted, and others ambiguous. Overall, the new proposed 
Code was considered a reworking of the old one in a new format that now blurred the 
definition of those issues included. 
Statement Four: 
The group believes television broadcasters act in a self-regulatory manner for their 
industry with a competitive profit motive their only consideration, and that they 
continue to display no real understanding of viewers' standards or programming 
interests. They thought this attitude was particularly inappropriate from TVNZ, a 
publicly owned organisation, but also that all broadcasters should be required to be 
more viewer aware. They felt under the present circumstances that anything they had 
to say about the draft Code of Practice would be dismissed and have no effect. They 
also suggested that unless the industry was regulated in some manner only a 
noncommercial channel could uphold a generally acceptable standard of programme 
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content and quality and that this would then have an affect on the standards of 
commercial broadcasters. For example, there would be an alternative to the present 
superficial treatment of news and the lack of indepth current affairs being screened. 
Statement Five: 
The group thought public consultation about the Code revision should not have been 
limited to a small number of invited people. They mentioned that many friends had 
expressed an interest in the television code of standards review when told about it. 
The group thought the response process should have at least been widely advertised. 
The group disliked television broadcasters thinking members of the public were 
incapable of reading the draft Code and providing responses. 
They suggested that the format and content of the draft Code, and especially the TBC 
draft policy about Children and Advertising on Television were extremely simplistic, 
especially in contrast to the policy documents most parents now engage with on school 
trustee boards. (Individual comment: broad, nonspecific policy statements like those 
produced by the TBC as a draft programme Code and the draft advertising Code 
would be laughed at and dismissed as inappropriate school operational documents.) 
Statement Six: 
There was discussion about the time of the watershed and also on screen warnings 
before and during AO content. The original Jury decision of two watersheds (one at 
8.30pm and one at l 0.30pm) was discussed and also the option of a single 9pm 
watershed to replace the present 8.30pm placement. No general agreement was 
reached but it was acknowledged it was difficult to protect children from AO content 
when parental rules vary so much. It was considered important that broadcasters 
adhere to the principle of not starting questionable AO content immediately at the 
watershed time to create a 'waterfall'. 
It was suggested that when programme content of an obvious AO nature was being 
screened that any on screen warning should also be screened after ad breaks before a 
programme continued. 
Statement Seven: (Written by a group member on behalf of group). 
The revised Code is much harder to follow with the principles being less defined 
thereby giving broadcasters more flexibility and 'outs' when dealing with marginal 
issues. 
The Code is generally geared towards the rights of the broadcaster rather than the 
rights of the public. 
We still have a consensus of opinion about the standards of broadcasting as decided 
last year as members of the Waikato Citizens' Jury. For example: 
• Regular consultation with the public about regulation 
• Public should be empowered to have an input 
• Television broadcasting should be regulated by public not owners 
• Public should have easier access to complaints procedures 
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• Those in authority should recognise citizens have wisdom and know the difference 
between right and wrong 
The lack of communication between the viewing public and the broadcasters is still 
there. Broadcasters are deciding what 'we want' to view, and also dictate the terms of 
any public input into the review process in a very narrow manner. 
No. I 
Individual Statements written by members of the second 
Waikato Citizens' Jury, 8 July 2000 
The content/principles of the new document give more leeway to broadcasters. There 
are less constraints/guidelines - therefore it is more difficult to pinpoint where 
principles have been breached. There is no mention of to educate and inform to a 
standard that is beneficial to the viewing public. 
The mention of 'observance of good taste and decency according to current norms' 
leaves a broad interpretation, which in the past has led to the breaking down of these 
moral-type issues. A moral code of ethics would clarify meaning of 'good taste and 
decency'. 
There needs to be a consultation with the public on what these broadcasting principles 
should be. Many people are interested and often concerned about the standard/quality 
of programming in New Zealand. Considering the power of the medium of 
broadcasting it is in the public's interest to be able to help set the standards - our voice 
needs to be heard. 
We met as a Citizens' Jury a year ago to discuss these very things. And having 
discussed again these aspects we find we are in agreement that the broadcasters need 
to be proactive in researching viewer opinion. We also have some concerns about the 
quality of programmes and are concerned that this whole thing seems to be driven by 
money and ratings. There is no obligation to supply in-depth information and quality 
programmmg. 
I am also concerned about children's television and advertising. Nos. 4, 5 and 6 
policies of this draft document are contradictory and so broad that whoever wrote it 
seems to have covered the broadcaster for any 'error' in broadcasting 
Signed P.F. 
No. 2 
So long as television and radio are commercially driven our most powerful and 
potentially informative medium will deny its ability to raise the consciousness and 
provide a standard of truth for the majority of our population. To give a person what 
she or he wants is to allow the self-perpetuation of ignorance. 
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Broadcasting should lift a society's standards, not reflect them unless the intellectual, 
moral and cultural level of that democratic society is already at the highest level. 
It is possible to screen programmes for most of the available time which fulfill all the 
criteria of the BSA yet which are harmful as they do not lead us to a greater 
understanding of ourselves, life, or the universe. All good entertainment should be 
instructive and vice versa. 
The BSA should be as much about what is not being presented as much as what is. 
Signed D. B. 
No.3 
We consider that the revised standards are less specific than those they are intended to 
replace, and that they are therefore open to greater abuse by unscrupulous 
broadcasters. Having said that, the broad intent of the standards appears to have 
remained unchanged and we would therefore refer you to our earlier report which 
provides details of the standards we would wish to see put in place. 
We remain strongly of the opinion that the purpose of broadcasting in NZ needs to be 
reviewed at a fundamental level, and particularly that the role it could potentially play 
in educating and informing the public be closely examined. 
We are dismayed at the lack of public consultation over the issue of broadcasting in 
this country and demand to see the matter addressed before any standards or other 
changes to broadcasting practices are passed through legislation. 
Signed A. C. 
No.4 
The draft free-to-air television Code of Broadcasting Practice appears to be essentially 
a rehash of the May 1996 Free-to air Television Programme Code. 
However, the draft Code does not appear to be as detailed or comprehensive as the 
1996 version. and its format is more difficult and ambiguous in its wording and 
therefore is harder to follow. The terms in the draft are more vague, than the 1996 
Code document, which will allow broadcasters more leeway in their ability to fend off 
viewer complaints or concerns. 
The wording in the draft would dissuade a complainant in lodging a protest 
(complaint) and this must be viewed as a serious impediment to the public complaint 
procedure. 
The issue is one of having a clear direction vis-a-vis what constitutes the purpose of 
broadcasting. Presently NZ TV seems to be dollar and rating driven and 
predominantly designed as a purely entertainment medium. There is no serious 
attempt to educate, or raise the social awareness of the population. 
While television has its good points (it stimulates discussion) its cons outweigh its 
benefits and I personally believe it is responsible for the 'dumbing down' of the 
population both at an educational level and in terms of the general level of morality in 
the nation. 
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Government bemoans the brain drain, the crime rate, and other socio-economic 
problems in this country, perhaps the role television has played in contributing to these 
issues is more relevant than it is given credence for. 
The mechanics of the complaint procedure need to be redesigned and the public 
consulted more. 
In conclusion, the concerns raised cannot be addressed until there is a frame of 
reference or defining principle about the purpose of television broadcasting. 
Children need to be protected. If this one area was seriously addressed it would 
impact on the other areas. 
Signed C. J. K. 
No.5 
The revised Code is much harder to follow with the principles are less defined, thereby 
giving broadcasters more flexibility and 'outs' when dealing with marginal issues. 
The draft is generally is geared towards the rights of broadcasters rather than the rights 
of the public. Specific comments: 
4a/b Does not ensure that issues are covered 'fairly and impartially' as 
required in G3-G8 of the 1996 Code, giving freedom for broadcasters to air to 
distorted views/programmes. 
2e Does not prohibit details of methods of suicides. Surely with the rate of youth 
suicide in NZ, in no way should NZ television provide information on how this 
might be accomplished. 
9b ls too general, needs to include the rest of VS 
8f The inclusion of this clause highlights the poor content of children's TV. This 
is an unacceptable condoning of violence. Whether violence is farcical or not, 
children still copy it. 
2f The basic principles of the Bill of Rights need to be spelt out as the general 
public are not familiar with such law. 
If the overall aim/mission of all NZ television broadcasting were to 'inform, educate 
and entertain' for the greater good and education of the public then the broadcasters 
code of standards would follow on from there. 
It seems that regulation is the only method which will achieve this as broadcasters 
have failed so far to attempt this.to achieve this and ensure programme content is 
beneficial to the general public interest. 
The lack of consultation with public regarding the guidelines is of particular 
concern. Having participated in the Jury last year I have a particular interest in this 
issue and yet was unaware of the revision of the Codes. I know from speaking with 
family and friends and associates that the general public is concerned about TV 
content and surrounding issues and they would participate if they knew how. 
(Re children and advertising draft document) 
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There needs to be restrictions on the type and amount of advertising within 
programmes including sponsorship of programmes and product placements within 
shows. 
Signed S. V. 
No.6 
The findings of the Citizens' Jury in 1999 still stand. 
The new draft Code for standards (especially 5b) gives a bigger loophole for 
broadcasters. 
There have been no changes since July 1999. 
There has been no public consultation. It has been prepared for broadcasters and is 
not viewer orientated. 
The standards set the limits or boundaries only. 
I believe the BSA should also set broadcasting content re news, documentaries, 
movies which should include quotas for education, information and entertainment, 
sport, local content.The issue of a broadcasting license would depend on compliance 
with a specified programme content. A change in the Broadcasting Act is required. 
SignedG. L. 
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